Improve security of the onlyGovernance modifier (#3147)

* add a protection mechanism to prevent relaying transaction that are not
part of an execute operation

* more accurate relay authorization

* force reset the relay authorizations after executions

* refactor of the onlyGovernor modifier

* only whitelist when executor is not governor itself

* fix lint

* add private function for call permission management

* use deque

* fix lint

* remove unecessary dependency

* remove unecessary dependency

* comment rephrasing

* Update contracts/governance/Governor.sol

Co-authored-by: Francisco Giordano <frangio.1@gmail.com>

* cache keccak256(_msgData())

* use Context

* lint

* conditionnal clear

* add test to cover queue.clear()

* lint

* write more extended docs for onlyGovernance

* add changelog entry

Co-authored-by: Francisco Giordano <frangio.1@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Hadrien Croubois
2022-02-18 21:03:03 +01:00
committed by GitHub
parent eae2384178
commit af7ec04b78
4 changed files with 120 additions and 6 deletions

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
const { constants, expectEvent, expectRevert } = require('@openzeppelin/test-helpers');
const { constants, expectEvent, expectRevert, time } = require('@openzeppelin/test-helpers');
const { expect } = require('chai');
const Enums = require('../../helpers/enums');
@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ contract('GovernorTimelockControl', function (accounts) {
this.timelock = await Timelock.new(3600, [], []);
this.mock = await Governor.new(name, this.token.address, 4, 16, this.timelock.address, 0);
this.receiver = await CallReceiver.new();
// normal setup: governor is proposer, everyone is executor, timelock is its own admin
// normal setup: governor and admin are proposers, everyone is executor, timelock is its own admin
await this.timelock.grantRole(await this.timelock.PROPOSER_ROLE(), this.mock.address);
await this.timelock.grantRole(await this.timelock.PROPOSER_ROLE(), admin);
await this.timelock.grantRole(await this.timelock.EXECUTOR_ROLE(), constants.ZERO_ADDRESS);
@ -338,6 +338,32 @@ contract('GovernorTimelockControl', function (accounts) {
);
});
it('protected against other proposers', async function () {
await this.timelock.schedule(
this.mock.address,
web3.utils.toWei('0'),
this.mock.contract.methods.relay(...this.call).encodeABI(),
constants.ZERO_BYTES32,
constants.ZERO_BYTES32,
3600,
{ from: admin },
);
await time.increase(3600);
await expectRevert(
this.timelock.execute(
this.mock.address,
web3.utils.toWei('0'),
this.mock.contract.methods.relay(...this.call).encodeABI(),
constants.ZERO_BYTES32,
constants.ZERO_BYTES32,
{ from: admin },
),
'TimelockController: underlying transaction reverted',
);
});
describe('using workflow', function () {
beforeEach(async function () {
this.settings = {
@ -461,4 +487,33 @@ contract('GovernorTimelockControl', function (accounts) {
runGovernorWorkflow();
});
});
describe('clear queue of pending governor calls', function () {
beforeEach(async function () {
this.settings = {
proposal: [
[ this.mock.address ],
[ web3.utils.toWei('0') ],
[ this.mock.contract.methods.nonGovernanceFunction().encodeABI() ],
'<proposal description>',
],
voters: [
{ voter: voter, support: Enums.VoteType.For },
],
steps: {
queue: { delay: 3600 },
},
};
});
afterEach(async function () {
expectEvent(
this.receipts.execute,
'ProposalExecuted',
{ proposalId: this.id },
);
});
runGovernorWorkflow();
});
});