openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/cryptography/ECDSA.sol

pragma solidity ^0.5.0;

/**
 * @dev Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) operations.
 *
 * These functions can be used to verify that a message was signed by the holder
 * of the private keys of a given address.
 */
library ECDSA {
    /**
     * @dev Returns the address that signed a hashed message (`hash`) with
     * `signature`. This address can then be used for verification purposes.
     *
     * The `ecrecover` EVM opcode allows for malleable (non-unique) signatures:
     * this function rejects them by requiring the `s` value to be in the lower
     * half order, and the `v` value to be either 27 or 28.
     *
     * (.note) This call _does not revert_ if the signature is invalid, or
     * if the signer is otherwise unable to be retrieved. In those scenarios,
     * the zero address is returned.
     *
     * (.warning) `hash` _must_ be the result of a hash operation for the
     * verification to be secure: it is possible to craft signatures that
     * recover to arbitrary addresses for non-hashed data. A safe way to ensure
     * this is by receiving a hash of the original message (which may otherwise)
     * be too long), and then calling `toEthSignedMessageHash` on it.
     */
    function recover(bytes32 hash, bytes memory signature) internal pure returns (address) {
        // Check the signature length
        if (signature.length != 65) {
            return (address(0));
        }

        // Divide the signature in r, s and v variables
        bytes32 r;
        bytes32 s;
        uint8 v;

        // ecrecover takes the signature parameters, and the only way to get them
        // currently is to use assembly.
        // solhint-disable-next-line no-inline-assembly
        assembly {
            r := mload(add(signature, 0x20))
            s := mload(add(signature, 0x40))
            v := byte(0, mload(add(signature, 0x60)))
        }

        // EIP-2 still allows signature malleability for ecrecover(). Remove this possibility and make the signature
        // unique. Appendix F in the Ethereum Yellow paper (https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf), defines
        // the valid range for s in (281): 0 < s < secp256k1n ÷ 2 + 1, and for v in (282): v ∈ {27, 28}. Most
        // signatures from current libraries generate a unique signature with an s-value in the lower half order.
        //
        // If your library generates malleable signatures, such as s-values in the upper range, calculate a new s-value
        // with 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141 - s1 and flip v from 27 to 28 or
        // vice versa. If your library also generates signatures with 0/1 for v instead 27/28, add 27 to v to accept
        // these malleable signatures as well.
        if (uint256(s) > 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF5D576E7357A4501DDFE92F46681B20A0) {
            return address(0);
        }

        if (v != 27 && v != 28) {
            return address(0);
        }

        // If the signature is valid (and not malleable), return the signer address
        return ecrecover(hash, v, r, s);
    }

    /**
     * @dev Returns an Ethereum Signed Message, created from a `hash`. This
     * replicates the behavior of the
     * [`eth_sign`](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/JSON-RPC#eth_sign)
     * JSON-RPC method.
     *
     * See `recover`.
     */
    function toEthSignedMessageHash(bytes32 hash) internal pure returns (bytes32) {
        // 32 is the length in bytes of hash,
        // enforced by the type signature above
        return keccak256(abi.encodePacked("\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n32", hash));
    }
}