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@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ rule deadlineChangeToPreventLateQuorum(uint256 pId, env e, method f, calldataarg
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requireInvariant proposalStateConsistency(pId);
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requireInvariant votesImplySnapshotPassed(pId);
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// This is not (easily) provable because the prover think `_totalSupplyCheckpoints` can arbitrarily change,
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// which causes the quorum() to change. Not sure how to fix that.
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require !quorumReached(pId) <=> getExtendedDeadline(pId) == 0;
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uint256 deadlineBefore = proposalDeadline(pId);
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bool deadlineExtendedBefore = getExtendedDeadline(pId) > 0;
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bool quorumReachedBefore = quorumReached(pId);
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@ -48,7 +52,7 @@ rule deadlineChangeToPreventLateQuorum(uint256 pId, env e, method f, calldataarg
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) || (
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!deadlineExtendedBefore &&
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deadlineExtendedAfter &&
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// !quorumReachedBefore && // Not sure how to prove that
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!quorumReachedBefore && // Not sure how to prove that
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quorumReachedAfter &&
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deadlineAfter == clock(e) + lateQuorumVoteExtension() &&
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votingAll(f)
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