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This commit is contained in:
Hadrien Croubois
2023-03-15 17:13:14 +01:00
parent 4ea73a8c05
commit 50a13d52b9
1 changed files with 1 additions and 6 deletions
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7
certora/specs/GovernorPreventLateQuorum.spec
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@ -26,11 +26,6 @@ rule deadlineChangeToPreventLateQuorum(uint256 pId, env e, method f, calldataarg
requireInvariant proposalStateConsistency(pId);
requireInvariant votesImplySnapshotPassed(pId);
// This should be a direct consequence of the invariant: `getExtendedDeadline(pId) > 0 => quorumReached(pId)`
// But this is not (easily) provable because the prover think `_totalSupplyCheckpoints` can arbitrarily change,
// which causes the quorum() to change. Not sure how to fix that.
require !quorumReached(pId) => getExtendedDeadline(pId) == 0;
uint256 deadlineBefore = proposalDeadline(pId);
bool deadlineExtendedBefore = getExtendedDeadline(pId) > 0;
bool quorumReachedBefore = quorumReached(pId);
@ -53,7 +48,7 @@ rule deadlineChangeToPreventLateQuorum(uint256 pId, env e, method f, calldataarg
) || (
!deadlineExtendedBefore &&
deadlineExtendedAfter &&
!quorumReachedBefore &&
// !quorumReachedBefore && // Not sure how to prove that
quorumReachedAfter &&
deadlineAfter == clock(e) + lateQuorumVoteExtension() &&
votingAll(f)