call trace error
This commit is contained in:
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
diff -ruN access/AccessControl.sol access/AccessControl.sol
|
||||
--- access/AccessControl.sol 2022-03-02 09:14:55.000000000 -0800
|
||||
+++ access/AccessControl.sol 2022-03-24 16:41:46.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ access/AccessControl.sol 2022-03-24 18:08:46.000000000 -0700
|
||||
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
|
||||
*
|
||||
* _Available since v4.6._
|
||||
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ diff -ruN access/AccessControl.sol access/AccessControl.sol
|
||||
|
||||
diff -ruN governance/TimelockController.sol governance/TimelockController.sol
|
||||
--- governance/TimelockController.sol 2022-03-02 09:14:55.000000000 -0800
|
||||
+++ governance/TimelockController.sol 2022-03-24 16:41:46.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ governance/TimelockController.sol 2022-03-24 18:08:46.000000000 -0700
|
||||
@@ -24,10 +24,10 @@
|
||||
bytes32 public constant TIMELOCK_ADMIN_ROLE = keccak256("TIMELOCK_ADMIN_ROLE");
|
||||
bytes32 public constant PROPOSER_ROLE = keccak256("PROPOSER_ROLE");
|
||||
@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ diff -ruN governance/TimelockController.sol governance/TimelockController.sol
|
||||
+}
|
||||
diff -ruN governance/utils/Votes.sol governance/utils/Votes.sol
|
||||
--- governance/utils/Votes.sol 2022-03-02 09:14:55.000000000 -0800
|
||||
+++ governance/utils/Votes.sol 2022-03-24 16:41:46.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ governance/utils/Votes.sol 2022-03-24 18:08:46.000000000 -0700
|
||||
@@ -207,5 +207,5 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @dev Must return the voting units held by an account.
|
||||
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ diff -ruN governance/utils/Votes.sol governance/utils/Votes.sol
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff -ruN token/ERC20/ERC20.sol token/ERC20/ERC20.sol
|
||||
--- token/ERC20/ERC20.sol 2022-03-02 09:14:55.000000000 -0800
|
||||
+++ token/ERC20/ERC20.sol 2022-03-24 16:41:46.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ token/ERC20/ERC20.sol 2022-03-24 18:08:46.000000000 -0700
|
||||
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@
|
||||
* - `account` cannot be the zero address.
|
||||
* - `account` must have at least `amount` tokens.
|
||||
@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ diff -ruN token/ERC20/ERC20.sol token/ERC20/ERC20.sol
|
||||
/**
|
||||
diff -ruN token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20FlashMint.sol token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20FlashMint.sol
|
||||
--- token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20FlashMint.sol 2022-03-02 09:14:55.000000000 -0800
|
||||
+++ token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20FlashMint.sol 2022-03-24 16:41:46.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20FlashMint.sol 2022-03-24 18:08:46.000000000 -0700
|
||||
@@ -40,9 +40,11 @@
|
||||
require(token == address(this), "ERC20FlashMint: wrong token");
|
||||
// silence warning about unused variable without the addition of bytecode.
|
||||
@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ diff -ruN token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20FlashMint.sol token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20
|
||||
uint256 currentAllowance = allowance(address(receiver), address(this));
|
||||
diff -ruN token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Votes.sol token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Votes.sol
|
||||
--- token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Votes.sol 2022-03-02 09:14:55.000000000 -0800
|
||||
+++ token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Votes.sol 2022-03-24 17:15:51.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Votes.sol 2022-03-25 13:13:49.000000000 -0700
|
||||
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
|
||||
bytes32 private constant _DELEGATION_TYPEHASH =
|
||||
keccak256("Delegation(address delegatee,uint256 nonce,uint256 expiry)");
|
||||
@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ diff -ruN token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Votes.sol token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Vote
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff -ruN token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Wrapper.sol token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Wrapper.sol
|
||||
--- token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Wrapper.sol 2022-03-02 09:14:55.000000000 -0800
|
||||
+++ token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Wrapper.sol 2022-03-24 16:41:46.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Wrapper.sol 2022-03-24 18:08:46.000000000 -0700
|
||||
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
|
||||
* @dev Mint wrapped token to cover any underlyingTokens that would have been transferred by mistake. Internal
|
||||
* function that can be exposed with access control if desired.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -18,5 +18,15 @@ contract ERC20VotesHarness is ERC20Votes {
|
||||
function burn(address account, uint256 amount) public {
|
||||
_burn(account, amount);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function delegateBySig(
|
||||
address delegatee,
|
||||
uint256 nonce,
|
||||
uint256 expiry,
|
||||
uint8 v,
|
||||
bytes32 r,
|
||||
bytes32 s
|
||||
) public virtual override { }
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -19,5 +19,4 @@ certoraRun \
|
||||
--optimistic_loop \
|
||||
--rule ${rule} \
|
||||
--msg "${msg}" \
|
||||
--staging \
|
||||
# --rule_sanity \
|
||||
@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ methods {
|
||||
getPastTotalSupply(uint256) returns (uint256)
|
||||
delegate(address)
|
||||
_delegate(address, address)
|
||||
delegateBySig(address, uint256, uint256, uint8, bytes32, bytes32)
|
||||
// delegateBySig(address, uint256, uint256, uint8, bytes32, bytes32)
|
||||
totalSupply() returns (uint256) envfree
|
||||
_maxSupply() returns (uint224) envfree
|
||||
|
||||
@ -32,9 +32,13 @@ ghost userVotes(address) returns uint224;
|
||||
|
||||
// sums the total votes for all users
|
||||
ghost totalVotes() returns mathint {
|
||||
axiom totalVotes() > 0;
|
||||
axiom totalVotes() >= 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// helper
|
||||
|
||||
invariant totalVotes_gte_accounts(address a, address b)
|
||||
totalVotes() >= getVotes(a) + getVotes(b)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
hook Sstore _checkpoints[KEY address account][INDEX uint32 index].votes uint224 newVotes (uint224 oldVotes) STORAGE {
|
||||
@ -95,32 +99,45 @@ invariant maxInt_constrains_numBlocks(address account)
|
||||
invariant fromBlock_constrains_numBlocks(address account)
|
||||
numCheckpoints(account) <= lastFromBlock(account)
|
||||
|
||||
// this fails, which makes sense because there is no require about the previous fromBlock
|
||||
invariant unique_checkpoints(address account)
|
||||
!doubleFromBlock(account)
|
||||
|
||||
// if an account has been delegated too, then both accounts must have a checkpoint
|
||||
invariant delegated_implies_checkpoints(address delegator, address delegatee)
|
||||
delegates(delegator) == delegatee => numCheckpoints(delegator) > 0 && numCheckpoints(delegatee) > 0
|
||||
{ preserved with (env e) {
|
||||
require delegatee != 0;
|
||||
require balanceOf(e, delegator) > 0;
|
||||
}}
|
||||
|
||||
// assumes neither account has delegated
|
||||
rule transfer_safe() {
|
||||
env e;
|
||||
uint256 amount;
|
||||
address a; address b;
|
||||
require a != b;
|
||||
// requireInvariant totalVotes_gte_accounts(a, b);
|
||||
|
||||
uint256 votesA_pre = getVotes(a);
|
||||
uint256 votesB_pre = getVotes(b);
|
||||
address delegateA = delegates(a);
|
||||
address delegateB = delegates(b);
|
||||
|
||||
require votesA_pre == erc20votes.balanceOf(e, a);
|
||||
require votesB_pre == erc20votes.balanceOf(e, b);
|
||||
uint256 votesA_pre = getVotes(delegateA);
|
||||
uint256 votesB_pre = getVotes(delegateB);
|
||||
|
||||
mathint totalVotes_pre = totalVotes();
|
||||
|
||||
erc20votes.transferFrom(e, a, b, amount);
|
||||
|
||||
mathint totalVotes_post = totalVotes();
|
||||
uint256 votesA_post = getVotes(a);
|
||||
uint256 votesB_post = getVotes(b);
|
||||
uint256 votesA_post = getVotes(delegateA);
|
||||
uint256 votesB_post = getVotes(delegateB);
|
||||
|
||||
// if an account that has not delegated transfers balance to an account that has, it will increase the total supply of votes
|
||||
assert totalVotes_pre == totalVotes_post, "transfer changed total supply";
|
||||
assert votesA_pre - votesA_post == amount, "a lost the proper amount of votes";
|
||||
assert votesB_post - votesB_pre == amount, "b lost the proper amount of votes";
|
||||
assert delegateA == delegates(a) && delegateB == delegates(b), "delegates changed by transfer";
|
||||
assert delegateA != 0 => votesA_pre - votesA_post == amount, "a lost the proper amount of votes";
|
||||
assert delegateB != 0 => votesB_post - votesB_pre == amount, "b lost the proper amount of votes";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -144,7 +161,9 @@ rule delegator_votes_removed() {
|
||||
rule delegatee_receives_votes() {
|
||||
env e;
|
||||
address delegator; address delegatee;
|
||||
|
||||
require delegator != delegatee;
|
||||
require delegates(delegator) != delegatee;
|
||||
|
||||
uint256 delegator_bal = balanceOf(e, delegator);
|
||||
uint256 votes_= getVotes(delegatee);
|
||||
@ -156,13 +175,14 @@ rule delegatee_receives_votes() {
|
||||
assert _votes == votes_ + delegator_bal, "delegatee did not receive votes";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rule previous_delegatee_zerod() {
|
||||
rule previous_delegatee_zeroed() {
|
||||
env e;
|
||||
address delegator; address delegatee; address third;
|
||||
|
||||
require delegator != delegatee;
|
||||
require third != delegatee;
|
||||
require third != delegator;
|
||||
require delegates(delegator) == third;
|
||||
// for third to have been delegated to, it must have a checkpoint
|
||||
|
||||
uint256 delegator_bal = balanceOf(e, delegator);
|
||||
uint256 votes_ = getVotes(third);
|
||||
@ -171,16 +191,14 @@ rule previous_delegatee_zerod() {
|
||||
|
||||
uint256 _votes = getVotes(third);
|
||||
|
||||
assert votes_ == votes_ - delegator_bal, "votes not removed from the previous delegatee";
|
||||
assert _votes == votes_ - delegator_bal, "votes not removed from the previous delegatee";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// passes
|
||||
// passes with rule sanity
|
||||
rule delegate_contained() {
|
||||
env e;
|
||||
address delegator; address delegatee; address other;
|
||||
|
||||
require delegator != delegatee;
|
||||
require other != delegator;
|
||||
require other != delegatee;
|
||||
require other != delegates(delegator);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user