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Author SHA1 Message Date
9188faa2fa 3.0.0-beta.0 2020-02-14 13:45:10 -03:00
860 changed files with 49263 additions and 92696 deletions

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@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
{
"$schema": "https://unpkg.com/@changesets/config@2.3.0/schema.json",
"changelog": [
"@changesets/changelog-github",
{
"repo": "OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts"
}
],
"commit": false,
"access": "public",
"baseBranch": "master"
}

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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
'openzeppelin-solidity': minor
---
`Strings`: Add `parseUint`, `parseInt`, `parseHexUint` and `parseAddress` to parse strings into numbers and addresses. Also provide variants of these functions that parse substrings, and `tryXxx` variants that do not revert on invalid input.

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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
"openzeppelin-solidity": minor
---
`Clones`: Add `cloneWithImmutableArgs` and `cloneDeterministicWithImmutableArgs` variants that create clones with per-instance immutable arguments. The immutable arguments can be retrieved using `fetchCloneArgs`. The corresponding `predictDeterministicWithImmutableArgs` function is also included.

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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
'openzeppelin-solidity': patch
---
`VotesExtended`: Create an extension of `Votes` which checkpoints balances and delegates.

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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
'openzeppelin-solidity': minor
---
`CAIP2` and `CAIP10`: Add libraries for formatting and parsing CAIP-2 and CAIP-10 identifiers.

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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
'openzeppelin-solidity': minor
---
`Packing`: Add variants for packing `bytes10` and `bytes22`

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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
'openzeppelin-solidity': minor
---
`NoncesKeyed`: Add a variant of `Nonces` that implements the ERC-4337 entrypoint nonce system.

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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
'openzeppelin-solidity': patch
---
`GovernorCountingOverridable`: Add a governor counting module that enables token holders to override the vote of their delegate.

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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
'openzeppelin-solidity': minor
---
`Bytes`: Add a library of common operations that operate on `bytes` objects.

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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
'openzeppelin-solidity': patch
---
Update some pragma directives to ensure that all file requirements match that of the files they import.

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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
'openzeppelin-solidity': minor
---
`ERC7579Utils`: Add a reusable library to interact with ERC-7579 modular accounts

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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
'openzeppelin-solidity': minor
---
`ERC1363Utils`: Add helper similar to the existing `ERC721Utils` and `ERC1155Utils`

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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
'openzeppelin-solidity': minor
---
`ERC4337Utils`: Add a reusable library to manipulate user operations and interact with ERC-4337 contracts

84
.circleci/config.yml Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
version: 2
# 2.1 does not yet support local run
# unless with workaround. For simplicity just use it.
# https://github.com/CircleCI-Public/circleci-cli/issues/79
aliases:
- &defaults
docker:
- image: circleci/node:10
- &cache_key_node_modules
key: v1-node_modules-{{ checksum "package-lock.json" }}
jobs:
dependencies:
<<: *defaults
steps:
- checkout
- restore_cache:
<<: *cache_key_node_modules
- run:
name: Install npm dependencies and prepare
command: |
if [ ! -d node_modules ]; then
npm ci
else
npm run prepare
fi
- persist_to_workspace:
root: .
paths:
- node_modules
- build
- save_cache:
paths:
- node_modules
<<: *cache_key_node_modules
lint:
<<: *defaults
steps:
- checkout
- attach_workspace:
at: .
- run:
name: Linter
command: npm run lint
test:
<<: *defaults
steps:
- checkout
- attach_workspace:
at: .
- run:
name: Unit tests
command: npm run test
coverage:
<<: *defaults
steps:
- checkout
- attach_workspace:
at: .
- run:
name: Unit tests with coverage report
command: npm run coverage
# TODO(xinbenlv, #1839): run SOLC_NIGHTLY to be run but allow it to fail.
workflows:
version: 2
everything:
jobs:
- dependencies
- lint:
requires:
- dependencies
- test:
requires:
- dependencies
- coverage:
requires:
- dependencies

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@ -1,16 +1,3 @@
comment: off
github_checks:
annotations: false
coverage:
status:
patch:
default:
target: 95%
only_pulls: true
project:
default:
threshold: 1%
ignore:
- "test"
- "contracts/mocks"
- "contracts/vendor"
range: "100...100"

7
.dependabot/config.yml Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
version: 1
update_configs:
- package_manager: "javascript"
directory: "/"
update_schedule: "weekly"
version_requirement_updates: "increase_versions"

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@ -8,14 +8,10 @@ charset = utf-8
end_of_line = lf
indent_style = space
insert_final_newline = true
trim_trailing_whitespace = false
max_line_length = 120
trim_trailing_whitespace = true
[*.sol]
indent_size = 4
[*.js]
indent_size = 2
[*.{adoc,md}]
max_line_length = 0

62
.eslintrc Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
{
"extends" : [
"standard",
"plugin:promise/recommended",
],
"plugins": [
"mocha-no-only",
"promise",
],
"env": {
"browser" : true,
"node" : true,
"mocha" : true,
"jest" : true,
},
"globals" : {
"artifacts": false,
"contract": false,
"assert": false,
"web3": false,
},
"rules": {
// Strict mode
"strict": ["error", "global"],
// Code style
"array-bracket-spacing": ["off"],
"camelcase": ["error", {"properties": "always"}],
"comma-dangle": ["error", "always-multiline"],
"comma-spacing": ["error", {"before": false, "after": true}],
"dot-notation": ["error", {"allowKeywords": true, "allowPattern": ""}],
"eol-last": ["error", "always"],
"eqeqeq": ["error", "smart"],
"generator-star-spacing": ["error", "before"],
"indent": ["error", 2],
"linebreak-style": ["error", "unix"],
"max-len": ["error", 120, 2],
"no-debugger": "off",
"no-dupe-args": "error",
"no-dupe-keys": "error",
"no-mixed-spaces-and-tabs": ["error", "smart-tabs"],
"no-redeclare": ["error", {"builtinGlobals": true}],
"no-trailing-spaces": ["error", { "skipBlankLines": false }],
"no-undef": "error",
"no-use-before-define": "off",
"no-var": "error",
"object-curly-spacing": ["error", "always"],
"prefer-const": "error",
"quotes": ["error", "single"],
"semi": ["error", "always"],
"space-before-function-paren": ["error", "always"],
"mocha-no-only/mocha-no-only": ["error"],
"promise/always-return": "off",
"promise/avoid-new": "off",
},
"parserOptions": {
"ecmaVersion": 2018
}
}

1
.gitattributes vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1 @@
*.sol linguist-language=Solidity

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@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
if [ "${CI:-"false"}" != "true" ]; then
npm run test:generation
npm run lint
fi

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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ about: Report a bug in OpenZeppelin Contracts
**💻 Environment**
<!-- Tell us what version of OpenZeppelin Contracts you're using, and how you're using it: Hardhat, Remix, etc. -->
<!-- Tell us what version of OpenZeppelin Contracts you're using, and how you're using it: Truffle, Remix, etc. -->
**📝 Details**

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@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
contact_links:
- name: Questions & Support Requests
url: https://forum.openzeppelin.com/c/support/contracts/18
about: Ask in the OpenZeppelin Forum

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@ -10,5 +10,5 @@ about: Suggest an idea for OpenZeppelin Contracts
**📝 Details**
<!-- Please describe your feature request in detail. -->
<!-- Make sure that you have reviewed the OpenZeppelin Contracts Contributor Guidelines. -->
<!-- Make sure that you have reviewed the OpenZeppelin Contributor Guidelines. -->
<!-- https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md -->

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@ -1,20 +1,22 @@
<!-- Thank you for your interest in contributing to OpenZeppelin! -->
<!-- 0. 🎉 Thank you for submitting a PR! -->
<!-- Consider opening an issue for discussion prior to submitting a PR. -->
<!-- New features will be merged faster if they were first discussed and designed with the team. -->
<!-- 1. Does this close any open issues? Please list them below. -->
Fixes #???? <!-- Fill in with issue number -->
<!-- Keep in mind that new features have a better chance of being merged fast if
they were first discussed and designed with the maintainers. If there is no
corresponding issue, please consider opening one for discussion first! -->
<!-- Describe the changes introduced in this pull request. -->
<!-- Include any context necessary for understanding the PR's purpose. -->
Fixes #
<!-- 2. Describe the changes introduced in this pull request. -->
<!-- Include any context necessary for understanding the PR's purpose. -->
#### PR Checklist
<!-- Before merging the pull request all of the following must be complete. -->
<!-- Feel free to submit a PR or Draft PR even if some items are pending. -->
<!-- Some of the items may not apply. -->
- [ ] Tests
- [ ] Documentation
- [ ] Changeset entry (run `npx changeset add`)
<!-- 3. Before submitting, please make sure that you have:
- reviewed the OpenZeppelin Contributor Guidelines
(https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md),
- added tests where applicable to test new functionality,
- made sure that your contracts are well-documented,
- run the Solidity linter (`npm run lint:sol`) and fixed any issues,
- run the JS linter and fixed any issues (`npm run lint:fix`), and
- updated the changelog, if applicable.
-->

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@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
name: Compare gas costs
description: Compare gas costs between branches
inputs:
token:
description: github token
required: true
report:
description: report to read from
required: false
default: gasReporterOutput.json
out_report:
description: report to read
required: false
default: ${{ github.ref_name }}.gasreport.json
ref_report:
description: report to read from
required: false
default: ${{ github.base_ref }}.gasreport.json
runs:
using: composite
steps:
- name: Download reference report
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
run: |
RUN_ID=`gh run list --repo ${{ github.repository }} --branch ${{ github.base_ref }} --workflow ${{ github.workflow }} --limit 100 --json 'conclusion,databaseId,event' --jq 'map(select(.conclusion=="success" and .event!="pull_request"))[0].databaseId'`
gh run download ${RUN_ID} --repo ${{ github.repository }} -n gasreport
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.token }}
shell: bash
continue-on-error: true
id: reference
- name: Compare reports
if: steps.reference.outcome == 'success' && github.event_name == 'pull_request'
run: |
node scripts/checks/compareGasReports.js ${{ inputs.report }} ${{ inputs.ref_report }} >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
env:
STYLE: markdown
shell: bash
- name: Rename report for upload
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'
run: |
mv ${{ inputs.report }} ${{ inputs.out_report }}
shell: bash
- name: Save report
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: gasreport
path: ${{ inputs.out_report }}

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@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
name: Setup
description: Common environment setup
runs:
using: composite
steps:
- uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with:
node-version: 20.x
- uses: actions/cache@v4
id: cache
with:
path: '**/node_modules'
key: npm-v3-${{ hashFiles('**/package-lock.json') }}
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci
shell: bash
if: steps.cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
- name: Install Foundry
uses: foundry-rs/foundry-toolchain@v1
with:
version: nightly

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@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
name: Compare storage layouts
description: Compare storage layouts between branches
inputs:
token:
description: github token
required: true
buildinfo:
description: compilation artifacts
required: false
default: artifacts/build-info/*.json
layout:
description: extracted storage layout
required: false
default: HEAD.layout.json
out_layout:
description: storage layout to upload
required: false
default: ${{ github.ref_name }}.layout.json
ref_layout:
description: storage layout for the reference branch
required: false
default: ${{ github.base_ref }}.layout.json
runs:
using: composite
steps:
- name: Extract layout
run: |
node scripts/checks/extract-layout.js ${{ inputs.buildinfo }} > ${{ inputs.layout }}
shell: bash
- name: Download reference
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
run: |
RUN_ID=`gh run list --repo ${{ github.repository }} --branch ${{ github.base_ref }} --workflow ${{ github.workflow }} --limit 100 --json 'conclusion,databaseId,event' --jq 'map(select(.conclusion=="success" and .event!="pull_request"))[0].databaseId'`
gh run download ${RUN_ID} --repo ${{ github.repository }} -n layout
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.token }}
shell: bash
continue-on-error: true
id: reference
- name: Compare layouts
if: steps.reference.outcome == 'success' && github.event_name == 'pull_request'
run: |
node scripts/checks/compare-layout.js --head ${{ inputs.layout }} --ref ${{ inputs.ref_layout }}
shell: bash
- name: Rename artifacts for upload
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'
run: |
mv ${{ inputs.layout }} ${{ inputs.out_layout }}
shell: bash
- name: Save artifacts
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: layout
path: ${{ inputs.out_layout }}

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.github/stale.yml vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
# Configuration for probot-stale - https://github.com/probot/stale
# Number of days of inactivity before an Issue or Pull Request becomes stale
daysUntilStale: 15
# Number of days of inactivity before an Issue or Pull Request with the stale label is closed.
# Set to false to disable. If disabled, issues still need to be closed manually, but will remain marked as stale.
daysUntilClose: 15
# Issues or Pull Requests with these labels will never be considered stale. Set to `[]` to disable
exemptLabels:
- on hold
- meta
# Set to true to ignore issues in a project (defaults to false)
exemptProjects: false
# Set to true to ignore issues in a milestone (defaults to false)
exemptMilestones: false
# Set to true to ignore issues with an assignee (defaults to false)
exemptAssignees: false
# Label to use when marking as stale
staleLabel: stale
# Comment to post when marking as stale. Set to `false` to disable
markComment: >
Hi all!
This Pull Request has not had any recent activity, is it still relevant? If so, what is blocking it?
Is there anything we can do to help move it forward?
Thanks!
# Comment to post when removing the stale label.
# unmarkComment: >
# Your comment here.
# Comment to post when closing a stale Issue or Pull Request.
closeComment: >
Hi folks!
This Pull Request is being closed as there was no response to the previous prompt.
However, please leave a comment whenever you're ready to resume, so it can be reopened.
Thanks again!
# Limit the number of actions per hour, from 1-30. Default is 30
limitPerRun: 30
# Limit to only `issues` or `pulls`
only: pulls
# Optionally, specify configuration settings that are specific to just 'issues' or 'pulls':
# pulls:
# daysUntilStale: 30
# markComment: >
# This pull request has been automatically marked as stale because it has not had
# recent activity. It will be closed if no further activity occurs. Thank you
# for your contributions.
# issues:
# exemptLabels:
# - confirmed

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@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
name: lint workflows
on:
pull_request:
paths:
- '.github/**/*.ya?ml'
jobs:
lint:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Add problem matchers
run: |
# https://github.com/rhysd/actionlint/blob/3a2f2c7/docs/usage.md#problem-matchers
curl -LO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rhysd/actionlint/main/.github/actionlint-matcher.json
echo "::add-matcher::actionlint-matcher.json"
- uses: docker://rhysd/actionlint:latest

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@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
name: changeset
on:
pull_request:
branches:
- master
types:
- opened
- synchronize
- labeled
- unlabeled
concurrency:
group: changeset-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
check:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: ${{ !contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'ignore-changeset') }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0 # Include history so Changesets finds merge-base
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- name: Check changeset
run: npx changeset status --since=origin/${{ github.base_ref }}

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@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
name: checks
on:
push:
branches:
- master
- next-v*
- release-v*
pull_request: {}
workflow_dispatch: {}
concurrency:
group: checks-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
NODE_OPTIONS: --max_old_space_size=8192
jobs:
lint:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- run: npm run lint
tests:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
env:
FORCE_COLOR: 1
# Needed for "eth-gas-reporter" to produce a "gasReporterOutput.json" as documented in
# https://github.com/cgewecke/eth-gas-reporter/blob/v0.2.27/docs/gasReporterOutput.md
CI: true
GAS: true
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- name: Run tests and generate gas report
run: npm run test
- name: Check linearisation of the inheritance graph
run: npm run test:inheritance
- name: Check pragma consistency between files
run: npm run test:pragma
- name: Check proceduraly generated contracts are up-to-date
run: npm run test:generation
- name: Compare gas costs
uses: ./.github/actions/gas-compare
with:
token: ${{ github.token }}
tests-upgradeable:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
env:
FORCE_COLOR: 1
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0 # Include history so patch conflicts are resolved automatically
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- name: Copy non-upgradeable contracts as dependency
run: |
mkdir -p lib/openzeppelin-contracts
cp -rnT contracts lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts
- name: Transpile to upgradeable
run: bash scripts/upgradeable/transpile.sh
- name: Run tests
run: npm run test
- name: Check linearisation of the inheritance graph
run: npm run test:inheritance
- name: Check pragma consistency between files
run: npm run test:pragma
- name: Check storage layout
uses: ./.github/actions/storage-layout
continue-on-error: ${{ contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'breaking change') }}
with:
token: ${{ github.token }}
tests-foundry:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- name: Run tests
run: forge test -vv
coverage:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- name: Run coverage
run: npm run coverage
- uses: codecov/codecov-action@v4
env:
CODECOV_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }}
harnesses:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- name: Compile harnesses
run: |
make -C certora apply
npm run compile:harnesses
slither:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- run: rm foundry.toml
- uses: crytic/slither-action@v0.4.0
with:
node-version: 18.15
slither-version: 0.10.1
codespell:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Run CodeSpell
uses: codespell-project/actions-codespell@v2.1
with:
check_hidden: true
check_filenames: true
skip: package-lock.json,*.pdf,vendor

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@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
name: Build Docs
on:
push:
branches: [release-v*]
permissions:
contents: write
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- run: bash scripts/git-user-config.sh
- run: node scripts/update-docs-branch.js
- run: git push --all origin

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@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
name: formal verification
on:
pull_request:
types:
- opened
- reopened
- synchronize
- labeled
workflow_dispatch: {}
env:
PIP_VERSION: '3.11'
JAVA_VERSION: '11'
SOLC_VERSION: '0.8.20'
concurrency: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
jobs:
apply-diff:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Apply patches
run: make -C certora apply
verify:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'formal-verification')
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- name: identify specs that need to be run
id: arguments
run: |
if [[ ${{ github.event_name }} = 'pull_request' ]];
then
RESULT=$(git diff ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}..${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }} --name-only certora/specs/*.spec | while IFS= read -r file; do [[ -f $file ]] && basename "${file%.spec}"; done | tr "\n" " ")
else
RESULT='--all'
fi
echo "result=$RESULT" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Install python
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: ${{ env.PIP_VERSION }}
cache: 'pip'
cache-dependency-path: 'fv-requirements.txt'
- name: Install python packages
run: pip install -r fv-requirements.txt
- name: Install java
uses: actions/setup-java@v3
with:
distribution: temurin
java-version: ${{ env.JAVA_VERSION }}
- name: Install solc
run: |
wget https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases/download/v${{ env.SOLC_VERSION }}/solc-static-linux
sudo mv solc-static-linux /usr/local/bin/solc
chmod +x /usr/local/bin/solc
- name: Verify specification
run: |
make -C certora apply
node certora/run.js ${{ steps.arguments.outputs.result }} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
env:
CERTORAKEY: ${{ secrets.CERTORAKEY }}
halmos:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- name: Install python
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: ${{ env.PIP_VERSION }}
cache: 'pip'
cache-dependency-path: 'fv-requirements.txt'
- name: Install python packages
run: pip install -r fv-requirements.txt
- name: Run Halmos
run: halmos --match-test '^symbolic|^testSymbolic' -vv

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@ -1,212 +0,0 @@
# D: Manual Dispatch
# M: Merge release PR
# C: Commit
# ┌───────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐
# │Development├──D──►RC-Unreleased│ ┌──►Final-Unreleased│
# └───────────┘ └─┬─────────▲─┘ │ └─┬────────────▲─┘
# │ │ │ │ │
# M C D M C
# │ │ │ │ │
# ┌▼─────────┴┐ │ ┌▼────────────┴┐
# │RC-Released├───┘ │Final-Released│
# └───────────┘ └──────────────┘
name: Release Cycle
on:
push:
branches:
- release-v*
workflow_dispatch: {}
concurrency: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
jobs:
state:
name: Check state
permissions:
pull-requests: read
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- id: state
name: Get state
uses: actions/github-script@v7
env:
TRIGGERING_ACTOR: ${{ github.triggering_actor }}
with:
result-encoding: string
script: await require('./scripts/release/workflow/state.js')({ github, context, core })
outputs:
# Job Flags
start: ${{ steps.state.outputs.start }}
changesets: ${{ steps.state.outputs.changesets }}
promote: ${{ steps.state.outputs.promote }}
publish: ${{ steps.state.outputs.publish }}
merge: ${{ steps.state.outputs.merge }}
# Global variables
is_prerelease: ${{ steps.state.outputs.is_prerelease }}
start:
needs: state
name: Start new release candidate
permissions:
contents: write
actions: write
if: needs.state.outputs.start == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- run: bash scripts/git-user-config.sh
- id: start
name: Create branch with release candidate
run: bash scripts/release/workflow/start.sh
- name: Re-run workflow
uses: actions/github-script@v7
env:
REF: ${{ steps.start.outputs.branch }}
with:
script: await require('./scripts/release/workflow/rerun.js')({ github, context })
promote:
needs: state
name: Promote to final release
permissions:
contents: write
actions: write
if: needs.state.outputs.promote == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- run: bash scripts/git-user-config.sh
- name: Exit prerelease state
if: needs.state.outputs.is_prerelease == 'true'
run: bash scripts/release/workflow/exit-prerelease.sh
- name: Re-run workflow
uses: actions/github-script@v7
with:
script: await require('./scripts/release/workflow/rerun.js')({ github, context })
changesets:
needs: state
name: Update PR to release
permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
if: needs.state.outputs.changesets == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0 # To get all tags
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- name: Set release title
uses: actions/github-script@v7
with:
result-encoding: string
script: await require('./scripts/release/workflow/set-changesets-pr-title.js')({ core })
- name: Create PR
uses: changesets/action@v1
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
PRERELEASE: ${{ needs.state.outputs.is_prerelease }}
with:
version: npm run version
title: ${{ env.TITLE }}
commit: ${{ env.TITLE }}
body: | # Wait for support on this https://github.com/changesets/action/pull/250
This is an automated PR for releasing ${{ github.repository }}
Check [CHANGELOG.md](${{ github.repository }}/CHANGELOG.md)
publish:
needs: state
name: Publish to npm
environment: npm
permissions:
contents: write
if: needs.state.outputs.publish == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- id: pack
name: Pack
run: bash scripts/release/workflow/pack.sh
env:
PRERELEASE: ${{ needs.state.outputs.is_prerelease }}
- name: Upload tarball artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: ${{ github.ref_name }}
path: ${{ steps.pack.outputs.tarball }}
- name: Publish
run: bash scripts/release/workflow/publish.sh
env:
NPM_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
TARBALL: ${{ steps.pack.outputs.tarball }}
TAG: ${{ steps.pack.outputs.tag }}
- name: Create Github Release
uses: actions/github-script@v7
env:
PRERELEASE: ${{ needs.state.outputs.is_prerelease }}
with:
script: await require('./scripts/release/workflow/github-release.js')({ github, context })
outputs:
tarball_name: ${{ steps.pack.outputs.tarball_name }}
integrity_check:
needs: publish
name: Tarball Integrity Check
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Download tarball artifact
id: artifact
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: ${{ github.ref_name }}
- name: Check integrity
run: bash scripts/release/workflow/integrity-check.sh
env:
TARBALL: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.download-path }}/${{ needs.publish.outputs.tarball_name }}
merge:
needs: state
name: Create PR back to master
permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
if: needs.state.outputs.merge == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
env:
MERGE_BRANCH: merge/${{ github.ref_name }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0 # All branches
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- run: bash scripts/git-user-config.sh
- name: Create branch to merge
run: |
git checkout -B "$MERGE_BRANCH" "$GITHUB_REF_NAME"
git push -f origin "$MERGE_BRANCH"
- name: Create PR back to master
uses: actions/github-script@v7
with:
script: |
await github.rest.pulls.create({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
head: process.env.MERGE_BRANCH,
base: 'master',
title: '${{ format('Merge {0} branch', github.ref_name) }}'
});

View File

@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
name: transpile upgradeable
on:
push:
branches:
- master
- release-v*
jobs:
transpile:
environment: push-upgradeable
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
repository: OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts-upgradeable
fetch-depth: 0
token: ${{ secrets.GH_TOKEN_UPGRADEABLE }}
- name: Fetch current non-upgradeable branch
run: |
git fetch "$REMOTE" master # Fetch default branch first for patch to apply cleanly
git fetch "$REMOTE" "$REF"
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
env:
REF: ${{ github.ref }}
REMOTE: https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}.git
- name: Set up environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
- run: bash scripts/git-user-config.sh
- name: Transpile to upgradeable
run: bash scripts/upgradeable/transpile-onto.sh ${{ github.ref_name }} origin/${{ github.ref_name }}
env:
SUBMODULE_REMOTE: https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}.git
- run: git push origin ${{ github.ref_name }}

26
.gitignore vendored
View File

@ -29,9 +29,15 @@ npm-debug.log
# local env variables
.env
# truffle build directory
build/
# macOS
.DS_Store
# truffle
.node-xmlhttprequest-*
# IntelliJ IDE
.idea
@ -44,23 +50,3 @@ contracts/README.md
# temporary artifact from solidity-coverage
allFiredEvents
.coverage_artifacts
.coverage_cache
.coverage_contracts
# hardat-exposed
contracts-exposed
# Hardhat
/cache
/artifacts
# Foundry
/out
/cache_forge
# Certora
.certora*
.last_confs
certora_*
.zip-output-url.txt

10
.gitmodules vendored
View File

@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
[submodule "lib/forge-std"]
branch = v1
path = lib/forge-std
url = https://github.com/foundry-rs/forge-std
[submodule "lib/erc4626-tests"]
path = lib/erc4626-tests
url = https://github.com/a16z/erc4626-tests.git
[submodule "lib/halmos-cheatcodes"]
path = lib/halmos-cheatcodes
url = https://github.com/a16z/halmos-cheatcodes

View File

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
module.exports = {
require: 'hardhat/register',
timeout: 4000,
};

View File

@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
{
"printWidth": 120,
"singleQuote": true,
"trailingComma": "all",
"arrowParens": "avoid",
"overrides": [
{
"files": "*.sol",
"options": {
"singleQuote": false
}
}
],
"plugins": ["prettier-plugin-solidity"]
}

View File

@ -1,21 +1,8 @@
module.exports = {
norpc: true,
testCommand: 'npm test',
compileCommand: 'npm run compile',
skipFiles: ['mocks'],
providerOptions: {
default_balance_ether: '10000000000000000000000000',
},
mocha: {
fgrep: '[skip-on-coverage]',
invert: true,
},
// Work around stack too deep for coverage
configureYulOptimizer: true,
solcOptimizerDetails: {
yul: true,
yulDetails: {
optimizerSteps: '',
},
},
};
norpc: true,
testCommand: 'npm test',
compileCommand: 'npm run compile',
skipFiles: [
'mocks',
]
}

9
.solhint.json Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
{
"extends": "solhint:recommended",
"rules": {
"func-order": "off",
"mark-callable-contracts": "off",
"no-empty-blocks": "off",
"compiler-version": ["error", "^0.6.0"]
}
}

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ In the interest of fostering an open and welcoming environment, we as
contributors and maintainers pledge to making participation in our project and
our community a harassment-free experience for everyone, regardless of age, body
size, disability, ethnicity, sex characteristics, gender identity and expression,
level of experience, education, socioeconomic status, nationality, personal
level of experience, education, socio-economic status, nationality, personal
appearance, race, religion, or sexual identity and orientation.
## Our Standards
@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ further defined and clarified by project maintainers.
## Enforcement
Instances of abusive, harassing, or otherwise unacceptable behavior may be
reported by contacting the project team at contact@openzeppelin.com. All
reported by contacting the project team at maintainers@openzeppelin.org. All
complaints will be reviewed and investigated and will result in a response that
is deemed necessary and appropriate to the circumstances. The project team is
obligated to maintain confidentiality with regard to the reporter of an incident.

69
CODE_STYLE.md Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
# Code Style
We value clean code and consistency, and those are prerequisites for us to
include new code in the repository. Before proposing a change, please read this
document and take some time to familiarize yourself with the style of the
existing codebase.
## Solidity code
In order to be consistent with all the other Solidity projects, we follow the
[official recommendations documented in the Solidity style guide](http://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/style-guide.html).
Any exception or additions specific to our project are documented below.
### Naming
* Try to avoid acronyms and abbreviations.
* All state variables should be private.
* Private state variables should have an underscore prefix.
```
contract TestContract {
uint256 private _privateVar;
uint256 internal _internalVar;
}
```
* Parameters must not be prefixed with an underscore.
```
function test(uint256 testParameter1, uint256 testParameter2) {
...
}
```
* Internal and private functions should have an underscore prefix.
```
function _testInternal() internal {
...
}
```
```
function _testPrivate() private {
...
}
```
* Events should be emitted immediately after the state change that they
represent, and consequently they should be named in past tense.
```
function _burn(address _who, uint256 _value) internal {
super._burn(_who, _value);
emit TokensBurned(_who, _value);
}
```
Some standards (e.g. ERC20) use present tense, and in those cases the
standard specification prevails.
* Interface names should have a capital I prefix.
```
interface IERC777 {
```

View File

@ -1,36 +1,71 @@
# Contributing Guidelines
Contributing to OpenZeppelin Contracts
=======
There are many ways to contribute to OpenZeppelin Contracts.
We really appreciate and value contributions to OpenZeppelin Contracts. Please take 5' to review the items listed below to make sure that your contributions are merged as soon as possible.
## Troubleshooting
## Contribution guidelines
You can help other users in the community to solve their smart contract issues in the [OpenZeppelin Forum].
Smart contracts manage value and are highly vulnerable to errors and attacks. We have very strict [guidelines], please make sure to review them!
[OpenZeppelin Forum]: https://forum.openzeppelin.com/
## Creating Pull Requests (PRs)
## Opening an issue
As a contributor, you are expected to fork this repository, work on your own fork and then submit pull requests. The pull requests will be reviewed and eventually merged into the main repo. See ["Fork-a-Repo"](https://help.github.com/articles/fork-a-repo/) for how this works.
You can [open an issue] to suggest a feature or report a minor bug. For serious bugs please do not open an issue, instead refer to our [security policy] for appropriate steps.
## A typical workflow
If you believe your issue may be due to user error and not a problem in the library, consider instead posting a question on the [OpenZeppelin Forum].
1) Make sure your fork is up to date with the main repository:
Before opening an issue, be sure to search through the existing open and closed issues, and consider posting a comment in one of those instead.
```
cd openzeppelin-contracts
git remote add upstream https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts.git
git fetch upstream
git pull --rebase upstream master
```
NOTE: The directory `openzeppelin-contracts` represents your fork's local copy.
When requesting a new feature, include as many details as you can, especially around the use cases that motivate it. Features are prioritized according to the impact they may have on the ecosystem, so we appreciate information showing that the impact could be high.
2) Branch out from `master` into `fix/some-bug-#123`:
(Postfixing #123 will associate your PR with the issue #123 and make everyone's life easier =D)
```
git checkout -b fix/some-bug-#123
```
[security policy]: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/security
[open an issue]: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/issues/new/choose
3) Make your changes, add your files, commit, and push to your fork.
## Submitting a pull request
```
git add SomeFile.js
git commit "Fix some bug #123"
git push origin fix/some-bug-#123
```
If you would like to contribute code or documentation you may do so by forking the repository and submitting a pull request.
4) Run tests, linter, etc. This can be done by running local continuous integration and make sure it passes.
Any non-trivial code contribution must be first discussed with the maintainers in an issue (see [Opening an issue](#opening-an-issue)). Only very minor changes are accepted without prior discussion.
```bash
npm test
npm run lint
```
Make sure to read and follow the [engineering guidelines](./GUIDELINES.md). Run linter and tests to make sure your pull request is good before submitting it.
or you can simply run CircleCI locally
```bash
circleci local execute --job build
circleci local execute --job test
```
*Note*: requires installing CircleCI and docker locally on your machine.
Changelog entries should be added to each pull request by using [Changesets](https://github.com/changesets/changesets/).
5) Go to [github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts) in your web browser and issue a new pull request.
When opening the pull request you will be presented with a template and a series of instructions. Read through it carefully and follow all the steps. Expect a review and feedback from the maintainers afterwards.
*IMPORTANT* Read the PR template very carefully and make sure to follow all the instructions. These instructions
refer to some very important conditions that your PR must meet in order to be accepted, such as making sure that all tests pass, JS linting tests pass, Solidity linting tests pass, etc.
If you're looking for a good place to start, look for issues labelled ["good first issue"](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/labels/good%20first%20issue)!
6) Maintainers will review your code and possibly ask for changes before your code is pulled in to the main repository. We'll check that all tests pass, review the coding style, and check for general code correctness. If everything is OK, we'll merge your pull request and your code will be part of OpenZeppelin.
*IMPORTANT* Please pay attention to the maintainer's feedback, since its a necessary step to keep up with the standards OpenZeppelin attains to.
## All set!
If you have any questions, feel free to post them to github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/issues.
Finally, if you're looking to collaborate and want to find easy tasks to start, look at the issues we marked as ["Good first issue"](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/labels/good%20first%20issue).
Thanks for your time and code!
[guidelines]: GUIDELINES.md

View File

@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ program that extracts the API Reference from source code.
The [`docs.openzeppelin.com`](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/docs.openzeppelin.com)
repository hosts the configuration for the entire site, which includes
documentation for all of the OpenZeppelin projects.
documetation for all of the OpenZeppelin projects.
To run the docs locally you should run `npm run docs:watch` on this
To run the docs locally you should run `npm run docs start` on this
repository.

View File

@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
{
"drips": {
"ethereum": {
"ownedBy": "0xAeb37910f93486C85A1F8F994b67E8187554d664"
}
}
}

View File

@ -1,155 +1,64 @@
# Engineering Guidelines
Design Guidelines
=======
## Testing
These are some global design goals in OpenZeppelin.
Code must be thoroughly tested with quality unit tests.
#### D0 - Security in Depth
We strive to provide secure, tested, audited code. To achieve this, we need to match intention with function. Thus, documentation, code clarity, community review and security discussions are fundamental.
We defer to the [Moloch Testing Guide](https://github.com/MolochVentures/moloch/tree/master/test#readme) for specific recommendations, though not all of it is relevant here. Note the introduction:
#### D1 - Simple and Modular
Simpler code means easier audits, and better understanding of what each component does. We look for small files, small contracts, and small functions. If you can separate a contract into two independent functionalities you should probably do it.
> Tests should be written, not only to verify correctness of the target code, but to be comprehensively reviewed by other programmers. Therefore, for mission critical Solidity code, the quality of the tests are just as important (if not more so) than the code itself, and should be written with the highest standards of clarity and elegance.
#### D2 - Naming Matters
Every addition or change to the code must come with relevant and comprehensive tests.
We take our time with picking names. Code is going to be written once, and read hundreds of times. Renaming for clarity is encouraged.
Refactors should avoid simultaneous changes to tests.
#### D3 - Tests
Flaky tests are not acceptable.
Write tests for all your code. We encourage Test Driven Development so we know when our code is right. Even though not all code in the repository is tested at the moment, we aim to test every line of code in the future.
The test suite should run automatically for every change in the repository, and in pull requests tests must pass before merging.
#### D4 - Check preconditions and post-conditions
The test suite coverage must be kept as close to 100% as possible, enforced in pull requests.
A very important way to prevent vulnerabilities is to catch a contracts inconsistent state as early as possible. This is why we want functions to check pre- and post-conditions for executing its logic. When writing code, ask yourself what you are expecting to be true before and after the function runs, and express it in code.
In some cases unit tests may be insufficient and complementary techniques should be used:
#### D5 - Code Consistency
1. Property-based tests (aka. fuzzing) for math-heavy code.
2. Formal verification for state machines.
Consistency on the way classes are used is paramount to an easier understanding of the library. The codebase should be as unified as possible. Read existing code and get inspired before you write your own. Follow the style guidelines. Dont hesitate to ask for help on how to best write a specific piece of code.
## Code style
#### D6 - Regular Audits
Following good programming practices is a way to reduce the risk of vulnerabilities, but professional code audits are still needed. We will perform regular code audits on major releases, and hire security professionals to provide independent review.
Solidity code should be written in a consistent format enforced by a linter, following the official [Solidity Style Guide](https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/style-guide.html). See below for further [Solidity Conventions](#solidity-conventions).
## Style Guidelines
The code should be simple and straightforward, prioritizing readability and understandability. Consistency and predictability should be maintained across the codebase. In particular, this applies to naming, which should be systematic, clear, and concise.
The design guidelines have quite a high abstraction level. These style guidelines are more concrete and easier to apply, and also more opinionated.
Sometimes these guidelines may be broken if doing so brings significant efficiency gains, but explanatory comments should be added.
### General
Modularity should be pursued, but not at the cost of the above priorities.
#### G0 - Default to Solidity's official style guide.
## Documentation
Follow the official Solidity style guide: https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/style-guide.html
For contributors, project guidelines and processes must be documented publicly.
#### G1 - No Magic Constants
For users, features must be abundantly documented. Documentation should include answers to common questions, solutions to common problems, and recommendations for critical decisions that the user may face.
Avoid constants in the code as much as possible. Magic strings are also magic constants.
All changes to the core codebase (excluding tests, auxiliary scripts, etc.) must be documented in a changelog, except for purely cosmetic or documentation changes.
#### G2 - Code that Fails Early
## Peer review
We ask our code to fail as soon as possible when an unexpected input was provided or unexpected state was found.
All changes must be submitted through pull requests and go through peer code review.
#### G3 - Internal Amounts Must be Signed Integers and Represent the Smallest Units.
The review must be approached by the reviewer in a similar way as if it was an audit of the code in question (but importantly it is not a substitute for and should not be considered an audit).
Avoid representation errors by always dealing with weis when handling ether. GUIs can convert to more human-friendly representations. Use Signed Integers (int) to prevent underflow problems.
Reviewers should enforce code and project guidelines.
External contributions must be reviewed separately by multiple maintainers.
### Testing
## Automation
#### T1 - Tests Must be Written Elegantly
Automation should be used as much as possible to reduce the possibility of human error and forgetfulness.
Style guidelines are not relaxed for tests. Tests are a good way to show how to use the library, and maintaining them is extremely necessary.
Automations that make use of sensitive credentials must use secure secret management, and must be strengthened against attacks such as [those on GitHub Actions workflows](https://github.com/nikitastupin/pwnhub).
Don't write long tests, write helper functions to make them be as short and concise as possible (they should take just a few lines each), and use good variable names.
Some other examples of automation are:
#### T2 - Tests Must not be Random
- Looking for common security vulnerabilities or errors in our code (eg. reentrancy analysis).
- Keeping dependencies up to date and monitoring for vulnerable dependencies.
## Pull requests
Pull requests are squash-merged to keep the `master` branch history clean. The title of the pull request becomes the commit message, so it should be written in a consistent format:
1) Begin with a capital letter.
2) Do not end with a period.
3) Write in the imperative: "Add feature X" and not "Adds feature X" or "Added feature X".
This repository does not follow conventional commits, so do not prefix the title with "fix:" or "feat:".
Work in progress pull requests should be submitted as Drafts and should not be prefixed with "WIP:".
Branch names don't matter, and commit messages within a pull request mostly don't matter either, although they can help the review process.
# Solidity Conventions
In addition to the official Solidity Style Guide we have a number of other conventions that must be followed.
* All state variables should be private.
Changes to state should be accompanied by events, and in some cases it is not correct to arbitrarily set state. Encapsulating variables as private and only allowing modification via setters enables us to ensure that events and other rules are followed reliably and prevents this kind of user error.
* Internal or private state variables or functions should have an underscore prefix.
```solidity
contract TestContract {
uint256 private _privateVar;
uint256 internal _internalVar;
function _testInternal() internal { ... }
function _testPrivate() private { ... }
}
```
* Functions should be declared virtual, with few exceptions listed below. The
contract logic should be written considering that these functions may be
overridden by developers, e.g. getting a value using an internal getter rather
than reading directly from a state variable.
If function A is an "alias" of function B, i.e. it invokes function B without
significant additional logic, then function A should not be virtual so that
any user overrides are implemented on B, preventing inconsistencies.
* Events should generally be emitted immediately after the state change that they
represent, and should be named in the past tense. Some exceptions may be made for gas
efficiency if the result doesn't affect observable ordering of events.
```solidity
function _burn(address who, uint256 value) internal {
super._burn(who, value);
emit TokensBurned(who, value);
}
```
Some standards (e.g. ERC-20) use present tense, and in those cases the
standard specification is used.
* Interface names should have a capital I prefix.
```solidity
interface IERC777 {
```
* Contracts not intended to be used standalone should be marked abstract
so they are required to be inherited to other contracts.
```solidity
abstract contract AccessControl is ..., {
```
* Return values are generally not named, unless they are not immediately clear or there are multiple return values.
```solidity
function expiration() public view returns (uint256) { // Good
function hasRole() public view returns (bool isMember, uint32 currentDelay) { // Good
```
* Unchecked arithmetic blocks should contain comments explaining why overflow is guaranteed not to happen. If the reason is immediately apparent from the line above the unchecked block, the comment may be omitted.
* Custom errors should be declared following the [EIP-6093](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-6093) rationale whenever reasonable. Also, consider the following:
* The domain prefix should be picked in the following order:
1. Use `ERC<number>` if the error is a violation of an ERC specification.
2. Use the name of the underlying component where it belongs (eg. `Governor`, `ECDSA`, or `Timelock`).
* The location of custom errors should be decided in the following order:
1. Take the errors from their underlying ERCs if they're already defined.
2. Declare the errors in the underlying interface/library if the error makes sense in its context.
3. Declare the error in the implementation if the underlying interface/library is not suitable to do so (eg. interface/library already specified in an ERC).
4. Declare the error in an extension if the error only happens in such extension or child contracts.
* Custom error names should not be declared twice along the library to avoid duplicated identifier declarations when inheriting from multiple contracts.
Inputs for tests should not be generated randomly. Accounts used to create test contracts are an exception, those can be random. Also, the type and structure of outputs should be checked.

View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
The MIT License (MIT)
Copyright (c) 2016-2024 Zeppelin Group Ltd
Copyright (c) 2016-2019 zOS Global Limited
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the

View File

@ -1,78 +1,59 @@
# <img src="logo.svg" alt="OpenZeppelin" height="40px">
# <img src="logo.png" alt="OpenZeppelin" height="40px">
[![NPM Package](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@openzeppelin/contracts.svg)](https://www.npmjs.org/package/@openzeppelin/contracts)
[![Build Status](https://circleci.com/gh/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts.svg?style=shield)](https://circleci.com/gh/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts)
[![Coverage Status](https://codecov.io/gh/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/graph/badge.svg)](https://codecov.io/gh/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts)
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**A library for secure smart contract development.** Build on a solid foundation of community-vetted code.
* Implementations of standards like [ERC20](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/erc20) and [ERC721](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/erc721).
* Flexible [role-based permissioning](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/access-control) scheme.
* Reusable [Solidity components](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/utilities) to build custom contracts and complex decentralized systems.
:mage: **Not sure how to get started?** Check out [Contracts Wizard](https://wizard.openzeppelin.com/) — an interactive smart contract generator.
:building_construction: **Want to scale your decentralized application?** Check out [OpenZeppelin Defender](https://openzeppelin.com/defender) — a mission-critical developer security platform to code, audit, deploy, monitor, and operate with confidence.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> OpenZeppelin Contracts uses semantic versioning to communicate backwards compatibility of its API and storage layout. For upgradeable contracts, the storage layout of different major versions should be assumed incompatible, for example, it is unsafe to upgrade from 4.9.3 to 5.0.0. Learn more at [Backwards Compatibility](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/backwards-compatibility).
* First-class integration with the [Gas Station Network](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/gsn) for systems with no gas fees!
* Audited by leading security firms.
## Overview
### Installation
#### Hardhat (npm)
```
```console
$ npm install @openzeppelin/contracts
```
#### Foundry (git)
> [!WARNING]
> When installing via git, it is a common error to use the `master` branch. This is a development branch that should be avoided in favor of tagged releases. The release process involves security measures that the `master` branch does not guarantee.
> [!WARNING]
> Foundry installs the latest version initially, but subsequent `forge update` commands will use the `master` branch.
```
$ forge install OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts
```
Add `@openzeppelin/contracts/=lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/` in `remappings.txt.`
OpenZeppelin Contracts features a [stable API](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/releases-stability#api-stability), which means your contracts won't break unexpectedly when upgrading to a newer minor version.
### Usage
Once installed, you can use the contracts in the library by importing them:
```solidity
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
pragma solidity ^0.5.0;
import {ERC721} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721Full.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721Mintable.sol";
contract MyCollectible is ERC721 {
constructor() ERC721("MyCollectible", "MCO") {
contract MyNFT is ERC721Full, ERC721Mintable {
constructor() ERC721Full("MyNFT", "MNFT") public {
}
}
```
_If you're new to smart contract development, head to [Developing Smart Contracts](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/learn/developing-smart-contracts) to learn about creating a new project and compiling your contracts._
To keep your system secure, you should **always** use the installed code as-is, and neither copy-paste it from online sources nor modify it yourself. The library is designed so that only the contracts and functions you use are deployed, so you don't need to worry about it needlessly increasing gas costs.
To keep your system secure, you should **always** use the installed code as-is, and neither copy-paste it from online sources, nor modify it yourself. The library is designed so that only the contracts and functions you use are deployed, so you don't need to worry about it needlessly increasing gas costs.
## Learn More
The guides in the [documentation site](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts) will teach about different concepts, and how to use the related contracts that OpenZeppelin Contracts provides:
The guides in the sidebar will teach about different concepts, and how to use the related contracts that OpenZeppelin Contracts provides:
* [Access Control](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/access-control): decide who can perform each of the actions on your system.
* [Tokens](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/tokens): create tradeable assets or collectives, and distribute them via [Crowdsales](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/crowdsales).
* [Utilities](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/utilities): generic useful tools including non-overflowing math, signature verification, and trustless paying systems.
* [Gas Station Network](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/gsn): let your users interact with your contracts without having to pay for gas themselves.
* [Utilities](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/utilities): generic useful tools, including non-overflowing math, signature verification, and trustless paying systems.
The [full API](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/api/token/ERC20) is also thoroughly documented, and serves as a great reference when developing your smart contract application. You can also ask for help or follow Contracts's development in the [community forum](https://forum.openzeppelin.com).
Finally, you may want to take a look at the [guides on our blog](https://blog.openzeppelin.com/), which cover several common use cases and good practices. The following articles provide great background reading, though please note that some of the referenced tools have changed, as the tooling in the ecosystem continues to rapidly evolve.
Finally, you may want to take a look at the [guides on our blog](https://blog.openzeppelin.com/guides), which cover several common use cases and good practices.. The following articles provide great background reading, though please note, some of the referenced tools have changed as the tooling in the ecosystem continues to rapidly evolve.
* [The Hitchhikers Guide to Smart Contracts in Ethereum](https://blog.openzeppelin.com/the-hitchhikers-guide-to-smart-contracts-in-ethereum-848f08001f05) will help you get an overview of the various tools available for smart contract development, and help you set up your environment.
* [A Gentle Introduction to Ethereum Programming, Part 1](https://blog.openzeppelin.com/a-gentle-introduction-to-ethereum-programming-part-1-783cc7796094) provides very useful information on an introductory level, including many basic concepts from the Ethereum platform.
@ -80,28 +61,18 @@ Finally, you may want to take a look at the [guides on our blog](https://blog.op
## Security
This project is maintained by [OpenZeppelin](https://openzeppelin.com) with the goal of providing a secure and reliable library of smart contract components for the ecosystem. We address security through risk management in various areas such as engineering and open source best practices, scoping and API design, multi-layered review processes, and incident response preparedness.
This project is maintained by [OpenZeppelin](https://openzeppelin.com), and developed following our high standards for code quality and security. OpenZeppelin is meant to provide tested and community-audited code, but please use common sense when doing anything that deals with real money! We take no responsibility for your implementation decisions and any security problems you might experience.
The [OpenZeppelin Contracts Security Center](https://contracts.openzeppelin.com/security) contains more details about the secure development process.
The core development principles and strategies that OpenZeppelin is based on include: security in depth, simple and modular code, clarity-driven naming conventions, comprehensive unit testing, pre-and-post-condition sanity checks, code consistency, and regular audits.
The security policy is detailed in [`SECURITY.md`](./SECURITY.md) as well, and specifies how you can report security vulnerabilities, which versions will receive security patches, and how to stay informed about them. We run a [bug bounty program on Immunefi](https://immunefi.com/bounty/openzeppelin) to reward the responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities.
The latest audit was done on October 2018 on version 2.0.0.
The engineering guidelines we follow to promote project quality can be found in [`GUIDELINES.md`](./GUIDELINES.md).
Past audits can be found in [`audits/`](./audits).
Smart contracts are a nascent technology and carry a high level of technical risk and uncertainty. Although OpenZeppelin is well known for its security audits, using OpenZeppelin Contracts is not a substitute for a security audit.
OpenZeppelin Contracts is made available under the MIT License, which disclaims all warranties in relation to the project and which limits the liability of those that contribute and maintain the project, including OpenZeppelin. As set out further in the Terms, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for any use of OpenZeppelin Contracts and you assume all risks associated with any such use.
Please report any security issues you find to security@openzeppelin.org.
## Contribute
OpenZeppelin Contracts exists thanks to its contributors. There are many ways you can participate and help build high quality software. Check out the [contribution guide](CONTRIBUTING.md)!
OpenZeppelin exists thanks to its contributors. There are many ways you can participate and help build high quality software. Check out the [contribution guide](CONTRIBUTING.md)!
## License
OpenZeppelin Contracts is released under the [MIT License](LICENSE).
## Legal
Your use of this Project is governed by the terms found at www.openzeppelin.com/tos (the "Terms").
OpenZeppelin is released under the [MIT License](LICENSE).

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@ -1,45 +1,99 @@
# Releasing
OpenZeppelin Contracts uses a fully automated release process that takes care of compiling, packaging, and publishing the library, all of which is carried out in a clean CI environment (GitHub Actions), implemented in the ([`release-cycle`](.github/workflows/release-cycle.yml)) workflow. This helps to reduce the potential for human error and inconsistencies, and ensures that the release process is ongoing and reliable.
This document describes our release process, and contains the steps to be followed by an OpenZeppelin maintainer at the several stages of a release.
## Changesets
We release a new version of OpenZeppelin monthly. Release cycles are tracked in the [issue milestones](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/milestones).
[Changesets](https://github.com/changesets/changesets/) is used as part of our release process for `CHANGELOG.md` management. Each change that is relevant for the codebase is expected to include a changeset.
Each release has at least one release candidate published first, intended for community review and any critical fixes that may come out of it. At the moment we leave 1 week between the first release candidate and the final release.
## Branching model
Before starting make sure to verify the following items.
* Your local `master` branch is in sync with your `upstream` remote (it may have another name depending on your setup).
* Your repo is clean, particularly with no untracked files in the contracts and tests directories. Verify with `git clean -n`.
The release cycle happens on release branches called `release-vX.Y`. Each of these branches starts as a release candidate (rc) and is eventually promoted to final.
A release branch can be updated with cherry-picked patches from `master`, or may sometimes be committed to directly in the case of old releases. These commits will lead to a new release candidate or a patch increment depending on the state of the release branch.
## Creating the release branch
```mermaid
%%{init: {'gitGraph': {'mainBranchName': 'master'}} }%%
gitGraph
commit id: "Feature A"
commit id: "Feature B"
branch release-vX.Y
commit id: "Start release"
commit id: "Release vX.Y.0-rc.0"
We'll refer to a release `vX.Y.Z`.
checkout master
commit id: "Feature C"
commit id: "Fix A"
checkout release-vX.Y
cherry-pick id: "Fix A" tag: ""
commit id: "Release vX.Y.0-rc.1"
commit id: "Release vX.Y.0"
checkout master
merge release-vX.Y
commit id: "Feature D"
commit id: "Patch B"
checkout release-vX.Y
cherry-pick id: "Patch B" tag: ""
commit id: "Release vX.Y.1"
checkout master
merge release-vX.Y
commit id: "Feature E"
```
git checkout master
git checkout -b release-vX.Y.Z
```
## Creating a release candidate
Once in the release branch, change the version string in `package.json`, `package-lock.json` and `ethpm.json` to `X.Y.Z-rc.R`. (This will be `X.Y.Z-rc.1` for the first release candidate.) Commit these changes and tag the commit as `vX.Y.Z-rc.R`.
```
git add package.json package-lock.json ethpm.json
git commit -m "Release candidate vX.Y.Z-rc.R"
git tag -a vX.Y.Z-rc.R
git push upstream release-vX.Y.Z
git push upstream vX.Y.Z-rc.R
```
Draft the release notes in our [GitHub releases](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/releases). Make sure to mark it as a pre-release! Try to be consistent with our previous release notes in the title and format of the text. Release candidates don't need a detailed changelog, but make sure to include a link to GitHub's compare page.
Once the CI run for the new tag is green, publish on npm under the `next` tag. You should see the contracts compile automatically.
```
npm publish --tag next
```
Publish the release notes on GitHub and the forum, and ask our community manager to announce the release candidate on at least Twitter.
## Creating the final release
Make sure to have the latest changes from `upstream` in your local release branch.
```
git checkout release-vX.Y.Z
git pull upstream
```
Before starting the release process, make one final commit to CHANGELOG.md, including the date of the release.
Change the version string in `package.json`, `package-lock.json` and `ethpm.json` removing the "-rc.R" suffix. Commit these changes and tag the commit as `vX.Y.Z`.
```
git add package.json package-lock.json ethpm.json
git commit -m "Release vX.Y.Z"
git tag -a vX.Y.Z
git push upstream release-vX.Y.Z
git push upstream vX.Y.Z
```
Draft the release notes in GitHub releases. Try to be consistent with our previous release notes in the title and format of the text. Make sure to include a detailed changelog.
Once the CI run for the new tag is green, publish on npm. You should see the contracts compile automatically.
```
npm publish
```
Publish the release notes on GitHub and ask our community manager to announce the release!
Delete the `next` tag in the npm package as there is no longer a release candidate.
```
npm dist-tag rm --otp $2FA_CODE @openzeppelin/contracts next
```
## Merging the release branch
After the final release, the release branch should be merged back into `master`. This merge must not be squashed because it would lose the tagged release commit. Since the GitHub repo is set up to only allow squashed merges, the merge should be done locally and pushed.
Make sure to have the latest changes from `upstream` in your local release branch.
```
git checkout release-vX.Y.Z
git pull upstream
```
```
git checkout master
git merge --no-ff release-vX.Y.Z
git push upstream master
```
The release branch can then be deleted on GitHub.

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@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
# Security Policy
Security vulnerabilities should be disclosed to the project maintainers through [Immunefi], or alternatively by email to security@openzeppelin.com.
[Immunefi]: https://immunefi.com/bounty/openzeppelin
## Bug Bounty
Responsible disclosure of security vulnerabilities is rewarded through a bug bounty program on [Immunefi].
There is a bonus reward for issues introduced in release candidates that are reported before making it into a stable release. Learn more about release candidates at [`RELEASING.md`](./RELEASING.md).
## Security Patches
Security vulnerabilities will be patched as soon as responsibly possible, and published as an advisory on this repository (see [advisories]) and on the affected npm packages.
[advisories]: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/security/advisories
Projects that build on OpenZeppelin Contracts are encouraged to clearly state, in their source code and websites, how to be contacted about security issues in the event that a direct notification is considered necessary. We recommend including it in the NatSpec for the contract as `/// @custom:security-contact security@example.com`.
Additionally, we recommend installing the library through npm and setting up vulnerability alerts such as [Dependabot].
[Dependabot]: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/supply-chain-security/understanding-your-software-supply-chain/about-supply-chain-security#what-is-dependabot
### Supported Versions
Security patches will be released for the latest minor of a given major release. For example, if an issue is found in versions >=4.6.0 and the latest is 4.8.0, the patch will be released only in version 4.8.1.
Only critical severity bug fixes will be backported to past major releases.
| Version | Critical security fixes | Other security fixes |
| ------- | ----------------------- | -------------------- |
| 5.x | :white_check_mark: | :white_check_mark: |
| 4.9 | :white_check_mark: | :x: |
| 3.4 | :white_check_mark: | :x: |
| 2.5 | :x: | :x: |
| < 2.0 | :x: | :x: |
Note as well that the Solidity language itself only guarantees security updates for the latest release.
## Legal
Smart contracts are a nascent technology and carry a high level of technical risk and uncertainty. OpenZeppelin Contracts is made available under the MIT License, which disclaims all warranties in relation to the project and which limits the liability of those that contribute and maintain the project, including OpenZeppelin. Your use of the project is also governed by the terms found at www.openzeppelin.com/tos (the "Terms"). As set out in the Terms, you are solely responsible for any use of OpenZeppelin Contracts and you assume all risks associated with any such use. This Security Policy in no way evidences or represents an on-going duty by any contributor, including OpenZeppelin, to correct any flaws or alert you to all or any of the potential risks of utilizing the project.

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@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
# OpenZeppelin Audit
NOTE ON 2021-07-19: This report makes reference to Zeppelin, OpenZeppelin, OpenZeppelin Contracts, the OpenZeppelin team, and OpenZeppelin library. Many of these things have since been renamed and know that this audit applies to what is currently called the OpenZeppelin Contracts which are maintained by the OpenZeppelin Contracts Community.
March, 2017
Authored by Dennis Peterson and Peter Vessenes
@ -133,7 +131,7 @@ I presume that the goal of this contract is to allow and annotate a migration to
We like these pauses! Note that these allow significant griefing potential by owners, and that this might not be obvious to participants in smart contracts using the OpenZeppelin framework. We would recommend that additional sample logic be added to for instance the TokenContract showing safer use of the pause and resume functions. In particular, we would recommend a timelock after which anyone could unpause the contract.
The modifiers use the pattern `if(bool){_;}`. This is fine for functions that return false upon failure, but could be problematic for functions expected to throw upon failure. See our comments above on standardizing on `throw` or `return(false)`.
The modifers use the pattern `if(bool){_;}`. This is fine for functions that return false upon failure, but could be problematic for functions expected to throw upon failure. See our comments above on standardizing on `throw` or `return(false)`.
## Ownership

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@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
# Audits
| Date | Version | Commit | Auditor | Scope | Links |
| ------------ | ------- | --------- | ------------ | -------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------- |
| October 2024 | v5.1.0 | TBD | OpenZeppelin | v5.1 Changes | [🔗](./2024-10-v5.1.pdf) |
| October 2023 | v5.0.0 | `b5a3e69` | OpenZeppelin | v5.0 Changes | [🔗](./2023-10-v5.0.pdf) |
| May 2023 | v4.9.0 | `91df66c` | OpenZeppelin | v4.9 Changes | [🔗](./2023-05-v4.9.pdf) |
| October 2022 | v4.8.0 | `14f98db` | OpenZeppelin | ERC4626, Checkpoints | [🔗](./2022-10-ERC4626.pdf) [🔗](./2022-10-Checkpoints.pdf) |
| October 2018 | v2.0.0 | `dac5bcc` | LevelK | Everything | [🔗](./2018-10.pdf) |
| March 2017 | v1.0.4 | `9c5975a` | New Alchemy | Everything | [🔗](./2017-03.md) |
# Formal Verification
| Date | Version | Commit | Tool | Scope | Links |
| ------------ | ------- | --------- | ------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------ |
| May 2022 | v4.7.0 | `109778c` | Certora | Initializable, GovernorPreventLateQuorum, ERC1155Burnable, ERC1155Pausable, ERC1155Supply, ERC1155Holder, ERC1155Receiver | [🔗](../certora/reports/2022-05.pdf) |
| March 2022 | v4.4.0 | `4088540` | Certora | ERC20Votes, ERC20FlashMint, ERC20Wrapper, TimelockController, ERC721Votes, Votes, AccessControl, ERC1155 | [🔗](../certora/reports/2022-03.pdf) |
| October 2021 | v4.4.0 | `4088540` | Certora | Governor, GovernorCountingSimple, GovernorProposalThreshold, GovernorTimelockControl, GovernorVotes, GovernorVotesQuorumFraction | [🔗](../certora/reports/2021-10.pdf) |

1
certora/.gitignore vendored
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@ -1 +0,0 @@
patched

View File

@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
default: help
SRC := ../contracts
DST := patched
DIFF := diff
SRCS := $(shell find $(SRC) -type f)
DSTS := $(shell find $(DST) -type f)
DIFFS := $(shell find $(DIFF) -type f)
###############################################################################
# Apply all patches in the $DIFF folder to the $DST folder
apply: $(DST) $(patsubst $(DIFF)/%.patch,$(DST)/%,$(subst _,/,$(DIFFS)))
# Reset the $DST folder
$(DST): FORCE
@rm -rf $@
@cp -r $(SRC) $@
# Update a solidity file in the $DST directory using the corresponding patch
$(DST)/%.sol: FORCE | $(DST)
@echo Applying patch to $@
@patch -p0 -d $(DST) < $(patsubst $(DST)_%,$(DIFF)/%.patch,$(subst /,_,$@))
###############################################################################
# Record all difference between $SRC and $DST in patches
record: $(DIFF) $(patsubst %,$(DIFF)/%.patch,$(subst /,_,$(subst $(SRC)/,,$(SRCS)) $(subst $(DST)/,,$(DSTS))))
# Create the $DIFF folder
$(DIFF): FORCE
@rm -rf $@
@mkdir $@
# Create the patch file by comparing the source and the destination
$(DIFF)/%.patch: FORCE | $(DIFF)
@echo Generating patch $@
@diff -ruN \
$(patsubst $(DIFF)/%.patch,$(SRC)/%,$(subst _,/,$@)) \
$(patsubst $(DIFF)/%.patch,$(DST)/%,$(subst _,/,$@)) \
| sed 's+$(SRC)/++g' \
| sed 's+$(DST)/++g' \
> $@
@[ -s $@ ] || rm $@
###############################################################################
help:
@echo "usage:"
@echo " make apply: create $(DST) directory by applying the patches to $(SRC)"
@echo " make record: record the patches capturing the differences between $(SRC) and $(DST)"
@echo " make clean: remove all generated files (those ignored by git)"
clean:
git clean -fdX
FORCE: ;

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@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
# Running the certora verification tool
These instructions detail the process for running Certora Verification Tool on OpenZeppelin Contracts.
Documentation for CVT and the specification language are available [here](https://certora.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/CPD/overview).
## Prerequisites
Follow the [Certora installation guide](https://docs.certora.com/en/latest/docs/user-guide/getting-started/install.html) in order to get the Certora Prover Package and the `solc` executable folder in your path.
> **Note**
> An API Key is required for local testing. Although the prover will run on a Github Actions' CI environment on selected Pull Requests.
## Running the verification
The Certora Verification Tool proves specs for contracts, which are defined by the `./specs.json` file along with their pre-configured options.
The verification script `./run.js` is used to submit verification jobs to the Certora Verification service.
You can run it from the root of the repository with the following command:
```bash
node certora/run.js [[CONTRACT_NAME:]SPEC_NAME] [OPTIONS...]
```
Where:
- `CONTRACT_NAME` matches the `contract` key in the `./spec.json` file and may be empty. It will run all matching contracts if not provided.
- `SPEC_NAME` refers to a `spec` key from the `./specs.json` file. It will run every spec if not provided.
- `OPTIONS` extend the [Certora Prover CLI options](https://docs.certora.com/en/latest/docs/prover/cli/options.html#certora-prover-cli-options) and will respect the preconfigured options in the `specs.json` file.
> **Note**
> A single spec may be configured to run for multiple contracts, whereas a single contract may run multiple specs.
Example usage:
```bash
node certora/run.js AccessControl # Run the AccessControl spec against every contract implementing it
```
## Adapting to changes in the contracts
Some of our rules require the code to be simplified in various ways. Our primary tool for performing these simplifications is to run verification on a contract that extends the original contracts and overrides some of the methods. These "harness" contracts can be found in the `certora/harness` directory.
This pattern does require some modifications to the original code: some methods need to be made virtual or public, for example. These changes are handled by applying a patch
to the code before verification by running:
```bash
make -C certora apply
```
Before running the `certora/run.js` script, it's required to apply the corresponding patches to the `contracts` directory, placing the output in the `certora/patched` directory. Then, the contracts are verified by running the verification for the `certora/patched` directory.
If the original contracts change, it is possible to create a conflict with the patch. In this case, the verify scripts will report an error message and output rejected changes in the `patched` directory. After merging the changes, run `make record` in the `certora` directory; this will regenerate the patch file, which can then be checked into git.
For more information about the `make` scripts available, run:
```bash
make -C certora help
```

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@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
--- access/manager/AccessManager.sol 2023-10-05 12:17:09.694051809 -0300
+++ access/manager/AccessManager.sol 2023-10-05 12:26:18.498688718 -0300
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
import {IAccessManaged} from "./IAccessManaged.sol";
import {Address} from "../../utils/Address.sol";
import {Context} from "../../utils/Context.sol";
-import {Multicall} from "../../utils/Multicall.sol";
import {Math} from "../../utils/math/Math.sol";
import {Time} from "../../utils/types/Time.sol";
@@ -57,7 +56,8 @@
* mindful of the danger associated with functions such as {{Ownable-renounceOwnership}} or
* {{AccessControl-renounceRole}}.
*/
-contract AccessManager is Context, Multicall, IAccessManager {
+// NOTE: The FV version of this contract doesn't include Multicall because CVL HAVOCs on any `delegatecall`.
+contract AccessManager is Context, IAccessManager {
using Time for *;
// Structure that stores the details for a target contract.
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
// Used to identify operations that are currently being executed via {execute}.
// This should be transient storage when supported by the EVM.
- bytes32 private _executionId;
+ bytes32 internal _executionId; // private → internal for FV
/**
* @dev Check that the caller is authorized to perform the operation, following the restrictions encoded in
@@ -253,6 +253,11 @@
_setGrantDelay(roleId, newDelay);
}
+ // Exposed for FV
+ function _getTargetAdminDelayFull(address target) internal view virtual returns (uint32, uint32, uint48) {
+ return _targets[target].adminDelay.getFull();
+ }
+
/**
* @dev Internal version of {grantRole} without access control. Returns true if the role was newly granted.
*
@@ -287,6 +292,11 @@
return newMember;
}
+ // Exposed for FV
+ function _getRoleGrantDelayFull(uint64 roleId) internal view virtual returns (uint32, uint32, uint48) {
+ return _roles[roleId].grantDelay.getFull();
+ }
+
/**
* @dev Internal version of {revokeRole} without access control. This logic is also used by {renounceRole}.
* Returns true if the role was previously granted.
@@ -586,7 +596,7 @@
/**
* @dev Check if the current call is authorized according to admin logic.
*/
- function _checkAuthorized() private {
+ function _checkAuthorized() internal virtual { // private → internal virtual for FV
address caller = _msgSender();
(bool immediate, uint32 delay) = _canCallSelf(caller, _msgData());
if (!immediate) {
@@ -609,7 +619,7 @@
*/
function _getAdminRestrictions(
bytes calldata data
- ) private view returns (bool adminRestricted, uint64 roleAdminId, uint32 executionDelay) {
+ ) internal view returns (bool adminRestricted, uint64 roleAdminId, uint32 executionDelay) { // private → internal for FV
if (data.length < 4) {
return (false, 0, 0);
}
@@ -662,7 +672,7 @@
address caller,
address target,
bytes calldata data
- ) private view returns (bool immediate, uint32 delay) {
+ ) internal view returns (bool immediate, uint32 delay) { // private → internal for FV
if (target == address(this)) {
return _canCallSelf(caller, data);
} else {
@@ -716,14 +726,14 @@
/**
* @dev Extracts the selector from calldata. Panics if data is not at least 4 bytes
*/
- function _checkSelector(bytes calldata data) private pure returns (bytes4) {
+ function _checkSelector(bytes calldata data) internal pure returns (bytes4) { // private → internal for FV
return bytes4(data[0:4]);
}
/**
* @dev Hashing function for execute protection
*/
- function _hashExecutionId(address target, bytes4 selector) private pure returns (bytes32) {
+ function _hashExecutionId(address target, bytes4 selector) internal pure returns (bytes32) { // private → internal for FV
return keccak256(abi.encode(target, selector));
}
}

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@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {AccessControlDefaultAdminRules} from "../patched/access/extensions/AccessControlDefaultAdminRules.sol";
contract AccessControlDefaultAdminRulesHarness is AccessControlDefaultAdminRules {
uint48 private _delayIncreaseWait;
constructor(
uint48 initialDelay,
address initialDefaultAdmin,
uint48 delayIncreaseWait
) AccessControlDefaultAdminRules(initialDelay, initialDefaultAdmin) {
_delayIncreaseWait = delayIncreaseWait;
}
// FV
function pendingDefaultAdmin_() external view returns (address) {
(address newAdmin, ) = pendingDefaultAdmin();
return newAdmin;
}
function pendingDefaultAdminSchedule_() external view returns (uint48) {
(, uint48 schedule) = pendingDefaultAdmin();
return schedule;
}
function pendingDelay_() external view returns (uint48) {
(uint48 newDelay, ) = pendingDefaultAdminDelay();
return newDelay;
}
function pendingDelaySchedule_() external view returns (uint48) {
(, uint48 schedule) = pendingDefaultAdminDelay();
return schedule;
}
function delayChangeWait_(uint48 newDelay) external view returns (uint48) {
return _delayChangeWait(newDelay);
}
// Overrides
function defaultAdminDelayIncreaseWait() public view override returns (uint48) {
return _delayIncreaseWait;
}
}

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@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {AccessControl} from "../patched/access/AccessControl.sol";
contract AccessControlHarness is AccessControl {}

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@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import "../patched/access/manager/IAccessManager.sol";
import "../patched/access/manager/AccessManaged.sol";
contract AccessManagedHarness is AccessManaged {
bytes internal SOME_FUNCTION_CALLDATA = abi.encodeCall(this.someFunction, ());
constructor(address initialAuthority) AccessManaged(initialAuthority) {}
function someFunction() public restricted() {
// Sanity for FV: the msg.data when calling this function should be the same as the data used when checking
// the schedule. This is a reformulation of `msg.data == SOME_FUNCTION_CALLDATA` that focuses on the operation
// hash for this call.
require(
IAccessManager(authority()).hashOperation(_msgSender(), address(this), msg.data)
==
IAccessManager(authority()).hashOperation(_msgSender(), address(this), SOME_FUNCTION_CALLDATA)
);
}
function authority_canCall_immediate(address caller) public view returns (bool result) {
(result,) = AuthorityUtils.canCallWithDelay(authority(), caller, address(this), this.someFunction.selector);
}
function authority_canCall_delay(address caller) public view returns (uint32 result) {
(,result) = AuthorityUtils.canCallWithDelay(authority(), caller, address(this), this.someFunction.selector);
}
function authority_getSchedule(address caller) public view returns (uint48) {
IAccessManager manager = IAccessManager(authority());
return manager.getSchedule(manager.hashOperation(caller, address(this), SOME_FUNCTION_CALLDATA));
}
}

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@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import "../patched/access/manager/AccessManager.sol";
contract AccessManagerHarness is AccessManager {
// override with a storage slot that can basically take any value.
uint32 private _minSetback;
constructor(address initialAdmin) AccessManager(initialAdmin) {}
// FV
function minSetback() public view override returns (uint32) {
return _minSetback;
}
function canCall_immediate(address caller, address target, bytes4 selector) external view returns (bool result) {
(result,) = canCall(caller, target, selector);
}
function canCall_delay(address caller, address target, bytes4 selector) external view returns (uint32 result) {
(,result) = canCall(caller, target, selector);
}
function canCallExtended(address caller, address target, bytes calldata data) external view returns (bool, uint32) {
return _canCallExtended(caller, target, data);
}
function canCallExtended_immediate(address caller, address target, bytes calldata data) external view returns (bool result) {
(result,) = _canCallExtended(caller, target, data);
}
function canCallExtended_delay(address caller, address target, bytes calldata data) external view returns (uint32 result) {
(,result) = _canCallExtended(caller, target, data);
}
function getAdminRestrictions_restricted(bytes calldata data) external view returns (bool result) {
(result,,) = _getAdminRestrictions(data);
}
function getAdminRestrictions_roleAdminId(bytes calldata data) external view returns (uint64 result) {
(,result,) = _getAdminRestrictions(data);
}
function getAdminRestrictions_executionDelay(bytes calldata data) external view returns (uint32 result) {
(,,result) = _getAdminRestrictions(data);
}
function hasRole_isMember(uint64 roleId, address account) external view returns (bool result) {
(result,) = hasRole(roleId, account);
}
function hasRole_executionDelay(uint64 roleId, address account) external view returns (uint32 result) {
(,result) = hasRole(roleId, account);
}
function getAccess_since(uint64 roleId, address account) external view returns (uint48 result) {
(result,,,) = getAccess(roleId, account);
}
function getAccess_currentDelay(uint64 roleId, address account) external view returns (uint32 result) {
(,result,,) = getAccess(roleId, account);
}
function getAccess_pendingDelay(uint64 roleId, address account) external view returns (uint32 result) {
(,,result,) = getAccess(roleId, account);
}
function getAccess_effect(uint64 roleId, address account) external view returns (uint48 result) {
(,,,result) = getAccess(roleId, account);
}
function getTargetAdminDelay_after(address target) public view virtual returns (uint32 result) {
(,result,) = _getTargetAdminDelayFull(target);
}
function getTargetAdminDelay_effect(address target) public view virtual returns (uint48 result) {
(,,result) = _getTargetAdminDelayFull(target);
}
function getRoleGrantDelay_after(uint64 roleId) public view virtual returns (uint32 result) {
(,result,) = _getRoleGrantDelayFull(roleId);
}
function getRoleGrantDelay_effect(uint64 roleId) public view virtual returns (uint48 result) {
(,,result) = _getRoleGrantDelayFull(roleId);
}
function hashExecutionId(address target, bytes4 selector) external pure returns (bytes32) {
return _hashExecutionId(target, selector);
}
function executionId() external view returns (bytes32) {
return _executionId;
}
// Pad with zeros (and don't revert) if data is too short.
function getSelector(bytes calldata data) external pure returns (bytes4) {
return bytes4(data);
}
function getFirstArgumentAsAddress(bytes calldata data) external pure returns (address) {
return abi.decode(data[0x04:0x24], (address));
}
function getFirstArgumentAsUint64(bytes calldata data) external pure returns (uint64) {
return abi.decode(data[0x04:0x24], (uint64));
}
function _checkAuthorized() internal override {
// We need this hack otherwise certora will assume _checkSelector(_msgData()) can return anything :/
require(msg.sig == _checkSelector(_msgData()));
super._checkAuthorized();
}
}

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@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {DoubleEndedQueue} from "../patched/utils/structs/DoubleEndedQueue.sol";
contract DoubleEndedQueueHarness {
using DoubleEndedQueue for DoubleEndedQueue.Bytes32Deque;
DoubleEndedQueue.Bytes32Deque private _deque;
function pushFront(bytes32 value) external {
_deque.pushFront(value);
}
function pushBack(bytes32 value) external {
_deque.pushBack(value);
}
function popFront() external returns (bytes32 value) {
return _deque.popFront();
}
function popBack() external returns (bytes32 value) {
return _deque.popBack();
}
function clear() external {
_deque.clear();
}
function begin() external view returns (uint128) {
return _deque._begin;
}
function end() external view returns (uint128) {
return _deque._end;
}
function length() external view returns (uint256) {
return _deque.length();
}
function empty() external view returns (bool) {
return _deque.empty();
}
function front() external view returns (bytes32 value) {
return _deque.front();
}
function back() external view returns (bytes32 value) {
return _deque.back();
}
function at_(uint256 index) external view returns (bytes32 value) {
return _deque.at(index);
}
}

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@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import "../patched/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
import "../patched/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Permit.sol";
import "../patched/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20FlashMint.sol";
contract ERC20FlashMintHarness is ERC20, ERC20Permit, ERC20FlashMint {
uint256 someFee;
address someFeeReceiver;
constructor(string memory name, string memory symbol) ERC20(name, symbol) ERC20Permit(name) {}
function mint(address account, uint256 amount) external {
_mint(account, amount);
}
function burn(address account, uint256 amount) external {
_burn(account, amount);
}
// public accessor
function flashFeeReceiver() public view returns (address) {
return someFeeReceiver;
}
// internal hook
function _flashFee(address, uint256) internal view override returns (uint256) {
return someFee;
}
function _flashFeeReceiver() internal view override returns (address) {
return someFeeReceiver;
}
}

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@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {ERC20Permit, ERC20} from "../patched/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Permit.sol";
contract ERC20PermitHarness is ERC20Permit {
constructor(string memory name, string memory symbol) ERC20(name, symbol) ERC20Permit(name) {}
function mint(address account, uint256 amount) external {
_mint(account, amount);
}
function burn(address account, uint256 amount) external {
_burn(account, amount);
}
}

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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {ERC20Permit} from "../patched/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Permit.sol";
import {ERC20Wrapper, IERC20, ERC20} from "../patched/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Wrapper.sol";
contract ERC20WrapperHarness is ERC20Permit, ERC20Wrapper {
constructor(
IERC20 _underlying,
string memory _name,
string memory _symbol
) ERC20(_name, _symbol) ERC20Permit(_name) ERC20Wrapper(_underlying) {}
function underlyingTotalSupply() public view returns (uint256) {
return underlying().totalSupply();
}
function underlyingBalanceOf(address account) public view returns (uint256) {
return underlying().balanceOf(account);
}
function underlyingAllowanceToThis(address account) public view returns (uint256) {
return underlying().allowance(account, address(this));
}
function recover(address account) public returns (uint256) {
return _recover(account);
}
function decimals() public view override(ERC20Wrapper, ERC20) returns (uint8) {
return super.decimals();
}
}

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@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
import {IERC3156FlashBorrower} from "../patched/interfaces/IERC3156FlashBorrower.sol";
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
contract ERC3156FlashBorrowerHarness is IERC3156FlashBorrower {
bytes32 somethingToReturn;
function onFlashLoan(address, address, uint256, uint256, bytes calldata) external view override returns (bytes32) {
return somethingToReturn;
}
}

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@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {ERC721} from "../patched/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol";
contract ERC721Harness is ERC721 {
constructor(string memory name, string memory symbol) ERC721(name, symbol) {}
function mint(address account, uint256 tokenId) external {
_mint(account, tokenId);
}
function safeMint(address to, uint256 tokenId) external {
_safeMint(to, tokenId);
}
function safeMint(address to, uint256 tokenId, bytes memory data) external {
_safeMint(to, tokenId, data);
}
function burn(uint256 tokenId) external {
_burn(tokenId);
}
function unsafeOwnerOf(uint256 tokenId) external view returns (address) {
return _ownerOf(tokenId);
}
function unsafeGetApproved(uint256 tokenId) external view returns (address) {
return _getApproved(tokenId);
}
}

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@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import "../patched/interfaces/IERC721Receiver.sol";
contract ERC721ReceiverHarness is IERC721Receiver {
function onERC721Received(address, address, uint256, bytes calldata) external pure returns (bytes4) {
return this.onERC721Received.selector;
}
}

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@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {EnumerableMap} from "../patched/utils/structs/EnumerableMap.sol";
contract EnumerableMapHarness {
using EnumerableMap for EnumerableMap.Bytes32ToBytes32Map;
EnumerableMap.Bytes32ToBytes32Map private _map;
function set(bytes32 key, bytes32 value) public returns (bool) {
return _map.set(key, value);
}
function remove(bytes32 key) public returns (bool) {
return _map.remove(key);
}
function contains(bytes32 key) public view returns (bool) {
return _map.contains(key);
}
function length() public view returns (uint256) {
return _map.length();
}
function key_at(uint256 index) public view returns (bytes32) {
(bytes32 key,) = _map.at(index);
return key;
}
function value_at(uint256 index) public view returns (bytes32) {
(,bytes32 value) = _map.at(index);
return value;
}
function tryGet_contains(bytes32 key) public view returns (bool) {
(bool contained,) = _map.tryGet(key);
return contained;
}
function tryGet_value(bytes32 key) public view returns (bytes32) {
(,bytes32 value) = _map.tryGet(key);
return value;
}
function get(bytes32 key) public view returns (bytes32) {
return _map.get(key);
}
function _positionOf(bytes32 key) public view returns (uint256) {
return _map._keys._inner._positions[key];
}
}

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@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {EnumerableSet} from "../patched/utils/structs/EnumerableSet.sol";
contract EnumerableSetHarness {
using EnumerableSet for EnumerableSet.Bytes32Set;
EnumerableSet.Bytes32Set private _set;
function add(bytes32 value) public returns (bool) {
return _set.add(value);
}
function remove(bytes32 value) public returns (bool) {
return _set.remove(value);
}
function contains(bytes32 value) public view returns (bool) {
return _set.contains(value);
}
function length() public view returns (uint256) {
return _set.length();
}
function at_(uint256 index) public view returns (bytes32) {
return _set.at(index);
}
function _positionOf(bytes32 value) public view returns (uint256) {
return _set._inner._positions[value];
}
}

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@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {Initializable} from "../patched/proxy/utils/Initializable.sol";
contract InitializableHarness is Initializable {
function initialize() public initializer {}
function reinitialize(uint64 n) public reinitializer(n) {}
function disable() public { _disableInitializers(); }
function nested_init_init() public initializer { initialize(); }
function nested_init_reinit(uint64 m) public initializer { reinitialize(m); }
function nested_reinit_init(uint64 n) public reinitializer(n) { initialize(); }
function nested_reinit_reinit(uint64 n, uint64 m) public reinitializer(n) { reinitialize(m); }
function version() public view returns (uint64) {
return _getInitializedVersion();
}
function initializing() public view returns (bool) {
return _isInitializing();
}
}

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@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {Nonces} from "../patched/utils/Nonces.sol";
contract NoncesHarness is Nonces {
function useNonce(address account) external returns (uint256) {
return _useNonce(account);
}
function useCheckedNonce(address account, uint256 nonce) external {
_useCheckedNonce(account, nonce);
}
}

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@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {Ownable2Step, Ownable} from "../patched/access/Ownable2Step.sol";
contract Ownable2StepHarness is Ownable2Step {
constructor(address initialOwner) Ownable(initialOwner) {}
function restricted() external onlyOwner {}
}

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@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {Ownable} from "../patched/access/Ownable.sol";
contract OwnableHarness is Ownable {
constructor(address initialOwner) Ownable(initialOwner) {}
function restricted() external onlyOwner {}
}

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@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {Pausable} from "../patched/utils/Pausable.sol";
contract PausableHarness is Pausable {
function pause() external {
_pause();
}
function unpause() external {
_unpause();
}
function onlyWhenPaused() external whenPaused {}
function onlyWhenNotPaused() external whenNotPaused {}
}

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@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {TimelockController} from "../patched/governance/TimelockController.sol";
contract TimelockControllerHarness is TimelockController {
constructor(
uint256 minDelay,
address[] memory proposers,
address[] memory executors,
address admin
) TimelockController(minDelay, proposers, executors, admin) {}
}

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@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
// USAGE:
// node certora/run.js [[CONTRACT_NAME:]SPEC_NAME]* [--all] [--options OPTIONS...] [--specs PATH]
// EXAMPLES:
// node certora/run.js --all
// node certora/run.js AccessControl
// node certora/run.js AccessControlHarness:AccessControl
import { spawn } from 'child_process';
import { PassThrough } from 'stream';
import { once } from 'events';
import path from 'path';
import yargs from 'yargs';
import { hideBin } from 'yargs/helpers';
import pLimit from 'p-limit';
import fs from 'fs/promises';
const argv = yargs(hideBin(process.argv))
.env('')
.options({
all: {
alias: 'a',
type: 'boolean',
},
spec: {
alias: 's',
type: 'string',
default: path.resolve(import.meta.dirname, 'specs.json'),
},
parallel: {
alias: 'p',
type: 'number',
default: 4,
},
verbose: {
alias: 'v',
type: 'count',
default: 0,
},
options: {
alias: 'o',
type: 'array',
default: [],
},
})
.parse();
function match(entry, request) {
const [reqSpec, reqContract] = request.split(':').reverse();
return entry.spec == reqSpec && (!reqContract || entry.contract == reqContract);
}
const specs = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(argv.spec, 'utf8')).filter(s => argv.all || argv._.some(r => match(s, r)));
const limit = pLimit(argv.parallel);
if (argv._.length == 0 && !argv.all) {
console.error(`Warning: No specs requested. Did you forget to toggle '--all'?`);
}
for (const r of argv._) {
if (!specs.some(s => match(s, r))) {
console.error(`Error: Requested spec '${r}' not found in ${argv.spec}`);
process.exitCode = 1;
}
}
if (process.exitCode) {
process.exit(process.exitCode);
}
for (const { spec, contract, files, options = [] } of specs) {
limit(() =>
runCertora(
spec,
contract,
files,
[...options, ...argv.options].flatMap(opt => opt.split(' ')),
),
);
}
// Run certora, aggregate the output and print it at the end
async function runCertora(spec, contract, files, options = []) {
const args = [...files, '--verify', `${contract}:certora/specs/${spec}.spec`, ...options];
if (argv.verbose) {
console.log('Running:', args.join(' '));
}
const child = spawn('certoraRun', args);
const stream = new PassThrough();
const output = collect(stream);
child.stdout.pipe(stream, { end: false });
child.stderr.pipe(stream, { end: false });
// as soon as we have a job id, print the output link
stream.on('data', function logStatusUrl(data) {
const { '-DjobId': jobId, '-DuserId': userId } = Object.fromEntries(
data
.toString('utf8')
.match(/-D\S+=\S+/g)
?.map(s => s.split('=')) || [],
);
if (jobId && userId) {
console.error(`[${spec}] https://prover.certora.com/output/${userId}/${jobId}/`);
stream.off('data', logStatusUrl);
}
});
// wait for process end
const [code, signal] = await once(child, 'exit');
// error
if (code || signal) {
console.error(`[${spec}] Exited with code ${code || signal}`);
process.exitCode = 1;
}
// get all output
stream.end();
// write results in markdown format
writeEntry(spec, contract, code || signal, (await output).match(/https:\/\/prover.certora.com\/output\/\S*/)?.[0]);
// write all details
console.error(`+ certoraRun ${args.join(' ')}\n` + (await output));
}
// Collects stream data into a string
async function collect(stream) {
const buffers = [];
for await (const data of stream) {
const buf = Buffer.isBuffer(data) ? data : Buffer.from(data);
buffers.push(buf);
}
return Buffer.concat(buffers).toString('utf8');
}
// Formatting
let hasHeader = false;
function formatRow(...array) {
return ['', ...array, ''].join(' | ');
}
function writeHeader() {
console.log(formatRow('spec', 'contract', 'result', 'status', 'output'));
console.log(formatRow('-', '-', '-', '-', '-'));
}
function writeEntry(spec, contract, success, url) {
if (!hasHeader) {
hasHeader = true;
writeHeader();
}
console.log(
formatRow(
spec,
contract,
success ? ':x:' : ':heavy_check_mark:',
url ? `[link](${url?.replace('/output/', '/jobStatus/')})` : 'error',
url ? `[link](${url})` : 'error',
),
);
}

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@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
[
{
"spec": "Pausable",
"contract": "PausableHarness",
"files": ["certora/harnesses/PausableHarness.sol"]
},
{
"spec": "AccessControl",
"contract": "AccessControlHarness",
"files": ["certora/harnesses/AccessControlHarness.sol"]
},
{
"spec": "AccessControlDefaultAdminRules",
"contract": "AccessControlDefaultAdminRulesHarness",
"files": ["certora/harnesses/AccessControlDefaultAdminRulesHarness.sol"]
},
{
"spec": "AccessManager",
"contract": "AccessManagerHarness",
"files": ["certora/harnesses/AccessManagerHarness.sol"],
"options": ["--optimistic_hashing", "--optimistic_loop"]
},
{
"spec": "AccessManaged",
"contract": "AccessManagedHarness",
"files": [
"certora/harnesses/AccessManagedHarness.sol",
"certora/harnesses/AccessManagerHarness.sol"
],
"options": [
"--optimistic_hashing",
"--optimistic_loop",
"--link AccessManagedHarness:_authority=AccessManagerHarness"
]
},
{
"spec": "DoubleEndedQueue",
"contract": "DoubleEndedQueueHarness",
"files": ["certora/harnesses/DoubleEndedQueueHarness.sol"]
},
{
"spec": "Ownable",
"contract": "OwnableHarness",
"files": ["certora/harnesses/OwnableHarness.sol"]
},
{
"spec": "Ownable2Step",
"contract": "Ownable2StepHarness",
"files": ["certora/harnesses/Ownable2StepHarness.sol"]
},
{
"spec": "ERC20",
"contract": "ERC20PermitHarness",
"files": ["certora/harnesses/ERC20PermitHarness.sol"],
"options": ["--optimistic_loop"]
},
{
"spec": "ERC20FlashMint",
"contract": "ERC20FlashMintHarness",
"files": [
"certora/harnesses/ERC20FlashMintHarness.sol",
"certora/harnesses/ERC3156FlashBorrowerHarness.sol"
],
"options": ["--optimistic_loop"]
},
{
"spec": "ERC20Wrapper",
"contract": "ERC20WrapperHarness",
"files": [
"certora/harnesses/ERC20PermitHarness.sol",
"certora/harnesses/ERC20WrapperHarness.sol"
],
"options": [
"--link ERC20WrapperHarness:_underlying=ERC20PermitHarness",
"--optimistic_loop"
]
},
{
"spec": "ERC721",
"contract": "ERC721Harness",
"files": ["certora/harnesses/ERC721Harness.sol", "certora/harnesses/ERC721ReceiverHarness.sol"],
"options": ["--optimistic_loop"]
},
{
"spec": "Initializable",
"contract": "InitializableHarness",
"files": ["certora/harnesses/InitializableHarness.sol"]
},
{
"spec": "EnumerableSet",
"contract": "EnumerableSetHarness",
"files": ["certora/harnesses/EnumerableSetHarness.sol"]
},
{
"spec": "EnumerableMap",
"contract": "EnumerableMapHarness",
"files": ["certora/harnesses/EnumerableMapHarness.sol"]
},
{
"spec": "TimelockController",
"contract": "TimelockControllerHarness",
"files": ["certora/harnesses/TimelockControllerHarness.sol"],
"options": ["--optimistic_hashing", "--optimistic_loop"]
},
{
"spec": "Nonces",
"contract": "NoncesHarness",
"files": ["certora/harnesses/NoncesHarness.sol"]
}
]

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@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
import "helpers/helpers.spec";
import "methods/IAccessControl.spec";
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Identify entrypoints: only grantRole, revokeRole and renounceRole can alter permissions
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule onlyGrantCanGrant(env e, method f, bytes32 role, address account) {
calldataarg args;
bool hasRoleBefore = hasRole(role, account);
f(e, args);
bool hasRoleAfter = hasRole(role, account);
assert (
!hasRoleBefore &&
hasRoleAfter
) => (
f.selector == sig:grantRole(bytes32, address).selector
);
assert (
hasRoleBefore &&
!hasRoleAfter
) => (
f.selector == sig:revokeRole(bytes32, address).selector ||
f.selector == sig:renounceRole(bytes32, address).selector
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Function correctness: grantRole only affects the specified user/role combo
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule grantRoleEffect(env e, bytes32 role) {
require nonpayable(e);
bytes32 otherRole;
address account;
address otherAccount;
bool isCallerAdmin = hasRole(getRoleAdmin(role), e.msg.sender);
bool hasOtherRoleBefore = hasRole(otherRole, otherAccount);
grantRole@withrevert(e, role, account);
bool success = !lastReverted;
bool hasOtherRoleAfter = hasRole(otherRole, otherAccount);
// liveness
assert success <=> isCallerAdmin;
// effect
assert success => hasRole(role, account);
// no side effect
assert hasOtherRoleBefore != hasOtherRoleAfter => (role == otherRole && account == otherAccount);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Function correctness: revokeRole only affects the specified user/role combo
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule revokeRoleEffect(env e, bytes32 role) {
require nonpayable(e);
bytes32 otherRole;
address account;
address otherAccount;
bool isCallerAdmin = hasRole(getRoleAdmin(role), e.msg.sender);
bool hasOtherRoleBefore = hasRole(otherRole, otherAccount);
revokeRole@withrevert(e, role, account);
bool success = !lastReverted;
bool hasOtherRoleAfter = hasRole(otherRole, otherAccount);
// liveness
assert success <=> isCallerAdmin;
// effect
assert success => !hasRole(role, account);
// no side effect
assert hasOtherRoleBefore != hasOtherRoleAfter => (role == otherRole && account == otherAccount);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Function correctness: renounceRole only affects the specified user/role combo
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule renounceRoleEffect(env e, bytes32 role) {
require nonpayable(e);
bytes32 otherRole;
address account;
address otherAccount;
bool hasOtherRoleBefore = hasRole(otherRole, otherAccount);
renounceRole@withrevert(e, role, account);
bool success = !lastReverted;
bool hasOtherRoleAfter = hasRole(otherRole, otherAccount);
// liveness
assert success <=> account == e.msg.sender;
// effect
assert success => !hasRole(role, account);
// no side effect
assert hasOtherRoleBefore != hasOtherRoleAfter => (role == otherRole && account == otherAccount);
}

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@ -1,464 +0,0 @@
import "helpers/helpers.spec";
import "methods/IAccessControlDefaultAdminRules.spec";
import "methods/IAccessControl.spec";
import "AccessControl.spec";
use rule onlyGrantCanGrant filtered {
f -> f.selector != sig:acceptDefaultAdminTransfer().selector
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Definitions
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
definition timeSanity(env e) returns bool =
e.block.timestamp > 0 && e.block.timestamp + defaultAdminDelay(e) < max_uint48;
definition delayChangeWaitSanity(env e, uint48 newDelay) returns bool =
e.block.timestamp + delayChangeWait_(e, newDelay) < max_uint48;
definition isSet(uint48 schedule) returns bool =
schedule != 0;
definition hasPassed(env e, uint48 schedule) returns bool =
assert_uint256(schedule) < e.block.timestamp;
definition increasingDelaySchedule(env e, uint48 newDelay) returns mathint =
e.block.timestamp + min(newDelay, defaultAdminDelayIncreaseWait());
definition decreasingDelaySchedule(env e, uint48 newDelay) returns mathint =
e.block.timestamp + defaultAdminDelay(e) - newDelay;
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: defaultAdmin holds the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant defaultAdminConsistency(address account)
(account == defaultAdmin() && account != 0) <=> hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE(), account)
{
preserved with (env e) {
require nonzerosender(e);
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: Only one account holds the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant singleDefaultAdmin(address account, address another)
hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE(), account) && hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE(), another) => another == account
{
preserved {
requireInvariant defaultAdminConsistency(account);
requireInvariant defaultAdminConsistency(another);
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE's admin is always DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant defaultAdminRoleAdminConsistency()
getRoleAdmin(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE()) == DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE();
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: owner is the defaultAdmin
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant ownerConsistency()
defaultAdmin() == owner();
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Function correctness: revokeRole only affects the specified user/role combo
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule revokeRoleEffect(env e, bytes32 role) {
require nonpayable(e);
bytes32 otherRole;
address account;
address otherAccount;
bool isCallerAdmin = hasRole(getRoleAdmin(role), e.msg.sender);
bool hasOtherRoleBefore = hasRole(otherRole, otherAccount);
revokeRole@withrevert(e, role, account);
bool success = !lastReverted;
bool hasOtherRoleAfter = hasRole(otherRole, otherAccount);
// liveness
assert success <=> isCallerAdmin && role != DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE(),
"roles can only be revoked by their owner except for the default admin role";
// effect
assert success => !hasRole(role, account),
"role is revoked";
// no side effect
assert hasOtherRoleBefore != hasOtherRoleAfter => (role == otherRole && account == otherAccount),
"no other role is affected";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Function correctness: renounceRole only affects the specified user/role combo
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule renounceRoleEffect(env e, bytes32 role) {
require nonpayable(e);
bytes32 otherRole;
address account;
address otherAccount;
bool hasOtherRoleBefore = hasRole(otherRole, otherAccount);
address adminBefore = defaultAdmin();
address pendingAdminBefore = pendingDefaultAdmin_();
uint48 scheduleBefore = pendingDefaultAdminSchedule_();
renounceRole@withrevert(e, role, account);
bool success = !lastReverted;
bool hasOtherRoleAfter = hasRole(otherRole, otherAccount);
address adminAfter = defaultAdmin();
address pendingAdminAfter = pendingDefaultAdmin_();
uint48 scheduleAfter = pendingDefaultAdminSchedule_();
// liveness
assert success <=> (
account == e.msg.sender &&
(
role != DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE() ||
account != adminBefore ||
(
pendingAdminBefore == 0 &&
isSet(scheduleBefore) &&
hasPassed(e, scheduleBefore)
)
)
),
"an account only can renounce by itself with a delay for the default admin role";
// effect
assert success => !hasRole(role, account),
"role is renounced";
assert success => (
(
role == DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE() &&
account == adminBefore
) ? (
adminAfter == 0 &&
pendingAdminAfter == 0 &&
scheduleAfter == 0
) : (
adminAfter == adminBefore &&
pendingAdminAfter == pendingAdminBefore &&
scheduleAfter == scheduleBefore
)
),
"renouncing default admin role cleans state iff called by previous admin";
// no side effect
assert hasOtherRoleBefore != hasOtherRoleAfter => (
role == otherRole &&
account == otherAccount
),
"no other role is affected";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: defaultAdmin is only affected by accepting an admin transfer or renoucing
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule noDefaultAdminChange(env e, method f, calldataarg args) {
address adminBefore = defaultAdmin();
f(e, args);
address adminAfter = defaultAdmin();
assert adminBefore != adminAfter => (
f.selector == sig:acceptDefaultAdminTransfer().selector ||
f.selector == sig:renounceRole(bytes32,address).selector
),
"default admin is only affected by accepting an admin transfer or renoucing";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: pendingDefaultAdmin is only affected by beginning, completing (accept or renounce), or canceling an admin
transfer
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule noPendingDefaultAdminChange(env e, method f, calldataarg args) {
address pendingAdminBefore = pendingDefaultAdmin_();
uint48 scheduleBefore = pendingDefaultAdminSchedule_();
f(e, args);
address pendingAdminAfter = pendingDefaultAdmin_();
uint48 scheduleAfter = pendingDefaultAdminSchedule_();
assert (
pendingAdminBefore != pendingAdminAfter ||
scheduleBefore != scheduleAfter
) => (
f.selector == sig:beginDefaultAdminTransfer(address).selector ||
f.selector == sig:acceptDefaultAdminTransfer().selector ||
f.selector == sig:cancelDefaultAdminTransfer().selector ||
f.selector == sig:renounceRole(bytes32,address).selector
),
"pending admin and its schedule is only affected by beginning, completing, or cancelling an admin transfer";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: defaultAdminDelay can't be changed atomically by any function
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule noDefaultAdminDelayChange(env e, method f, calldataarg args) {
uint48 delayBefore = defaultAdminDelay(e);
f(e, args);
uint48 delayAfter = defaultAdminDelay(e);
assert delayBefore == delayAfter,
"delay can't be changed atomically by any function";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: pendingDefaultAdminDelay is only affected by changeDefaultAdminDelay or rollbackDefaultAdminDelay
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule noPendingDefaultAdminDelayChange(env e, method f, calldataarg args) {
uint48 pendingDelayBefore = pendingDelay_(e);
f(e, args);
uint48 pendingDelayAfter = pendingDelay_(e);
assert pendingDelayBefore != pendingDelayAfter => (
f.selector == sig:changeDefaultAdminDelay(uint48).selector ||
f.selector == sig:rollbackDefaultAdminDelay().selector
),
"pending delay is only affected by changeDefaultAdminDelay or rollbackDefaultAdminDelay";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: defaultAdminDelayIncreaseWait can't be changed atomically by any function
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule noDefaultAdminDelayIncreaseWaitChange(env e, method f, calldataarg args) {
uint48 delayIncreaseWaitBefore = defaultAdminDelayIncreaseWait();
f(e, args);
uint48 delayIncreaseWaitAfter = defaultAdminDelayIncreaseWait();
assert delayIncreaseWaitBefore == delayIncreaseWaitAfter,
"delay increase wait can't be changed atomically by any function";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Function correctness: beginDefaultAdminTransfer sets a pending default admin and its schedule
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule beginDefaultAdminTransfer(env e, address newAdmin) {
require timeSanity(e);
require nonpayable(e);
require nonzerosender(e);
requireInvariant defaultAdminConsistency(e.msg.sender);
beginDefaultAdminTransfer@withrevert(e, newAdmin);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> e.msg.sender == defaultAdmin(),
"only the current default admin can begin a transfer";
// effect
assert success => pendingDefaultAdmin_() == newAdmin,
"pending default admin is set";
assert success => to_mathint(pendingDefaultAdminSchedule_()) == e.block.timestamp + defaultAdminDelay(e),
"pending default admin delay is set";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: A default admin can't change in less than the applied schedule
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule pendingDefaultAdminDelayEnforced(env e1, env e2, method f, calldataarg args, address newAdmin) {
require e1.block.timestamp <= e2.block.timestamp;
uint48 delayBefore = defaultAdminDelay(e1);
address adminBefore = defaultAdmin();
// There might be a better way to generalize this without requiring `beginDefaultAdminTransfer`, but currently
// it's the only way in which we can attest that only `delayBefore` has passed before a change.
beginDefaultAdminTransfer(e1, newAdmin);
f(e2, args);
address adminAfter = defaultAdmin();
// change can only happen towards the newAdmin, with the delay
assert adminAfter != adminBefore => (
adminAfter == newAdmin &&
to_mathint(e2.block.timestamp) >= e1.block.timestamp + delayBefore
),
"The admin can only change after the enforced delay and to the previously scheduled new admin";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Function correctness: acceptDefaultAdminTransfer updates defaultAdmin resetting the pending admin and its schedule
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule acceptDefaultAdminTransfer(env e) {
require nonpayable(e);
address pendingAdminBefore = pendingDefaultAdmin_();
uint48 scheduleBefore = pendingDefaultAdminSchedule_();
acceptDefaultAdminTransfer@withrevert(e);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> (
e.msg.sender == pendingAdminBefore &&
isSet(scheduleBefore) &&
hasPassed(e, scheduleBefore)
),
"only the pending default admin can accept the role after the schedule has been set and passed";
// effect
assert success => defaultAdmin() == pendingAdminBefore,
"Default admin is set to the previous pending default admin";
assert success => pendingDefaultAdmin_() == 0,
"Pending default admin is reset";
assert success => pendingDefaultAdminSchedule_() == 0,
"Pending default admin delay is reset";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Function correctness: cancelDefaultAdminTransfer resets pending default admin and its schedule
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule cancelDefaultAdminTransfer(env e) {
require nonpayable(e);
require nonzerosender(e);
requireInvariant defaultAdminConsistency(e.msg.sender);
cancelDefaultAdminTransfer@withrevert(e);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> e.msg.sender == defaultAdmin(),
"only the current default admin can cancel a transfer";
// effect
assert success => pendingDefaultAdmin_() == 0,
"Pending default admin is reset";
assert success => pendingDefaultAdminSchedule_() == 0,
"Pending default admin delay is reset";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Function correctness: changeDefaultAdminDelay sets a pending default admin delay and its schedule
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule changeDefaultAdminDelay(env e, uint48 newDelay) {
require timeSanity(e);
require nonpayable(e);
require nonzerosender(e);
require delayChangeWaitSanity(e, newDelay);
requireInvariant defaultAdminConsistency(e.msg.sender);
uint48 delayBefore = defaultAdminDelay(e);
changeDefaultAdminDelay@withrevert(e, newDelay);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> e.msg.sender == defaultAdmin(),
"only the current default admin can begin a delay change";
// effect
assert success => pendingDelay_(e) == newDelay,
"pending delay is set";
assert success => (
assert_uint256(pendingDelaySchedule_(e)) > e.block.timestamp ||
delayBefore == newDelay || // Interpreted as decreasing, x - x = 0
defaultAdminDelayIncreaseWait() == 0
),
"pending delay schedule is set in the future unless accepted edge cases";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: A delay can't change in less than the applied schedule
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule pendingDelayWaitEnforced(env e1, env e2, method f, calldataarg args, uint48 newDelay) {
require e1.block.timestamp <= e2.block.timestamp;
uint48 delayBefore = defaultAdminDelay(e1);
changeDefaultAdminDelay(e1, newDelay);
f(e2, args);
uint48 delayAfter = defaultAdminDelay(e2);
mathint delayWait = newDelay > delayBefore ? increasingDelaySchedule(e1, newDelay) : decreasingDelaySchedule(e1, newDelay);
assert delayAfter != delayBefore => (
delayAfter == newDelay &&
to_mathint(e2.block.timestamp) >= delayWait
),
"A delay can only change after the applied schedule";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: pending delay wait is set depending on increasing or decreasing the delay
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule pendingDelayWait(env e, uint48 newDelay) {
uint48 oldDelay = defaultAdminDelay(e);
changeDefaultAdminDelay(e, newDelay);
assert newDelay > oldDelay => to_mathint(pendingDelaySchedule_(e)) == increasingDelaySchedule(e, newDelay),
"Delay wait is the minimum between the new delay and a threshold when the delay is increased";
assert newDelay <= oldDelay => to_mathint(pendingDelaySchedule_(e)) == decreasingDelaySchedule(e, newDelay),
"Delay wait is the difference between the current and the new delay when the delay is decreased";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Function correctness: rollbackDefaultAdminDelay resets the delay and its schedule
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule rollbackDefaultAdminDelay(env e) {
require nonpayable(e);
require nonzerosender(e);
requireInvariant defaultAdminConsistency(e.msg.sender);
rollbackDefaultAdminDelay@withrevert(e);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> e.msg.sender == defaultAdmin(),
"only the current default admin can rollback a delay change";
// effect
assert success => pendingDelay_(e) == 0,
"Pending default admin is reset";
assert success => pendingDelaySchedule_(e) == 0,
"Pending default admin delay is reset";
}

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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
import "helpers/helpers.spec";
import "methods/IAccessManaged.spec";
methods {
// FV
function someFunction() external;
function authority_canCall_immediate(address) external returns (bool);
function authority_canCall_delay(address) external returns (uint32);
function authority_getSchedule(address) external returns (uint48);
}
invariant isConsumingScheduledOpClean()
isConsumingScheduledOp() == to_bytes4(0);
rule callRestrictedFunction(env e) {
bool immediate = authority_canCall_immediate(e, e.msg.sender);
uint32 delay = authority_canCall_delay(e, e.msg.sender);
uint48 scheduleBefore = authority_getSchedule(e, e.msg.sender);
someFunction@withrevert(e);
bool success = !lastReverted;
uint48 scheduleAfter = authority_getSchedule(e, e.msg.sender);
// can only call if immediate, or (with delay) by consuming a scheduled op
assert success => (
immediate ||
(
delay > 0 &&
isSetAndPast(e, scheduleBefore) &&
scheduleAfter == 0
)
);
}

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@ -1,826 +0,0 @@
import "helpers/helpers.spec";
import "methods/IAccessManager.spec";
methods {
// FV
function canCall_immediate(address,address,bytes4) external returns (bool);
function canCall_delay(address,address,bytes4) external returns (uint32);
function canCallExtended(address,address,bytes) external returns (bool,uint32);
function canCallExtended_immediate(address,address,bytes) external returns (bool);
function canCallExtended_delay(address,address,bytes) external returns (uint32);
function getAdminRestrictions_restricted(bytes) external returns (bool);
function getAdminRestrictions_roleAdminId(bytes) external returns (uint64);
function getAdminRestrictions_executionDelay(bytes) external returns (uint32);
function hasRole_isMember(uint64,address) external returns (bool);
function hasRole_executionDelay(uint64,address) external returns (uint32);
function getAccess_since(uint64,address) external returns (uint48);
function getAccess_currentDelay(uint64,address) external returns (uint32);
function getAccess_pendingDelay(uint64,address) external returns (uint32);
function getAccess_effect(uint64,address) external returns (uint48);
function getTargetAdminDelay_after(address target) external returns (uint32);
function getTargetAdminDelay_effect(address target) external returns (uint48);
function getRoleGrantDelay_after(uint64 roleId) external returns (uint32);
function getRoleGrantDelay_effect(uint64 roleId) external returns (uint48);
function hashExecutionId(address,bytes4) external returns (bytes32) envfree;
function executionId() external returns (bytes32) envfree;
function getSelector(bytes) external returns (bytes4) envfree;
function getFirstArgumentAsAddress(bytes) external returns (address) envfree;
function getFirstArgumentAsUint64(bytes) external returns (uint64) envfree;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Helpers
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
definition isOnlyAuthorized(bytes4 selector) returns bool =
selector == to_bytes4(sig:labelRole(uint64,string).selector ) ||
selector == to_bytes4(sig:setRoleAdmin(uint64,uint64).selector ) ||
selector == to_bytes4(sig:setRoleGuardian(uint64,uint64).selector ) ||
selector == to_bytes4(sig:setGrantDelay(uint64,uint32).selector ) ||
selector == to_bytes4(sig:setTargetAdminDelay(address,uint32).selector ) ||
selector == to_bytes4(sig:updateAuthority(address,address).selector ) ||
selector == to_bytes4(sig:setTargetClosed(address,bool).selector ) ||
selector == to_bytes4(sig:setTargetFunctionRole(address,bytes4[],uint64).selector) ||
selector == to_bytes4(sig:grantRole(uint64,address,uint32).selector ) ||
selector == to_bytes4(sig:revokeRole(uint64,address).selector );
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: executionId must be clean when not in the middle of a call
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant cleanExecutionId()
executionId() == to_bytes32(0);
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: public role
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant publicRole(env e, address account)
hasRole_isMember(e, PUBLIC_ROLE(), account) &&
hasRole_executionDelay(e, PUBLIC_ROLE(), account) == 0 &&
getAccess_since(e, PUBLIC_ROLE(), account) == 0 &&
getAccess_currentDelay(e, PUBLIC_ROLE(), account) == 0 &&
getAccess_pendingDelay(e, PUBLIC_ROLE(), account) == 0 &&
getAccess_effect(e, PUBLIC_ROLE(), account) == 0;
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: hasRole is consistent with getAccess
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant hasRoleGetAccessConsistency(env e, uint64 roleId, address account)
hasRole_isMember(e, roleId, account) == (roleId == PUBLIC_ROLE() || isSetAndPast(e, getAccess_since(e, roleId, account))) &&
hasRole_executionDelay(e, roleId, account) == getAccess_currentDelay(e, roleId, account);
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Functions: canCall, canCallExtended, getAccess, hasRole, isTargetClosed and getTargetFunctionRole do NOT revert
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule noRevert(env e) {
require nonpayable(e);
require sanity(e);
address caller;
address target;
bytes data;
bytes4 selector;
uint64 roleId;
canCall@withrevert(e, caller, target, selector);
assert !lastReverted;
// require data.length <= max_uint64;
//
// canCallExtended@withrevert(e, caller, target, data);
// assert !lastReverted;
getAccess@withrevert(e, roleId, caller);
assert !lastReverted;
hasRole@withrevert(e, roleId, caller);
assert !lastReverted;
isTargetClosed@withrevert(target);
assert !lastReverted;
getTargetFunctionRole@withrevert(target, selector);
assert !lastReverted;
// Not covered:
// - getAdminRestrictions (_1, _2 & _3)
// - getSelector
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Functions: admin restrictions are correct
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule getAdminRestrictions(env e, bytes data) {
bool restricted = getAdminRestrictions_restricted(e, data);
uint64 roleId = getAdminRestrictions_roleAdminId(e, data);
uint32 delay = getAdminRestrictions_executionDelay(e, data);
bytes4 selector = getSelector(data);
if (data.length < 4) {
assert restricted == false;
assert roleId == 0;
assert delay == 0;
} else {
assert restricted ==
isOnlyAuthorized(selector);
assert roleId == (
(restricted && selector == to_bytes4(sig:grantRole(uint64,address,uint32).selector)) ||
(restricted && selector == to_bytes4(sig:revokeRole(uint64,address).selector ))
? getRoleAdmin(getFirstArgumentAsUint64(data))
: ADMIN_ROLE()
);
assert delay == (
(restricted && selector == to_bytes4(sig:updateAuthority(address,address).selector )) ||
(restricted && selector == to_bytes4(sig:setTargetClosed(address,bool).selector )) ||
(restricted && selector == to_bytes4(sig:setTargetFunctionRole(address,bytes4[],uint64).selector))
? getTargetAdminDelay(e, getFirstArgumentAsAddress(data))
: 0
);
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Functions: canCall
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule canCall(env e) {
address caller;
address target;
bytes4 selector;
// Get relevant values
bool immediate = canCall_immediate(e, caller, target, selector);
uint32 delay = canCall_delay(e, caller, target, selector);
bool closed = isTargetClosed(target);
uint64 roleId = getTargetFunctionRole(target, selector);
bool isMember = hasRole_isMember(e, roleId, caller);
uint32 currentDelay = hasRole_executionDelay(e, roleId, caller);
// Can only execute without delay in specific cases:
// - target not closed
// - if self-execution: `executionId` must match
// - if third party execution: must be member with no delay
assert immediate <=> (
!closed &&
(
(caller == currentContract && executionId() == hashExecutionId(target, selector))
||
(caller != currentContract && isMember && currentDelay == 0)
)
);
// Can only execute with delay in specific cases:
// - target not closed
// - third party execution
// - caller is a member and has an execution delay
assert delay > 0 <=> (
!closed &&
caller != currentContract &&
isMember &&
currentDelay > 0
);
// If there is a delay, then it must be the caller's execution delay
assert delay > 0 => delay == currentDelay;
// Immediate execute means no delayed execution
assert immediate => delay == 0;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Functions: canCallExtended
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule canCallExtended(env e) {
address caller;
address target;
bytes data;
bytes4 selector = getSelector(data);
bool immediate = canCallExtended_immediate(e, caller, target, data);
uint32 delay = canCallExtended_delay(e, caller, target, data);
bool enabled = getAdminRestrictions_restricted(e, data);
uint64 roleId = getAdminRestrictions_roleAdminId(e, data);
uint32 operationDelay = getAdminRestrictions_executionDelay(e, data);
bool inRole = hasRole_isMember(e, roleId, caller);
uint32 executionDelay = hasRole_executionDelay(e, roleId, caller);
if (target == currentContract) {
// Can only execute without delay in the specific cases:
// - caller is the AccessManager and the executionId is set
// or
// - data matches an admin restricted function
// - caller has the necessary role
// - operation delay is not set
// - execution delay is not set
assert immediate <=> (
(
caller == currentContract &&
data.length >= 4 &&
executionId() == hashExecutionId(target, selector)
) || (
caller != currentContract &&
enabled &&
inRole &&
operationDelay == 0 &&
executionDelay == 0
)
);
// Immediate execute means no delayed execution
// This is equivalent to "delay > 0 => !immediate"
assert immediate => delay == 0;
// Can only execute with delay in specific cases:
// - caller is a third party
// - data matches an admin restricted function
// - caller has the necessary role
// -operation delay or execution delay is set
assert delay > 0 <=> (
caller != currentContract &&
enabled &&
inRole &&
(operationDelay > 0 || executionDelay > 0)
);
// If there is a delay, then it must be the maximum of caller's execution delay and the operation delay
assert delay > 0 => to_mathint(delay) == max(operationDelay, executionDelay);
} else if (data.length < 4) {
assert immediate == false;
assert delay == 0;
} else {
// results are equivalent when targeting third party contracts
assert immediate == canCall_immediate(e, caller, target, selector);
assert delay == canCall_delay(e, caller, target, selector);
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
State transitions: getAccess
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule getAccessChangeTime(uint64 roleId, address account) {
env e1;
env e2;
// values before
mathint getAccess1Before = getAccess_since(e1, roleId, account);
mathint getAccess2Before = getAccess_currentDelay(e1, roleId, account);
mathint getAccess3Before = getAccess_pendingDelay(e1, roleId, account);
mathint getAccess4Before = getAccess_effect(e1, roleId, account);
// time pass: e1 e2
require clock(e1) <= clock(e2);
// values after
mathint getAccess1After = getAccess_since(e2, roleId, account);
mathint getAccess2After = getAccess_currentDelay(e2, roleId, account);
mathint getAccess3After = getAccess_pendingDelay(e2, roleId, account);
mathint getAccess4After = getAccess_effect(e2, roleId, account);
// member "since" cannot change as a consequence of time passing
assert getAccess1Before == getAccess1After;
// any change of any other value should be a consequence of the effect timepoint being reached
assert (
getAccess2Before != getAccess2After ||
getAccess3Before != getAccess3After ||
getAccess4Before != getAccess4After
) => (
getAccess4Before != 0 &&
getAccess4Before > clock(e1) &&
getAccess4Before <= clock(e2) &&
getAccess2After == getAccess3Before &&
getAccess3After == 0 &&
getAccess4After == 0
);
}
rule getAccessChangeCall(uint64 roleId, address account) {
env e;
// sanity
require sanity(e);
// values before
mathint getAccess1Before = getAccess_since(e, roleId, account);
mathint getAccess2Before = getAccess_currentDelay(e, roleId, account);
mathint getAccess3Before = getAccess_pendingDelay(e, roleId, account);
mathint getAccess4Before = getAccess_effect(e, roleId, account);
// arbitrary function call
method f; calldataarg args; f(e, args);
// values before
mathint getAccess1After = getAccess_since(e, roleId, account);
mathint getAccess2After = getAccess_currentDelay(e, roleId, account);
mathint getAccess3After = getAccess_pendingDelay(e, roleId, account);
mathint getAccess4After = getAccess_effect(e, roleId, account);
// transitions
assert (
getAccess1Before != getAccess1After ||
getAccess2Before != getAccess2After ||
getAccess3Before != getAccess3After ||
getAccess4Before != getAccess4After
) => (
(
f.selector == sig:grantRole(uint64,address,uint32).selector &&
getAccess1After > 0
) || (
(
f.selector == sig:revokeRole(uint64,address).selector ||
f.selector == sig:renounceRole(uint64,address).selector
) &&
getAccess1After == 0 &&
getAccess2After == 0 &&
getAccess3After == 0 &&
getAccess4After == 0
)
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
State transitions: isTargetClosed
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule isTargetClosedChangeTime(address target) {
env e1;
env e2;
// values before
bool isClosedBefore = isTargetClosed(e1, target);
// time pass: e1 e2
require clock(e1) <= clock(e2);
// values after
bool isClosedAfter = isTargetClosed(e2, target);
// transitions
assert isClosedBefore == isClosedAfter;
}
rule isTargetClosedChangeCall(address target) {
env e;
// values before
bool isClosedBefore = isTargetClosed(e, target);
// arbitrary function call
method f; calldataarg args; f(e, args);
// values after
bool isClosedAfter = isTargetClosed(e, target);
// transitions
assert isClosedBefore != isClosedAfter => (
f.selector == sig:setTargetClosed(address,bool).selector
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
State transitions: getTargetFunctionRole
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule getTargetFunctionRoleChangeTime(address target, bytes4 selector) {
env e1;
env e2;
// values before
mathint roleIdBefore = getTargetFunctionRole(e1, target, selector);
// time pass: e1 e2
require clock(e1) <= clock(e2);
// values after
mathint roleIdAfter = getTargetFunctionRole(e2, target, selector);
// transitions
assert roleIdBefore == roleIdAfter;
}
rule getTargetFunctionRoleChangeCall(address target, bytes4 selector) {
env e;
// values before
mathint roleIdBefore = getTargetFunctionRole(e, target, selector);
// arbitrary function call
method f; calldataarg args; f(e, args);
// values after
mathint roleIdAfter = getTargetFunctionRole(e, target, selector);
// transitions
assert roleIdBefore != roleIdAfter => (
f.selector == sig:setTargetFunctionRole(address,bytes4[],uint64).selector
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
State transitions: getTargetAdminDelay
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule getTargetAdminDelayChangeTime(address target) {
env e1;
env e2;
// values before
mathint delayBefore = getTargetAdminDelay(e1, target);
mathint delayPendingBefore = getTargetAdminDelay_after(e1, target);
mathint delayEffectBefore = getTargetAdminDelay_effect(e1, target);
// time pass: e1 e2
require clock(e1) <= clock(e2);
// values after
mathint delayAfter = getTargetAdminDelay(e2, target);
mathint delayPendingAfter = getTargetAdminDelay_after(e2, target);
mathint delayEffectAfter = getTargetAdminDelay_effect(e2, target);
assert (
delayBefore != delayAfter ||
delayPendingBefore != delayPendingAfter ||
delayEffectBefore != delayEffectAfter
) => (
delayEffectBefore > clock(e1) &&
delayEffectBefore <= clock(e2) &&
delayAfter == delayPendingBefore &&
delayPendingAfter == 0 &&
delayEffectAfter == 0
);
}
rule getTargetAdminDelayChangeCall(address target) {
env e;
// values before
mathint delayBefore = getTargetAdminDelay(e, target);
mathint delayPendingBefore = getTargetAdminDelay_after(e, target);
mathint delayEffectBefore = getTargetAdminDelay_effect(e, target);
// arbitrary function call
method f; calldataarg args; f(e, args);
// values after
mathint delayAfter = getTargetAdminDelay(e, target);
mathint delayPendingAfter = getTargetAdminDelay_after(e, target);
mathint delayEffectAfter = getTargetAdminDelay_effect(e, target);
// if anything changed ...
assert (
delayBefore != delayAfter ||
delayPendingBefore != delayPendingAfter ||
delayEffectBefore != delayEffectAfter
) => (
(
// ... it was the consequence of a call to setTargetAdminDelay
f.selector == sig:setTargetAdminDelay(address,uint32).selector
) && (
// ... delay cannot decrease instantly
delayAfter >= delayBefore
) && (
// ... if setback is not 0, value cannot change instantly
minSetback() > 0 => (
delayBefore == delayAfter
)
) && (
// ... if the value did not change and there is a minSetback, there must be something scheduled in the future
delayAfter == delayBefore && minSetback() > 0 => (
delayEffectAfter >= clock(e) + minSetback()
)
// note: if there is no minSetback, and if the caller "confirms" the current value,
// then this as immediate effect and nothing is scheduled
) && (
// ... if the value changed, then no further change should be scheduled
delayAfter != delayBefore => (
delayPendingAfter == 0 &&
delayEffectAfter == 0
)
)
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
State transitions: getRoleGrantDelay
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule getRoleGrantDelayChangeTime(uint64 roleId) {
env e1;
env e2;
// values before
mathint delayBefore = getRoleGrantDelay(e1, roleId);
mathint delayPendingBefore = getRoleGrantDelay_after(e1, roleId);
mathint delayEffectBefore = getRoleGrantDelay_effect(e1, roleId);
// time pass: e1 e2
require clock(e1) <= clock(e2);
// values after
mathint delayAfter = getRoleGrantDelay(e2, roleId);
mathint delayPendingAfter = getRoleGrantDelay_after(e2, roleId);
mathint delayEffectAfter = getRoleGrantDelay_effect(e2, roleId);
assert (
delayBefore != delayAfter ||
delayPendingBefore != delayPendingAfter ||
delayEffectBefore != delayEffectAfter
) => (
delayEffectBefore > clock(e1) &&
delayEffectBefore <= clock(e2) &&
delayAfter == delayPendingBefore &&
delayPendingAfter == 0 &&
delayEffectAfter == 0
);
}
rule getRoleGrantDelayChangeCall(uint64 roleId) {
env e;
// values before
mathint delayBefore = getRoleGrantDelay(e, roleId);
mathint delayPendingBefore = getRoleGrantDelay_after(e, roleId);
mathint delayEffectBefore = getRoleGrantDelay_effect(e, roleId);
// arbitrary function call
method f; calldataarg args; f(e, args);
// values after
mathint delayAfter = getRoleGrantDelay(e, roleId);
mathint delayPendingAfter = getRoleGrantDelay_after(e, roleId);
mathint delayEffectAfter = getRoleGrantDelay_effect(e, roleId);
// if anything changed ...
assert (
delayBefore != delayAfter ||
delayPendingBefore != delayPendingAfter ||
delayEffectBefore != delayEffectAfter
) => (
(
// ... it was the consequence of a call to setTargetAdminDelay
f.selector == sig:setGrantDelay(uint64,uint32).selector
) && (
// ... delay cannot decrease instantly
delayAfter >= delayBefore
) && (
// ... if setback is not 0, value cannot change instantly
minSetback() > 0 => (
delayBefore == delayAfter
)
) && (
// ... if the value did not change and there is a minSetback, there must be something scheduled in the future
delayAfter == delayBefore && minSetback() > 0 => (
delayEffectAfter >= clock(e) + minSetback()
)
// note: if there is no minSetback, and if the caller "confirms" the current value,
// then this as immediate effect and nothing is scheduled
) && (
// ... if the value changed, then no further change should be scheduled
delayAfter != delayBefore => (
delayPendingAfter == 0 &&
delayEffectAfter == 0
)
)
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
State transitions: getRoleAdmin & getRoleGuardian
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule getRoleAdminChangeCall(uint64 roleId) {
// values before
mathint adminIdBefore = getRoleAdmin(roleId);
// arbitrary function call
env e; method f; calldataarg args; f(e, args);
// values after
mathint adminIdAfter = getRoleAdmin(roleId);
// transitions
assert adminIdBefore != adminIdAfter => f.selector == sig:setRoleAdmin(uint64,uint64).selector;
}
rule getRoleGuardianChangeCall(uint64 roleId) {
// values before
mathint guardianIdBefore = getRoleGuardian(roleId);
// arbitrary function call
env e; method f; calldataarg args; f(e, args);
// values after
mathint guardianIdAfter = getRoleGuardian(roleId);
// transitions
assert guardianIdBefore != guardianIdAfter => (
f.selector == sig:setRoleGuardian(uint64,uint64).selector
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
State transitions: getNonce
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule getNonceChangeCall(bytes32 operationId) {
// values before
mathint nonceBefore = getNonce(operationId);
// reasonable assumption
require nonceBefore < max_uint32;
// arbitrary function call
env e; method f; calldataarg args; f(e, args);
// values after
mathint nonceAfter = getNonce(operationId);
// transitions
assert nonceBefore != nonceAfter => (
f.selector == sig:schedule(address,bytes,uint48).selector &&
nonceAfter == nonceBefore + 1
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
State transitions: getSchedule
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule getScheduleChangeTime(bytes32 operationId) {
env e1;
env e2;
// values before
mathint scheduleBefore = getSchedule(e1, operationId);
// time pass: e1 e2
require clock(e1) <= clock(e2);
// values after
mathint scheduleAfter = getSchedule(e2, operationId);
// transition
assert scheduleBefore != scheduleAfter => (
scheduleBefore + expiration() > clock(e1) &&
scheduleBefore + expiration() <= clock(e2) &&
scheduleAfter == 0
);
}
rule getScheduleChangeCall(bytes32 operationId) {
env e;
// values before
mathint scheduleBefore = getSchedule(e, operationId);
// arbitrary function call
method f; calldataarg args; f(e, args);
// values after
mathint scheduleAfter = getSchedule(e, operationId);
// transitions
assert scheduleBefore != scheduleAfter => (
(f.selector == sig:schedule(address,bytes,uint48).selector && scheduleAfter >= clock(e)) ||
(f.selector == sig:execute(address,bytes).selector && scheduleAfter == 0 ) ||
(f.selector == sig:cancel(address,address,bytes).selector && scheduleAfter == 0 ) ||
(f.selector == sig:consumeScheduledOp(address,bytes).selector && scheduleAfter == 0 ) ||
(isOnlyAuthorized(to_bytes4(f.selector)) && scheduleAfter == 0 )
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Functions: restricted functions can only be called by owner
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule restrictedFunctions(env e) {
require nonpayable(e);
require sanity(e);
method f;
calldataarg args;
f(e,args);
assert (
f.selector == sig:labelRole(uint64,string).selector ||
f.selector == sig:setRoleAdmin(uint64,uint64).selector ||
f.selector == sig:setRoleGuardian(uint64,uint64).selector ||
f.selector == sig:setGrantDelay(uint64,uint32).selector ||
f.selector == sig:setTargetAdminDelay(address,uint32).selector ||
f.selector == sig:updateAuthority(address,address).selector ||
f.selector == sig:setTargetClosed(address,bool).selector ||
f.selector == sig:setTargetFunctionRole(address,bytes4[],uint64).selector
) => (
hasRole_isMember(e, ADMIN_ROLE(), e.msg.sender) || e.msg.sender == currentContract
);
}
rule restrictedFunctionsGrantRole(env e) {
require nonpayable(e);
require sanity(e);
uint64 roleId;
address account;
uint32 executionDelay;
// We want to check that the caller has the admin role before we possibly grant it.
bool hasAdminRoleBefore = hasRole_isMember(e, getRoleAdmin(roleId), e.msg.sender);
grantRole(e, roleId, account, executionDelay);
assert hasAdminRoleBefore || e.msg.sender == currentContract;
}
rule restrictedFunctionsRevokeRole(env e) {
require nonpayable(e);
require sanity(e);
uint64 roleId;
address account;
// This is needed if roleId is self-administered, the `revokeRole` call could target
// e.msg.sender and remove the very role that is necessary for authorizing the call.
bool hasAdminRoleBefore = hasRole_isMember(e, getRoleAdmin(roleId), e.msg.sender);
revokeRole(e, roleId, account);
assert hasAdminRoleBefore || e.msg.sender == currentContract;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Functions: canCall delay is enforced for calls to execute (only for others target)
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
// getScheduleChangeCall proves that only {schedule} can set an operation schedule to a non 0 value
rule callDelayEnforce_scheduleInTheFuture(env e) {
address target;
bytes data;
uint48 when;
// Condition: calling a third party with a delay
mathint delay = canCallExtended_delay(e, e.msg.sender, target, data);
require delay > 0;
// Schedule
schedule(e, target, data, when);
// Get operation schedule
mathint timepoint = getSchedule(e, hashOperation(e.msg.sender, target, data));
// Schedule is far enough in the future
assert timepoint == max(clock(e) + delay, when);
}
rule callDelayEnforce_executeAfterDelay(env e) {
address target;
bytes data;
// Condition: calling a third party with a delay
mathint delay = canCallExtended_delay(e, e.msg.sender, target, data);
// Get operation schedule before
mathint scheduleBefore = getSchedule(e, hashOperation(e.msg.sender, target, data));
// Do call
execute@withrevert(e, target, data);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// Get operation schedule after
mathint scheduleAfter = getSchedule(e, hashOperation(e.msg.sender, target, data));
// Can only execute if delay is set and has passed
assert success => (
delay > 0 => (
scheduleBefore != 0 &&
scheduleBefore <= clock(e)
) &&
scheduleAfter == 0
);
}

View File

@ -1,300 +0,0 @@
import "helpers/helpers.spec";
methods {
function pushFront(bytes32) external envfree;
function pushBack(bytes32) external envfree;
function popFront() external returns (bytes32) envfree;
function popBack() external returns (bytes32) envfree;
function clear() external envfree;
// exposed for FV
function begin() external returns (uint128) envfree;
function end() external returns (uint128) envfree;
// view
function length() external returns (uint256) envfree;
function empty() external returns (bool) envfree;
function front() external returns (bytes32) envfree;
function back() external returns (bytes32) envfree;
function at_(uint256) external returns (bytes32) envfree; // at is a reserved word
}
definition full() returns bool = length() == max_uint128;
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: empty() is length 0 and no element exists
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant emptiness()
empty() <=> length() == 0
filtered { f -> !f.isView }
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: front points to the first index and back points to the last one
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant queueFront()
at_(0) == front()
filtered { f -> !f.isView }
invariant queueBack()
at_(require_uint256(length() - 1)) == back()
filtered { f -> !f.isView }
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Function correctness: pushFront adds an element at the beginning of the queue
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule pushFront(bytes32 value) {
uint256 lengthBefore = length();
bool fullBefore = full();
pushFront@withrevert(value);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> !fullBefore, "never revert if not previously full";
// effect
assert success => front() == value, "front set to value";
assert success => to_mathint(length()) == lengthBefore + 1, "queue extended";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: pushFront preserves the previous values in the queue with a +1 offset
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule pushFrontConsistency(uint256 index) {
bytes32 beforeAt = at_(index);
bytes32 value;
pushFront(value);
// try to read value
bytes32 afterAt = at_@withrevert(require_uint256(index + 1));
assert !lastReverted, "value still there";
assert afterAt == beforeAt, "data is preserved";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Function correctness: pushBack adds an element at the end of the queue
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule pushBack(bytes32 value) {
uint256 lengthBefore = length();
bool fullBefore = full();
pushBack@withrevert(value);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> !fullBefore, "never revert if not previously full";
// effect
assert success => back() == value, "back set to value";
assert success => to_mathint(length()) == lengthBefore + 1, "queue increased";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: pushBack preserves the previous values in the queue
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule pushBackConsistency(uint256 index) {
bytes32 beforeAt = at_(index);
bytes32 value;
pushBack(value);
// try to read value
bytes32 afterAt = at_@withrevert(index);
assert !lastReverted, "value still there";
assert afterAt == beforeAt, "data is preserved";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Function correctness: popFront removes an element from the beginning of the queue
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule popFront {
uint256 lengthBefore = length();
bytes32 frontBefore = front@withrevert();
bytes32 popped = popFront@withrevert();
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> lengthBefore != 0, "never reverts if not previously empty";
// effect
assert success => frontBefore == popped, "previous front is returned";
assert success => to_mathint(length()) == lengthBefore - 1, "queue decreased";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: at(x) is preserved and offset to at(x - 1) after calling popFront |
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule popFrontConsistency(uint256 index) {
// Read (any) value that is not the front (this asserts the value exists / the queue is long enough)
require index > 1;
bytes32 before = at_(index);
popFront();
// try to read value
bytes32 after = at_@withrevert(require_uint256(index - 1));
assert !lastReverted, "value still exists in the queue";
assert before == after, "values are offset and not modified";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Function correctness: popBack removes an element from the end of the queue
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule popBack {
uint256 lengthBefore = length();
bytes32 backBefore = back@withrevert();
bytes32 popped = popBack@withrevert();
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> lengthBefore != 0, "never reverts if not previously empty";
// effect
assert success => backBefore == popped, "previous back is returned";
assert success => to_mathint(length()) == lengthBefore - 1, "queue decreased";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: at(x) is preserved after calling popBack |
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule popBackConsistency(uint256 index) {
// Read (any) value that is not the back (this asserts the value exists / the queue is long enough)
require to_mathint(index) < length() - 1;
bytes32 before = at_(index);
popBack();
// try to read value
bytes32 after = at_@withrevert(index);
assert !lastReverted, "value still exists in the queue";
assert before == after, "values are offset and not modified";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Function correctness: clear sets length to 0
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule clear {
clear@withrevert();
// liveness
assert !lastReverted, "never reverts";
// effect
assert length() == 0, "sets length to 0";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: front/back access reverts only if the queue is empty or querying out of bounds
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule onlyEmptyOrFullRevert(env e) {
require nonpayable(e);
method f;
calldataarg args;
bool emptyBefore = empty();
bool fullBefore = full();
f@withrevert(e, args);
assert lastReverted => (
(f.selector == sig:front().selector && emptyBefore) ||
(f.selector == sig:back().selector && emptyBefore) ||
(f.selector == sig:popFront().selector && emptyBefore) ||
(f.selector == sig:popBack().selector && emptyBefore) ||
(f.selector == sig:pushFront(bytes32).selector && fullBefore ) ||
(f.selector == sig:pushBack(bytes32).selector && fullBefore ) ||
f.selector == sig:at_(uint256).selector // revert conditions are verified in onlyOutOfBoundsRevert
), "only revert if empty or out of bounds";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: at(index) only reverts if index is out of bounds |
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule onlyOutOfBoundsRevert(uint256 index) {
at_@withrevert(index);
assert lastReverted <=> index >= length(), "only reverts if index is out of bounds";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: only clear/push/pop operations can change the length of the queue
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule noLengthChange(env e) {
method f;
calldataarg args;
uint256 lengthBefore = length();
f(e, args);
uint256 lengthAfter = length();
assert lengthAfter != lengthBefore => (
(f.selector == sig:pushFront(bytes32).selector && to_mathint(lengthAfter) == lengthBefore + 1) ||
(f.selector == sig:pushBack(bytes32).selector && to_mathint(lengthAfter) == lengthBefore + 1) ||
(f.selector == sig:popBack().selector && to_mathint(lengthAfter) == lengthBefore - 1) ||
(f.selector == sig:popFront().selector && to_mathint(lengthAfter) == lengthBefore - 1) ||
(f.selector == sig:clear().selector && lengthAfter == 0)
), "length is only affected by clear/pop/push operations";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: only push/pop can change values bounded in the queue (outside values aren't cleared)
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule noDataChange(env e) {
method f;
calldataarg args;
uint256 index;
bytes32 atBefore = at_(index);
f(e, args);
bytes32 atAfter = at_@withrevert(index);
bool atAfterSuccess = !lastReverted;
assert !atAfterSuccess <=> (
(f.selector == sig:clear().selector ) ||
(f.selector == sig:popBack().selector && index == length()) ||
(f.selector == sig:popFront().selector && index == length())
), "indexes of the queue are only removed by clear or pop";
assert atAfterSuccess && atAfter != atBefore => (
f.selector == sig:popFront().selector ||
f.selector == sig:pushFront(bytes32).selector
), "values of the queue are only changed by popFront or pushFront";
}

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import "helpers/helpers.spec";
import "methods/IERC20.spec";
import "methods/IERC2612.spec";
methods {
// exposed for FV
function mint(address,uint256) external;
function burn(address,uint256) external;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Ghost & hooks: sum of all balances
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
ghost mathint sumOfBalances {
init_state axiom sumOfBalances == 0;
}
// Because `balance` has a uint256 type, any balance addition in CVL1 behaved as a `require_uint256()` casting,
// leaving out the possibility of overflow. This is not the case in CVL2 where casting became more explicit.
// A counterexample in CVL2 is having an initial state where Alice initial balance is larger than totalSupply, which
// overflows Alice's balance when receiving a transfer. This is not possible unless the contract is deployed into an
// already used address (or upgraded from corrupted state).
// We restrict such behavior by making sure no balance is greater than the sum of balances.
hook Sload uint256 balance _balances[KEY address addr] STORAGE {
require sumOfBalances >= to_mathint(balance);
}
hook Sstore _balances[KEY address addr] uint256 newValue (uint256 oldValue) STORAGE {
sumOfBalances = sumOfBalances - oldValue + newValue;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: totalSupply is the sum of all balances
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances()
to_mathint(totalSupply()) == sumOfBalances;
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: balance of address(0) is 0
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant zeroAddressNoBalance()
balanceOf(0) == 0;
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rules: only mint and burn can change total supply
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule noChangeTotalSupply(env e) {
requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances();
method f;
calldataarg args;
uint256 totalSupplyBefore = totalSupply();
f(e, args);
uint256 totalSupplyAfter = totalSupply();
assert totalSupplyAfter > totalSupplyBefore => f.selector == sig:mint(address,uint256).selector;
assert totalSupplyAfter < totalSupplyBefore => f.selector == sig:burn(address,uint256).selector;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rules: only the token holder or an approved third party can reduce an account's balance
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule onlyAuthorizedCanTransfer(env e) {
requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances();
method f;
calldataarg args;
address account;
uint256 allowanceBefore = allowance(account, e.msg.sender);
uint256 balanceBefore = balanceOf(account);
f(e, args);
uint256 balanceAfter = balanceOf(account);
assert (
balanceAfter < balanceBefore
) => (
f.selector == sig:burn(address,uint256).selector ||
e.msg.sender == account ||
balanceBefore - balanceAfter <= to_mathint(allowanceBefore)
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rules: only the token holder (or a permit) can increase allowance. The spender can decrease it by using it
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule onlyHolderOfSpenderCanChangeAllowance(env e) {
requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances();
method f;
calldataarg args;
address holder;
address spender;
uint256 allowanceBefore = allowance(holder, spender);
f(e, args);
uint256 allowanceAfter = allowance(holder, spender);
assert (
allowanceAfter > allowanceBefore
) => (
(f.selector == sig:approve(address,uint256).selector && e.msg.sender == holder) ||
(f.selector == sig:permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32).selector)
);
assert (
allowanceAfter < allowanceBefore
) => (
(f.selector == sig:transferFrom(address,address,uint256).selector && e.msg.sender == spender) ||
(f.selector == sig:approve(address,uint256).selector && e.msg.sender == holder ) ||
(f.selector == sig:permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32).selector)
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rules: mint behavior and side effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule mint(env e) {
requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances();
require nonpayable(e);
address to;
address other;
uint256 amount;
// cache state
uint256 toBalanceBefore = balanceOf(to);
uint256 otherBalanceBefore = balanceOf(other);
uint256 totalSupplyBefore = totalSupply();
// run transaction
mint@withrevert(e, to, amount);
// check outcome
if (lastReverted) {
assert to == 0 || totalSupplyBefore + amount > max_uint256;
} else {
// updates balance and totalSupply
assert to_mathint(balanceOf(to)) == toBalanceBefore + amount;
assert to_mathint(totalSupply()) == totalSupplyBefore + amount;
// no other balance is modified
assert balanceOf(other) != otherBalanceBefore => other == to;
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rules: burn behavior and side effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule burn(env e) {
requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances();
require nonpayable(e);
address from;
address other;
uint256 amount;
// cache state
uint256 fromBalanceBefore = balanceOf(from);
uint256 otherBalanceBefore = balanceOf(other);
uint256 totalSupplyBefore = totalSupply();
// run transaction
burn@withrevert(e, from, amount);
// check outcome
if (lastReverted) {
assert from == 0 || fromBalanceBefore < amount;
} else {
// updates balance and totalSupply
assert to_mathint(balanceOf(from)) == fromBalanceBefore - amount;
assert to_mathint(totalSupply()) == totalSupplyBefore - amount;
// no other balance is modified
assert balanceOf(other) != otherBalanceBefore => other == from;
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: transfer behavior and side effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule transfer(env e) {
requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances();
require nonpayable(e);
address holder = e.msg.sender;
address recipient;
address other;
uint256 amount;
// cache state
uint256 holderBalanceBefore = balanceOf(holder);
uint256 recipientBalanceBefore = balanceOf(recipient);
uint256 otherBalanceBefore = balanceOf(other);
// run transaction
transfer@withrevert(e, recipient, amount);
// check outcome
if (lastReverted) {
assert holder == 0 || recipient == 0 || amount > holderBalanceBefore;
} else {
// balances of holder and recipient are updated
assert to_mathint(balanceOf(holder)) == holderBalanceBefore - (holder == recipient ? 0 : amount);
assert to_mathint(balanceOf(recipient)) == recipientBalanceBefore + (holder == recipient ? 0 : amount);
// no other balance is modified
assert balanceOf(other) != otherBalanceBefore => (other == holder || other == recipient);
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: transferFrom behavior and side effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule transferFrom(env e) {
requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances();
require nonpayable(e);
address spender = e.msg.sender;
address holder;
address recipient;
address other;
uint256 amount;
// cache state
uint256 allowanceBefore = allowance(holder, spender);
uint256 holderBalanceBefore = balanceOf(holder);
uint256 recipientBalanceBefore = balanceOf(recipient);
uint256 otherBalanceBefore = balanceOf(other);
// run transaction
transferFrom@withrevert(e, holder, recipient, amount);
// check outcome
if (lastReverted) {
assert holder == 0 || recipient == 0 || spender == 0 || amount > holderBalanceBefore || amount > allowanceBefore;
} else {
// allowance is valid & updated
assert allowanceBefore >= amount;
assert to_mathint(allowance(holder, spender)) == (allowanceBefore == max_uint256 ? max_uint256 : allowanceBefore - amount);
// balances of holder and recipient are updated
assert to_mathint(balanceOf(holder)) == holderBalanceBefore - (holder == recipient ? 0 : amount);
assert to_mathint(balanceOf(recipient)) == recipientBalanceBefore + (holder == recipient ? 0 : amount);
// no other balance is modified
assert balanceOf(other) != otherBalanceBefore => (other == holder || other == recipient);
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: approve behavior and side effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule approve(env e) {
require nonpayable(e);
address holder = e.msg.sender;
address spender;
address otherHolder;
address otherSpender;
uint256 amount;
// cache state
uint256 otherAllowanceBefore = allowance(otherHolder, otherSpender);
// run transaction
approve@withrevert(e, spender, amount);
// check outcome
if (lastReverted) {
assert holder == 0 || spender == 0;
} else {
// allowance is updated
assert allowance(holder, spender) == amount;
// other allowances are untouched
assert allowance(otherHolder, otherSpender) != otherAllowanceBefore => (otherHolder == holder && otherSpender == spender);
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: permit behavior and side effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule permit(env e) {
require nonpayable(e);
address holder;
address spender;
uint256 amount;
uint256 deadline;
uint8 v;
bytes32 r;
bytes32 s;
address account1;
address account2;
address account3;
// cache state
uint256 nonceBefore = nonces(holder);
uint256 otherNonceBefore = nonces(account1);
uint256 otherAllowanceBefore = allowance(account2, account3);
// sanity: nonce overflow, which possible in theory, is assumed to be impossible in practice
require nonceBefore < max_uint256;
require otherNonceBefore < max_uint256;
// run transaction
permit@withrevert(e, holder, spender, amount, deadline, v, r, s);
// check outcome
if (lastReverted) {
// Without formally checking the signature, we can't verify exactly the revert causes
assert true;
} else {
// allowance and nonce are updated
assert allowance(holder, spender) == amount;
assert to_mathint(nonces(holder)) == nonceBefore + 1;
// deadline was respected
assert deadline >= e.block.timestamp;
// no other allowance or nonce is modified
assert nonces(account1) != otherNonceBefore => account1 == holder;
assert allowance(account2, account3) != otherAllowanceBefore => (account2 == holder && account3 == spender);
}
}

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@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
import "helpers/helpers.spec";
import "methods/IERC20.spec";
import "methods/IERC3156FlashLender.spec";
import "methods/IERC3156FlashBorrower.spec";
methods {
// non standard ERC-3156 functions
function flashFeeReceiver() external returns (address) envfree;
// function summaries below
function _._update(address from, address to, uint256 amount) internal => specUpdate(from, to, amount) expect void ALL;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Ghost: track mint and burns in the CVL
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
ghost mapping(address => mathint) trackedMintAmount;
ghost mapping(address => mathint) trackedBurnAmount;
ghost mapping(address => mapping(address => mathint)) trackedTransferedAmount;
function specUpdate(address from, address to, uint256 amount) {
if (from == 0 && to == 0) { assert(false); } // defensive
if (from == 0) {
trackedMintAmount[to] = amount;
} else if (to == 0) {
trackedBurnAmount[from] = amount;
} else {
trackedTransferedAmount[from][to] = amount;
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: When doing a flashLoan, "amount" is minted and burnt, additionally, the fee is either burnt
(if the fee recipient is 0) or transferred (if the fee recipient is not 0)
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule checkMintAndBurn(env e) {
address receiver;
address token;
uint256 amount;
bytes data;
uint256 fees = flashFee(token, amount);
address recipient = flashFeeReceiver();
flashLoan(e, receiver, token, amount, data);
assert trackedMintAmount[receiver] == to_mathint(amount);
assert trackedBurnAmount[receiver] == amount + to_mathint(recipient == 0 ? fees : 0);
assert (fees > 0 && recipient != 0) => trackedTransferedAmount[receiver][recipient] == to_mathint(fees);
}

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@ -1,198 +0,0 @@
import "helpers/helpers.spec";
import "ERC20.spec";
methods {
function underlying() external returns(address) envfree;
function underlyingTotalSupply() external returns(uint256) envfree;
function underlyingBalanceOf(address) external returns(uint256) envfree;
function underlyingAllowanceToThis(address) external returns(uint256) envfree;
function depositFor(address, uint256) external returns(bool);
function withdrawTo(address, uint256) external returns(bool);
function recover(address) external returns(uint256);
}
use invariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances;
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Helper: consequence of `totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances` applied to underlying
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
definition underlyingBalancesLowerThanUnderlyingSupply(address a) returns bool =
underlyingBalanceOf(a) <= underlyingTotalSupply();
definition sumOfUnderlyingBalancesLowerThanUnderlyingSupply(address a, address b) returns bool =
a != b => underlyingBalanceOf(a) + underlyingBalanceOf(b) <= to_mathint(underlyingTotalSupply());
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: wrapped token can't be undercollateralized (solvency of the wrapper)
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant totalSupplyIsSmallerThanUnderlyingBalance()
totalSupply() <= underlyingBalanceOf(currentContract) &&
underlyingBalanceOf(currentContract) <= underlyingTotalSupply() &&
underlyingTotalSupply() <= max_uint256
{
preserved {
requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances;
require underlyingBalancesLowerThanUnderlyingSupply(currentContract);
}
preserved depositFor(address account, uint256 amount) with (env e) {
require sumOfUnderlyingBalancesLowerThanUnderlyingSupply(e.msg.sender, currentContract);
}
}
invariant noSelfWrap()
currentContract != underlying();
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: depositFor liveness and effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule depositFor(env e) {
require nonpayable(e);
address sender = e.msg.sender;
address receiver;
address other;
uint256 amount;
// sanity
requireInvariant noSelfWrap;
requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances;
requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSmallerThanUnderlyingBalance;
require sumOfUnderlyingBalancesLowerThanUnderlyingSupply(currentContract, sender);
uint256 balanceBefore = balanceOf(receiver);
uint256 supplyBefore = totalSupply();
uint256 senderUnderlyingBalanceBefore = underlyingBalanceOf(sender);
uint256 senderUnderlyingAllowanceBefore = underlyingAllowanceToThis(sender);
uint256 wrapperUnderlyingBalanceBefore = underlyingBalanceOf(currentContract);
uint256 underlyingSupplyBefore = underlyingTotalSupply();
uint256 otherBalanceBefore = balanceOf(other);
uint256 otherUnderlyingBalanceBefore = underlyingBalanceOf(other);
depositFor@withrevert(e, receiver, amount);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> (
sender != currentContract && // invalid sender
sender != 0 && // invalid sender
receiver != currentContract && // invalid receiver
receiver != 0 && // invalid receiver
amount <= senderUnderlyingBalanceBefore && // deposit doesn't exceed balance
amount <= senderUnderlyingAllowanceBefore // deposit doesn't exceed allowance
);
// effects
assert success => (
to_mathint(balanceOf(receiver)) == balanceBefore + amount &&
to_mathint(totalSupply()) == supplyBefore + amount &&
to_mathint(underlyingBalanceOf(currentContract)) == wrapperUnderlyingBalanceBefore + amount &&
to_mathint(underlyingBalanceOf(sender)) == senderUnderlyingBalanceBefore - amount
);
// no side effect
assert underlyingTotalSupply() == underlyingSupplyBefore;
assert balanceOf(other) != otherBalanceBefore => other == receiver;
assert underlyingBalanceOf(other) != otherUnderlyingBalanceBefore => (other == sender || other == currentContract);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: withdrawTo liveness and effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule withdrawTo(env e) {
require nonpayable(e);
address sender = e.msg.sender;
address receiver;
address other;
uint256 amount;
// sanity
requireInvariant noSelfWrap;
requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances;
requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSmallerThanUnderlyingBalance;
require sumOfUnderlyingBalancesLowerThanUnderlyingSupply(currentContract, receiver);
uint256 balanceBefore = balanceOf(sender);
uint256 supplyBefore = totalSupply();
uint256 receiverUnderlyingBalanceBefore = underlyingBalanceOf(receiver);
uint256 wrapperUnderlyingBalanceBefore = underlyingBalanceOf(currentContract);
uint256 underlyingSupplyBefore = underlyingTotalSupply();
uint256 otherBalanceBefore = balanceOf(other);
uint256 otherUnderlyingBalanceBefore = underlyingBalanceOf(other);
withdrawTo@withrevert(e, receiver, amount);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> (
sender != 0 && // invalid sender
receiver != currentContract && // invalid receiver
receiver != 0 && // invalid receiver
amount <= balanceBefore // withdraw doesn't exceed balance
);
// effects
assert success => (
to_mathint(balanceOf(sender)) == balanceBefore - amount &&
to_mathint(totalSupply()) == supplyBefore - amount &&
to_mathint(underlyingBalanceOf(currentContract)) == wrapperUnderlyingBalanceBefore - (currentContract != receiver ? amount : 0) &&
to_mathint(underlyingBalanceOf(receiver)) == receiverUnderlyingBalanceBefore + (currentContract != receiver ? amount : 0)
);
// no side effect
assert underlyingTotalSupply() == underlyingSupplyBefore;
assert balanceOf(other) != otherBalanceBefore => other == sender;
assert underlyingBalanceOf(other) != otherUnderlyingBalanceBefore => (other == receiver || other == currentContract);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: recover liveness and effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule recover(env e) {
require nonpayable(e);
address receiver;
address other;
// sanity
requireInvariant noSelfWrap;
requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances;
requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSmallerThanUnderlyingBalance;
mathint value = underlyingBalanceOf(currentContract) - totalSupply();
uint256 supplyBefore = totalSupply();
uint256 balanceBefore = balanceOf(receiver);
uint256 otherBalanceBefore = balanceOf(other);
uint256 otherUnderlyingBalanceBefore = underlyingBalanceOf(other);
recover@withrevert(e, receiver);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> receiver != 0;
// effect
assert success => (
to_mathint(balanceOf(receiver)) == balanceBefore + value &&
to_mathint(totalSupply()) == supplyBefore + value &&
totalSupply() == underlyingBalanceOf(currentContract)
);
// no side effect
assert underlyingBalanceOf(other) == otherUnderlyingBalanceBefore;
assert balanceOf(other) != otherBalanceBefore => other == receiver;
}

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@ -1,679 +0,0 @@
import "helpers/helpers.spec";
import "methods/IERC721.spec";
import "methods/IERC721Receiver.spec";
methods {
// exposed for FV
function mint(address,uint256) external;
function safeMint(address,uint256) external;
function safeMint(address,uint256,bytes) external;
function burn(uint256) external;
function unsafeOwnerOf(uint256) external returns (address) envfree;
function unsafeGetApproved(uint256) external returns (address) envfree;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Helpers
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
definition authSanity(env e) returns bool = e.msg.sender != 0;
// Could be broken in theory, but not in practice
definition balanceLimited(address account) returns bool = balanceOf(account) < max_uint256;
function helperTransferWithRevert(env e, method f, address from, address to, uint256 tokenId) {
if (f.selector == sig:transferFrom(address,address,uint256).selector) {
transferFrom@withrevert(e, from, to, tokenId);
} else if (f.selector == sig:safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256).selector) {
safeTransferFrom@withrevert(e, from, to, tokenId);
} else if (f.selector == sig:safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes).selector) {
bytes params;
require params.length < 0xffff;
safeTransferFrom@withrevert(e, from, to, tokenId, params);
} else {
calldataarg args;
f@withrevert(e, args);
}
}
function helperMintWithRevert(env e, method f, address to, uint256 tokenId) {
if (f.selector == sig:mint(address,uint256).selector) {
mint@withrevert(e, to, tokenId);
} else if (f.selector == sig:safeMint(address,uint256).selector) {
safeMint@withrevert(e, to, tokenId);
} else if (f.selector == sig:safeMint(address,uint256,bytes).selector) {
bytes params;
require params.length < 0xffff;
safeMint@withrevert(e, to, tokenId, params);
} else {
require false;
}
}
function helperSoundFnCall(env e, method f) {
if (f.selector == sig:mint(address,uint256).selector) {
address to; uint256 tokenId;
require balanceLimited(to);
requireInvariant notMintedUnset(tokenId);
mint(e, to, tokenId);
} else if (f.selector == sig:safeMint(address,uint256).selector) {
address to; uint256 tokenId;
require balanceLimited(to);
requireInvariant notMintedUnset(tokenId);
safeMint(e, to, tokenId);
} else if (f.selector == sig:safeMint(address,uint256,bytes).selector) {
address to; uint256 tokenId; bytes data;
require data.length < 0xffff;
require balanceLimited(to);
requireInvariant notMintedUnset(tokenId);
safeMint(e, to, tokenId, data);
} else if (f.selector == sig:burn(uint256).selector) {
uint256 tokenId;
requireInvariant ownerHasBalance(tokenId);
requireInvariant notMintedUnset(tokenId);
burn(e, tokenId);
} else if (f.selector == sig:transferFrom(address,address,uint256).selector) {
address from; address to; uint256 tokenId;
require balanceLimited(to);
requireInvariant ownerHasBalance(tokenId);
requireInvariant notMintedUnset(tokenId);
transferFrom(e, from, to, tokenId);
} else if (f.selector == sig:safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256).selector) {
address from; address to; uint256 tokenId;
require balanceLimited(to);
requireInvariant ownerHasBalance(tokenId);
requireInvariant notMintedUnset(tokenId);
safeTransferFrom(e, from, to, tokenId);
} else if (f.selector == sig:safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes).selector) {
address from; address to; uint256 tokenId; bytes data;
require data.length < 0xffff;
require balanceLimited(to);
requireInvariant ownerHasBalance(tokenId);
requireInvariant notMintedUnset(tokenId);
safeTransferFrom(e, from, to, tokenId, data);
} else {
calldataarg args;
f(e, args);
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Ghost & hooks: ownership count
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
ghost mathint _ownedTotal {
init_state axiom _ownedTotal == 0;
}
ghost mapping(address => mathint) _ownedByUser {
init_state axiom forall address a. _ownedByUser[a] == 0;
}
hook Sstore _owners[KEY uint256 tokenId] address newOwner (address oldOwner) STORAGE {
_ownedByUser[newOwner] = _ownedByUser[newOwner] + to_mathint(newOwner != 0 ? 1 : 0);
_ownedByUser[oldOwner] = _ownedByUser[oldOwner] - to_mathint(oldOwner != 0 ? 1 : 0);
_ownedTotal = _ownedTotal + to_mathint(newOwner != 0 ? 1 : 0) - to_mathint(oldOwner != 0 ? 1 : 0);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Ghost & hooks: sum of all balances
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
ghost mathint _supply {
init_state axiom _supply == 0;
}
ghost mapping(address => mathint) _balances {
init_state axiom forall address a. _balances[a] == 0;
}
hook Sstore _balances[KEY address addr] uint256 newValue (uint256 oldValue) STORAGE {
_supply = _supply - oldValue + newValue;
}
// TODO: This used to not be necessary. We should try to remove it. In order to do so, we will probably need to add
// many "preserved" directive that require the "balanceOfConsistency" invariant on the accounts involved.
hook Sload uint256 value _balances[KEY address user] STORAGE {
require _balances[user] == to_mathint(value);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: number of owned tokens is the sum of all balances
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant ownedTotalIsSumOfBalances()
_ownedTotal == _supply
{
preserved mint(address to, uint256 tokenId) with (env e) {
require balanceLimited(to);
}
preserved safeMint(address to, uint256 tokenId) with (env e) {
require balanceLimited(to);
}
preserved safeMint(address to, uint256 tokenId, bytes data) with (env e) {
require balanceLimited(to);
}
preserved burn(uint256 tokenId) with (env e) {
requireInvariant ownerHasBalance(tokenId);
requireInvariant balanceOfConsistency(ownerOf(tokenId));
}
preserved transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 tokenId) with (env e) {
require balanceLimited(to);
requireInvariant ownerHasBalance(tokenId);
requireInvariant balanceOfConsistency(from);
requireInvariant balanceOfConsistency(to);
}
preserved safeTransferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 tokenId) with (env e) {
require balanceLimited(to);
requireInvariant ownerHasBalance(tokenId);
requireInvariant balanceOfConsistency(from);
requireInvariant balanceOfConsistency(to);
}
preserved safeTransferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 tokenId, bytes data) with (env e) {
require balanceLimited(to);
requireInvariant ownerHasBalance(tokenId);
requireInvariant balanceOfConsistency(from);
requireInvariant balanceOfConsistency(to);
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: balanceOf is the number of tokens owned
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant balanceOfConsistency(address user)
to_mathint(balanceOf(user)) == _ownedByUser[user] &&
to_mathint(balanceOf(user)) == _balances[user]
{
preserved {
require balanceLimited(user);
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: owner of a token must have some balance
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant ownerHasBalance(uint256 tokenId)
balanceOf(ownerOf(tokenId)) > 0
{
preserved {
requireInvariant balanceOfConsistency(ownerOf(tokenId));
require balanceLimited(ownerOf(tokenId));
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: balance of address(0) is 0
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule zeroAddressBalanceRevert() {
balanceOf@withrevert(0);
assert lastReverted;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: address(0) has no authorized operator
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant zeroAddressHasNoApprovedOperator(address a)
!isApprovedForAll(0, a)
{
preserved with (env e) {
require nonzerosender(e);
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: tokens that do not exist are not owned and not approved
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant notMintedUnset(uint256 tokenId)
unsafeOwnerOf(tokenId) == 0 => unsafeGetApproved(tokenId) == 0;
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: unsafeOwnerOf and unsafeGetApproved don't revert + ownerOf and getApproved revert if token does not exist
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule notMintedRevert(uint256 tokenId) {
requireInvariant notMintedUnset(tokenId);
address _owner = unsafeOwnerOf@withrevert(tokenId);
assert !lastReverted;
address _approved = unsafeGetApproved@withrevert(tokenId);
assert !lastReverted;
address owner = ownerOf@withrevert(tokenId);
assert lastReverted <=> _owner == 0;
assert !lastReverted => _owner == owner;
address approved = getApproved@withrevert(tokenId);
assert lastReverted <=> _owner == 0;
assert !lastReverted => _approved == approved;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rules: total supply can only change through mint and burn
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule supplyChange(env e) {
require nonzerosender(e);
requireInvariant zeroAddressHasNoApprovedOperator(e.msg.sender);
mathint supplyBefore = _supply;
method f; helperSoundFnCall(e, f);
mathint supplyAfter = _supply;
assert supplyAfter > supplyBefore => (
supplyAfter == supplyBefore + 1 &&
(
f.selector == sig:mint(address,uint256).selector ||
f.selector == sig:safeMint(address,uint256).selector ||
f.selector == sig:safeMint(address,uint256,bytes).selector
)
);
assert supplyAfter < supplyBefore => (
supplyAfter == supplyBefore - 1 &&
f.selector == sig:burn(uint256).selector
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rules: balanceOf can only change through mint, burn or transfers. balanceOf cannot change by more than 1.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule balanceChange(env e, address account) {
requireInvariant balanceOfConsistency(account);
require balanceLimited(account);
mathint balanceBefore = balanceOf(account);
method f; helperSoundFnCall(e, f);
mathint balanceAfter = balanceOf(account);
// balance can change by at most 1
assert balanceBefore != balanceAfter => (
balanceAfter == balanceBefore - 1 ||
balanceAfter == balanceBefore + 1
);
// only selected function can change balances
assert balanceBefore != balanceAfter => (
f.selector == sig:transferFrom(address,address,uint256).selector ||
f.selector == sig:safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256).selector ||
f.selector == sig:safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes).selector ||
f.selector == sig:mint(address,uint256).selector ||
f.selector == sig:safeMint(address,uint256).selector ||
f.selector == sig:safeMint(address,uint256,bytes).selector ||
f.selector == sig:burn(uint256).selector
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rules: ownership can only change through mint, burn or transfers.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule ownershipChange(env e, uint256 tokenId) {
require nonzerosender(e);
requireInvariant zeroAddressHasNoApprovedOperator(e.msg.sender);
address ownerBefore = unsafeOwnerOf(tokenId);
method f; helperSoundFnCall(e, f);
address ownerAfter = unsafeOwnerOf(tokenId);
assert ownerBefore == 0 && ownerAfter != 0 => (
f.selector == sig:mint(address,uint256).selector ||
f.selector == sig:safeMint(address,uint256).selector ||
f.selector == sig:safeMint(address,uint256,bytes).selector
);
assert ownerBefore != 0 && ownerAfter == 0 => (
f.selector == sig:burn(uint256).selector
);
assert (ownerBefore != ownerAfter && ownerBefore != 0 && ownerAfter != 0) => (
f.selector == sig:transferFrom(address,address,uint256).selector ||
f.selector == sig:safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256).selector ||
f.selector == sig:safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes).selector
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rules: token approval can only change through approve or transfers (implicitly).
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule approvalChange(env e, uint256 tokenId) {
address approvalBefore = unsafeGetApproved(tokenId);
method f; helperSoundFnCall(e, f);
address approvalAfter = unsafeGetApproved(tokenId);
// approve can set any value, other functions reset
assert approvalBefore != approvalAfter => (
f.selector == sig:approve(address,uint256).selector ||
(
(
f.selector == sig:transferFrom(address,address,uint256).selector ||
f.selector == sig:safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256).selector ||
f.selector == sig:safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes).selector ||
f.selector == sig:burn(uint256).selector
) && approvalAfter == 0
)
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rules: approval for all tokens can only change through isApprovedForAll.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule approvedForAllChange(env e, address owner, address spender) {
bool approvedForAllBefore = isApprovedForAll(owner, spender);
method f; helperSoundFnCall(e, f);
bool approvedForAllAfter = isApprovedForAll(owner, spender);
assert approvedForAllBefore != approvedForAllAfter => f.selector == sig:setApprovalForAll(address,bool).selector;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: transferFrom behavior and side effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule transferFrom(env e, address from, address to, uint256 tokenId) {
require nonpayable(e);
require authSanity(e);
address operator = e.msg.sender;
uint256 otherTokenId;
address otherAccount;
requireInvariant ownerHasBalance(tokenId);
require balanceLimited(to);
uint256 balanceOfFromBefore = balanceOf(from);
uint256 balanceOfToBefore = balanceOf(to);
uint256 balanceOfOtherBefore = balanceOf(otherAccount);
address ownerBefore = unsafeOwnerOf(tokenId);
address otherOwnerBefore = unsafeOwnerOf(otherTokenId);
address approvalBefore = unsafeGetApproved(tokenId);
address otherApprovalBefore = unsafeGetApproved(otherTokenId);
transferFrom@withrevert(e, from, to, tokenId);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> (
from == ownerBefore &&
from != 0 &&
to != 0 &&
(operator == from || operator == approvalBefore || isApprovedForAll(ownerBefore, operator))
);
// effect
assert success => (
to_mathint(balanceOf(from)) == balanceOfFromBefore - assert_uint256(from != to ? 1 : 0) &&
to_mathint(balanceOf(to)) == balanceOfToBefore + assert_uint256(from != to ? 1 : 0) &&
unsafeOwnerOf(tokenId) == to &&
unsafeGetApproved(tokenId) == 0
);
// no side effect
assert balanceOf(otherAccount) != balanceOfOtherBefore => (otherAccount == from || otherAccount == to);
assert unsafeOwnerOf(otherTokenId) != otherOwnerBefore => otherTokenId == tokenId;
assert unsafeGetApproved(otherTokenId) != otherApprovalBefore => otherTokenId == tokenId;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: safeTransferFrom behavior and side effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule safeTransferFrom(env e, method f, address from, address to, uint256 tokenId) filtered { f ->
f.selector == sig:safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256).selector ||
f.selector == sig:safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes).selector
} {
require nonpayable(e);
require authSanity(e);
address operator = e.msg.sender;
uint256 otherTokenId;
address otherAccount;
requireInvariant ownerHasBalance(tokenId);
require balanceLimited(to);
uint256 balanceOfFromBefore = balanceOf(from);
uint256 balanceOfToBefore = balanceOf(to);
uint256 balanceOfOtherBefore = balanceOf(otherAccount);
address ownerBefore = unsafeOwnerOf(tokenId);
address otherOwnerBefore = unsafeOwnerOf(otherTokenId);
address approvalBefore = unsafeGetApproved(tokenId);
address otherApprovalBefore = unsafeGetApproved(otherTokenId);
helperTransferWithRevert(e, f, from, to, tokenId);
bool success = !lastReverted;
assert success <=> (
from == ownerBefore &&
from != 0 &&
to != 0 &&
(operator == from || operator == approvalBefore || isApprovedForAll(ownerBefore, operator))
);
// effect
assert success => (
to_mathint(balanceOf(from)) == balanceOfFromBefore - assert_uint256(from != to ? 1: 0) &&
to_mathint(balanceOf(to)) == balanceOfToBefore + assert_uint256(from != to ? 1: 0) &&
unsafeOwnerOf(tokenId) == to &&
unsafeGetApproved(tokenId) == 0
);
// no side effect
assert balanceOf(otherAccount) != balanceOfOtherBefore => (otherAccount == from || otherAccount == to);
assert unsafeOwnerOf(otherTokenId) != otherOwnerBefore => otherTokenId == tokenId;
assert unsafeGetApproved(otherTokenId) != otherApprovalBefore => otherTokenId == tokenId;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: mint behavior and side effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule mint(env e, address to, uint256 tokenId) {
require nonpayable(e);
requireInvariant notMintedUnset(tokenId);
uint256 otherTokenId;
address otherAccount;
require balanceLimited(to);
mathint supplyBefore = _supply;
uint256 balanceOfToBefore = balanceOf(to);
uint256 balanceOfOtherBefore = balanceOf(otherAccount);
address ownerBefore = unsafeOwnerOf(tokenId);
address otherOwnerBefore = unsafeOwnerOf(otherTokenId);
mint@withrevert(e, to, tokenId);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> (
ownerBefore == 0 &&
to != 0
);
// effect
assert success => (
_supply == supplyBefore + 1 &&
to_mathint(balanceOf(to)) == balanceOfToBefore + 1 &&
unsafeOwnerOf(tokenId) == to
);
// no side effect
assert balanceOf(otherAccount) != balanceOfOtherBefore => otherAccount == to;
assert unsafeOwnerOf(otherTokenId) != otherOwnerBefore => otherTokenId == tokenId;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: safeMint behavior and side effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule safeMint(env e, method f, address to, uint256 tokenId) filtered { f ->
f.selector == sig:safeMint(address,uint256).selector ||
f.selector == sig:safeMint(address,uint256,bytes).selector
} {
require nonpayable(e);
requireInvariant notMintedUnset(tokenId);
uint256 otherTokenId;
address otherAccount;
require balanceLimited(to);
mathint supplyBefore = _supply;
uint256 balanceOfToBefore = balanceOf(to);
uint256 balanceOfOtherBefore = balanceOf(otherAccount);
address ownerBefore = unsafeOwnerOf(tokenId);
address otherOwnerBefore = unsafeOwnerOf(otherTokenId);
helperMintWithRevert(e, f, to, tokenId);
bool success = !lastReverted;
assert success <=> (
ownerBefore == 0 &&
to != 0
);
// effect
assert success => (
_supply == supplyBefore + 1 &&
to_mathint(balanceOf(to)) == balanceOfToBefore + 1 &&
unsafeOwnerOf(tokenId) == to
);
// no side effect
assert balanceOf(otherAccount) != balanceOfOtherBefore => otherAccount == to;
assert unsafeOwnerOf(otherTokenId) != otherOwnerBefore => otherTokenId == tokenId;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: burn behavior and side effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule burn(env e, uint256 tokenId) {
require nonpayable(e);
address from = unsafeOwnerOf(tokenId);
uint256 otherTokenId;
address otherAccount;
requireInvariant ownerHasBalance(tokenId);
mathint supplyBefore = _supply;
uint256 balanceOfFromBefore = balanceOf(from);
uint256 balanceOfOtherBefore = balanceOf(otherAccount);
address ownerBefore = unsafeOwnerOf(tokenId);
address otherOwnerBefore = unsafeOwnerOf(otherTokenId);
address otherApprovalBefore = unsafeGetApproved(otherTokenId);
burn@withrevert(e, tokenId);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> (
ownerBefore != 0
);
// effect
assert success => (
_supply == supplyBefore - 1 &&
to_mathint(balanceOf(from)) == balanceOfFromBefore - 1 &&
unsafeOwnerOf(tokenId) == 0 &&
unsafeGetApproved(tokenId) == 0
);
// no side effect
assert balanceOf(otherAccount) != balanceOfOtherBefore => otherAccount == from;
assert unsafeOwnerOf(otherTokenId) != otherOwnerBefore => otherTokenId == tokenId;
assert unsafeGetApproved(otherTokenId) != otherApprovalBefore => otherTokenId == tokenId;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: approve behavior and side effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule approve(env e, address spender, uint256 tokenId) {
require nonpayable(e);
require authSanity(e);
address caller = e.msg.sender;
address owner = unsafeOwnerOf(tokenId);
uint256 otherTokenId;
address otherApprovalBefore = unsafeGetApproved(otherTokenId);
approve@withrevert(e, spender, tokenId);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> (
owner != 0 &&
(owner == caller || isApprovedForAll(owner, caller))
);
// effect
assert success => unsafeGetApproved(tokenId) == spender;
// no side effect
assert unsafeGetApproved(otherTokenId) != otherApprovalBefore => otherTokenId == tokenId;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: setApprovalForAll behavior and side effects
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule setApprovalForAll(env e, address operator, bool approved) {
require nonpayable(e);
address owner = e.msg.sender;
address otherOwner;
address otherOperator;
bool otherIsApprovedForAllBefore = isApprovedForAll(otherOwner, otherOperator);
setApprovalForAll@withrevert(e, operator, approved);
bool success = !lastReverted;
// liveness
assert success <=> operator != 0;
// effect
assert success => isApprovedForAll(owner, operator) == approved;
// no side effect
assert isApprovedForAll(otherOwner, otherOperator) != otherIsApprovedForAllBefore => (
otherOwner == owner &&
otherOperator == operator
);
}

View File

@ -1,333 +0,0 @@
import "helpers/helpers.spec";
methods {
// library
function set(bytes32,bytes32) external returns (bool) envfree;
function remove(bytes32) external returns (bool) envfree;
function contains(bytes32) external returns (bool) envfree;
function length() external returns (uint256) envfree;
function key_at(uint256) external returns (bytes32) envfree;
function value_at(uint256) external returns (bytes32) envfree;
function tryGet_contains(bytes32) external returns (bool) envfree;
function tryGet_value(bytes32) external returns (bytes32) envfree;
function get(bytes32) external returns (bytes32) envfree;
// FV
function _positionOf(bytes32) external returns (uint256) envfree;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Helpers
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
definition sanity() returns bool =
length() < max_uint256;
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: the value mapping is empty for keys that are not in the EnumerableMap.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant noValueIfNotContained(bytes32 key)
!contains(key) => tryGet_value(key) == to_bytes32(0)
{
preserved set(bytes32 otherKey, bytes32 someValue) {
require sanity();
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: All indexed keys are contained
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant indexedContained(uint256 index)
index < length() => contains(key_at(index))
{
preserved {
requireInvariant consistencyIndex(index);
requireInvariant consistencyIndex(require_uint256(length() - 1));
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: A value can only be stored at a single location
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant atUniqueness(uint256 index1, uint256 index2)
index1 == index2 <=> key_at(index1) == key_at(index2)
{
preserved remove(bytes32 key) {
requireInvariant atUniqueness(index1, require_uint256(length() - 1));
requireInvariant atUniqueness(index2, require_uint256(length() - 1));
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: index <> value relationship is consistent
Note that the two consistencyXxx invariants, put together, prove that at_ and _positionOf are inverse of one
another. This proves that we have a bijection between indices (the enumerability part) and keys (the entries that
are set and removed from the EnumerableMap).
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant consistencyIndex(uint256 index)
index < length() => to_mathint(_positionOf(key_at(index))) == index + 1
{
preserved remove(bytes32 key) {
requireInvariant consistencyIndex(require_uint256(length() - 1));
}
}
invariant consistencyKey(bytes32 key)
contains(key) => (
_positionOf(key) > 0 &&
_positionOf(key) <= length() &&
key_at(require_uint256(_positionOf(key) - 1)) == key
)
{
preserved remove(bytes32 otherKey) {
requireInvariant consistencyKey(otherKey);
requireInvariant atUniqueness(
require_uint256(_positionOf(key) - 1),
require_uint256(_positionOf(otherKey) - 1)
);
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: state only changes by setting or removing elements
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule stateChange(env e, bytes32 key) {
require sanity();
requireInvariant consistencyKey(key);
uint256 lengthBefore = length();
bool containsBefore = contains(key);
bytes32 valueBefore = tryGet_value(key);
method f;
calldataarg args;
f(e, args);
uint256 lengthAfter = length();
bool containsAfter = contains(key);
bytes32 valueAfter = tryGet_value(key);
assert lengthBefore != lengthAfter => (
(f.selector == sig:set(bytes32,bytes32).selector && to_mathint(lengthAfter) == lengthBefore + 1) ||
(f.selector == sig:remove(bytes32).selector && to_mathint(lengthAfter) == lengthBefore - 1)
);
assert containsBefore != containsAfter => (
(f.selector == sig:set(bytes32,bytes32).selector && containsAfter) ||
(f.selector == sig:remove(bytes32).selector && !containsAfter)
);
assert valueBefore != valueAfter => (
(f.selector == sig:set(bytes32,bytes32).selector && containsAfter) ||
(f.selector == sig:remove(bytes32).selector && !containsAfter && valueAfter == to_bytes32(0))
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: check liveness of view functions.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule liveness_1(bytes32 key) {
requireInvariant consistencyKey(key);
// contains never revert
bool contains = contains@withrevert(key);
assert !lastReverted;
// tryGet never reverts (key)
tryGet_contains@withrevert(key);
assert !lastReverted;
// tryGet never reverts (value)
tryGet_value@withrevert(key);
assert !lastReverted;
// get reverts iff the key is not in the map
get@withrevert(key);
assert !lastReverted <=> contains;
}
rule liveness_2(uint256 index) {
requireInvariant consistencyIndex(index);
// length never revert
uint256 length = length@withrevert();
assert !lastReverted;
// key_at reverts iff the index is out of bound
key_at@withrevert(index);
assert !lastReverted <=> index < length;
// value_at reverts iff the index is out of bound
value_at@withrevert(index);
assert !lastReverted <=> index < length;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: get and tryGet return the expected values.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule getAndTryGet(bytes32 key) {
requireInvariant noValueIfNotContained(key);
bool contained = contains(key);
bool tryContained = tryGet_contains(key);
bytes32 tryValue = tryGet_value(key);
bytes32 value = get@withrevert(key); // revert is not contained
assert contained == tryContained;
assert contained => tryValue == value;
assert !contained => tryValue == to_bytes32(0);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: set key-value in EnumerableMap
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule set(bytes32 key, bytes32 value, bytes32 otherKey) {
require sanity();
uint256 lengthBefore = length();
bool containsBefore = contains(key);
bool containsOtherBefore = contains(otherKey);
bytes32 otherValueBefore = tryGet_value(otherKey);
bool added = set@withrevert(key, value);
bool success = !lastReverted;
assert success && contains(key) && get(key) == value,
"liveness & immediate effect";
assert added <=> !containsBefore,
"return value: added iff not contained";
assert to_mathint(length()) == lengthBefore + to_mathint(added ? 1 : 0),
"effect: length increases iff added";
assert added => (key_at(lengthBefore) == key && value_at(lengthBefore) == value),
"effect: add at the end";
assert containsOtherBefore != contains(otherKey) => (added && key == otherKey),
"side effect: other keys are not affected";
assert otherValueBefore != tryGet_value(otherKey) => key == otherKey,
"side effect: values attached to other keys are not affected";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: remove key from EnumerableMap
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule remove(bytes32 key, bytes32 otherKey) {
requireInvariant consistencyKey(key);
requireInvariant consistencyKey(otherKey);
uint256 lengthBefore = length();
bool containsBefore = contains(key);
bool containsOtherBefore = contains(otherKey);
bytes32 otherValueBefore = tryGet_value(otherKey);
bool removed = remove@withrevert(key);
bool success = !lastReverted;
assert success && !contains(key),
"liveness & immediate effect";
assert removed <=> containsBefore,
"return value: removed iff contained";
assert to_mathint(length()) == lengthBefore - to_mathint(removed ? 1 : 0),
"effect: length decreases iff removed";
assert containsOtherBefore != contains(otherKey) => (removed && key == otherKey),
"side effect: other keys are not affected";
assert otherValueBefore != tryGet_value(otherKey) => key == otherKey,
"side effect: values attached to other keys are not affected";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: when adding a new key, the other keys remain in set, at the same index.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule setEnumerability(bytes32 key, bytes32 value, uint256 index) {
require sanity();
bytes32 atKeyBefore = key_at(index);
bytes32 atValueBefore = value_at(index);
set(key, value);
bytes32 atKeyAfter = key_at@withrevert(index);
assert !lastReverted;
bytes32 atValueAfter = value_at@withrevert(index);
assert !lastReverted;
assert atKeyAfter == atKeyBefore;
assert atValueAfter != atValueBefore => (
key == atKeyBefore &&
value == atValueAfter
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: when removing a existing key, the other keys remain in set, at the same index (except for the last one).
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule removeEnumerability(bytes32 key, uint256 index) {
uint256 last = require_uint256(length() - 1);
requireInvariant consistencyKey(key);
requireInvariant consistencyIndex(index);
requireInvariant consistencyIndex(last);
bytes32 atKeyBefore = key_at(index);
bytes32 atValueBefore = value_at(index);
bytes32 lastKeyBefore = key_at(last);
bytes32 lastValueBefore = value_at(last);
remove(key);
// can't read last value & keys (length decreased)
bytes32 atKeyAfter = key_at@withrevert(index);
assert lastReverted <=> index == last;
bytes32 atValueAfter = value_at@withrevert(index);
assert lastReverted <=> index == last;
// One value that is allowed to change is if previous value was removed,
// in that case the last value before took its place.
assert (
index != last &&
atKeyBefore != atKeyAfter
) => (
atKeyBefore == key &&
atKeyAfter == lastKeyBefore
);
assert (
index != last &&
atValueBefore != atValueAfter
) => (
atValueAfter == lastValueBefore
);
}

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@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
import "helpers/helpers.spec";
methods {
// library
function add(bytes32) external returns (bool) envfree;
function remove(bytes32) external returns (bool) envfree;
function contains(bytes32) external returns (bool) envfree;
function length() external returns (uint256) envfree;
function at_(uint256) external returns (bytes32) envfree;
// FV
function _positionOf(bytes32) external returns (uint256) envfree;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Helpers
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
definition sanity() returns bool =
length() < max_uint256;
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: All indexed keys are contained
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant indexedContained(uint256 index)
index < length() => contains(at_(index))
{
preserved {
requireInvariant consistencyIndex(index);
requireInvariant consistencyIndex(require_uint256(length() - 1));
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: A value can only be stored at a single location
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant atUniqueness(uint256 index1, uint256 index2)
index1 == index2 <=> at_(index1) == at_(index2)
{
preserved remove(bytes32 key) {
requireInvariant atUniqueness(index1, require_uint256(length() - 1));
requireInvariant atUniqueness(index2, require_uint256(length() - 1));
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: index <> key relationship is consistent
Note that the two consistencyXxx invariants, put together, prove that at_ and _positionOf are inverse of one
another. This proves that we have a bijection between indices (the enumerability part) and keys (the entries that
are added and removed from the EnumerableSet).
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant consistencyIndex(uint256 index)
index < length() => _positionOf(at_(index)) == require_uint256(index + 1)
{
preserved remove(bytes32 key) {
requireInvariant consistencyIndex(require_uint256(length() - 1));
}
}
invariant consistencyKey(bytes32 key)
contains(key) => (
_positionOf(key) > 0 &&
_positionOf(key) <= length() &&
at_(require_uint256(_positionOf(key) - 1)) == key
)
{
preserved remove(bytes32 otherKey) {
requireInvariant consistencyKey(otherKey);
requireInvariant atUniqueness(
require_uint256(_positionOf(key) - 1),
require_uint256(_positionOf(otherKey) - 1)
);
}
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: state only changes by adding or removing elements
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule stateChange(env e, bytes32 key) {
require sanity();
requireInvariant consistencyKey(key);
uint256 lengthBefore = length();
bool containsBefore = contains(key);
method f;
calldataarg args;
f(e, args);
uint256 lengthAfter = length();
bool containsAfter = contains(key);
assert lengthBefore != lengthAfter => (
(f.selector == sig:add(bytes32).selector && lengthAfter == require_uint256(lengthBefore + 1)) ||
(f.selector == sig:remove(bytes32).selector && lengthAfter == require_uint256(lengthBefore - 1))
);
assert containsBefore != containsAfter => (
(f.selector == sig:add(bytes32).selector && containsAfter) ||
(f.selector == sig:remove(bytes32).selector && containsBefore)
);
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: check liveness of view functions.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule liveness_1(bytes32 key) {
requireInvariant consistencyKey(key);
// contains never revert
contains@withrevert(key);
assert !lastReverted;
}
rule liveness_2(uint256 index) {
requireInvariant consistencyIndex(index);
// length never revert
uint256 length = length@withrevert();
assert !lastReverted;
// at reverts iff the index is out of bound
at_@withrevert(index);
assert !lastReverted <=> index < length;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: add key to EnumerableSet if not already contained
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule add(bytes32 key, bytes32 otherKey) {
require sanity();
uint256 lengthBefore = length();
bool containsBefore = contains(key);
bool containsOtherBefore = contains(otherKey);
bool added = add@withrevert(key);
bool success = !lastReverted;
assert success && contains(key),
"liveness & immediate effect";
assert added <=> !containsBefore,
"return value: added iff not contained";
assert length() == require_uint256(lengthBefore + to_mathint(added ? 1 : 0)),
"effect: length increases iff added";
assert added => at_(lengthBefore) == key,
"effect: add at the end";
assert containsOtherBefore != contains(otherKey) => (added && key == otherKey),
"side effect: other keys are not affected";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: remove key from EnumerableSet if already contained
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule remove(bytes32 key, bytes32 otherKey) {
requireInvariant consistencyKey(key);
requireInvariant consistencyKey(otherKey);
uint256 lengthBefore = length();
bool containsBefore = contains(key);
bool containsOtherBefore = contains(otherKey);
bool removed = remove@withrevert(key);
bool success = !lastReverted;
assert success && !contains(key),
"liveness & immediate effect";
assert removed <=> containsBefore,
"return value: removed iff contained";
assert length() == require_uint256(lengthBefore - to_mathint(removed ? 1 : 0)),
"effect: length decreases iff removed";
assert containsOtherBefore != contains(otherKey) => (removed && key == otherKey),
"side effect: other keys are not affected";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: when adding a new key, the other keys remain in set, at the same index.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule addEnumerability(bytes32 key, uint256 index) {
require sanity();
bytes32 atBefore = at_(index);
add(key);
bytes32 atAfter = at_@withrevert(index);
bool atAfterSuccess = !lastReverted;
assert atAfterSuccess;
assert atBefore == atAfter;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: when removing a existing key, the other keys remain in set, at the same index (except for the last one).
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule removeEnumerability(bytes32 key, uint256 index) {
uint256 last = require_uint256(length() - 1);
requireInvariant consistencyKey(key);
requireInvariant consistencyIndex(index);
requireInvariant consistencyIndex(last);
bytes32 atBefore = at_(index);
bytes32 lastBefore = at_(last);
remove(key);
// can't read last value (length decreased)
bytes32 atAfter = at_@withrevert(index);
assert lastReverted <=> index == last;
// One value that is allowed to change is if previous value was removed,
// in that case the last value before took its place.
assert (
index != last &&
atBefore != atAfter
) => (
atBefore == key &&
atAfter == lastBefore
);
}

View File

@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
import "helpers/helpers.spec";
methods {
// initialize, reinitialize, disable
function initialize() external envfree;
function reinitialize(uint64) external envfree;
function disable() external envfree;
function nested_init_init() external envfree;
function nested_init_reinit(uint64) external envfree;
function nested_reinit_init(uint64) external envfree;
function nested_reinit_reinit(uint64,uint64) external envfree;
// view
function version() external returns uint64 envfree;
function initializing() external returns bool envfree;
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Definitions
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
definition isUninitialized() returns bool = version() == 0;
definition isInitialized() returns bool = version() > 0;
definition isDisabled() returns bool = version() == max_uint64;
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Invariant: A contract must only ever be in an initializing state while in the middle of a transaction execution.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
invariant notInitializing()
!initializing();
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: The version cannot decrease & disable state is irrevocable.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule increasingVersion(env e) {
uint64 versionBefore = version();
bool disabledBefore = isDisabled();
method f; calldataarg args;
f(e, args);
assert versionBefore <= version(), "_initialized must only increase";
assert disabledBefore => isDisabled(), "a disabled initializer must stay disabled";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: Cannot initialize a contract that is already initialized.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule cannotInitializeTwice() {
require isInitialized();
initialize@withrevert();
assert lastReverted, "contract must only be initialized once";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: Cannot initialize once disabled.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule cannotInitializeOnceDisabled() {
require isDisabled();
initialize@withrevert();
assert lastReverted, "contract is disabled";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: Cannot reinitialize once disabled.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule cannotReinitializeOnceDisabled() {
require isDisabled();
uint64 n;
reinitialize@withrevert(n);
assert lastReverted, "contract is disabled";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: Cannot nest initializers (after construction).
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule cannotNestInitializers_init_init() {
nested_init_init@withrevert();
assert lastReverted, "nested initializers";
}
rule cannotNestInitializers_init_reinit(uint64 m) {
nested_init_reinit@withrevert(m);
assert lastReverted, "nested initializers";
}
rule cannotNestInitializers_reinit_init(uint64 n) {
nested_reinit_init@withrevert(n);
assert lastReverted, "nested initializers";
}
rule cannotNestInitializers_reinit_reinit(uint64 n, uint64 m) {
nested_reinit_reinit@withrevert(n, m);
assert lastReverted, "nested initializers";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: Initialize correctly sets the version.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule initializeEffects() {
requireInvariant notInitializing();
bool isUninitializedBefore = isUninitialized();
initialize@withrevert();
bool success = !lastReverted;
assert success <=> isUninitializedBefore, "can only initialize uninitialized contracts";
assert success => version() == 1, "initialize must set version() to 1";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: Reinitialize correctly sets the version.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule reinitializeEffects() {
requireInvariant notInitializing();
uint64 versionBefore = version();
uint64 n;
reinitialize@withrevert(n);
bool success = !lastReverted;
assert success <=> versionBefore < n, "can only reinitialize to a latter versions";
assert success => version() == n, "reinitialize must set version() to n";
}
/*
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
Rule: Can disable.
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
*/
rule disableEffect() {
requireInvariant notInitializing();
disable@withrevert();
bool success = !lastReverted;
assert success, "call to _disableInitializers failed";
assert isDisabled(), "disable state not set";
}

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