Update docs

certora/applyHarness.patch

@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ diff -ruN governance/Governor.sol governance/Governor.sol
 + 
      /**
       * @dev Restrict access to governor executing address. Some module might override the _executor function to make
-      * sure this modifier is consistant with the execution model.
+      * sure this modifier is consistent with the execution model.
 @@ -167,12 +167,12 @@
      /**
       * @dev Amount of votes already cast passes the threshold limit.

certora/specs/GovernorBase.spec

@@ -173,11 +173,11 @@ rule executionOnlyIfQuoromReachedAndVoteSucceeded(uint256 pId, env e, method f){
 /*
  * A user cannot vote twice
  */
- // Checked for castVote only. all 3 castVote functions call _castVote, so the completness of the verification is counted on
- // the fact that the 3 functions themselves makes no chages, but rather call an internal function to execute.
+ // Checked for castVote only. all 3 castVote functions call _castVote, so the completeness of the verification is counted on
+ // the fact that the 3 functions themselves makes no changes, but rather call an internal function to execute.
  // That means that we do not check those 3 functions directly, however for castVote & castVoteWithReason it is quite trivial
  // to understand why this is ok. For castVoteBySig we basically assume that the signature referendum is correct without checking it.
- // We could check each function seperately and pass the rule, but that would have uglyfied the code with no concrete 
+ // We could check each function separately and pass the rule, but that would have uglyfied the code with no concrete 
  // benefit, as it is evident that nothing is happening in the first 2 functions (calling a view function), and we do not desire to check the signature verification.
 rule doubleVoting(uint256 pId, uint8 sup, method f) {
     env e;

certora/specs/GovernorCountingSimple.spec

@@ -128,11 +128,11 @@ invariant OneIsNotMoreThanAll(uint256 pId)
 /*
  * Only sender's voting status can be changed by execution of any cast vote function
  */
-// Checked for castVote only. all 3 castVote functions call _castVote, so the completness of the verification is counted on
- // the fact that the 3 functions themselves makes no chages, but rather call an internal function to execute.
+// Checked for castVote only. all 3 castVote functions call _castVote, so the completeness of the verification is counted on
+ // the fact that the 3 functions themselves makes no changes, but rather call an internal function to execute.
  // That means that we do not check those 3 functions directly, however for castVote & castVoteWithReason it is quite trivial
  // to understand why this is ok. For castVoteBySig we basically assume that the signature referendum is correct without checking it.
- // We could check each function seperately and pass the rule, but that would have uglyfied the code with no concrete 
+ // We could check each function separately and pass the rule, but that would have uglyfied the code with no concrete 
  // benefit, as it is evident that nothing is happening in the first 2 functions (calling a view function), and we do not desire to check the signature verification.
 rule noVoteForSomeoneElse(uint256 pId, uint8 sup, method f) {
     env e; calldataarg args;
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ rule privilegedOnlyNumerator(method f, uint256 newQuorumNumerator){
     uint256 quorumNumAfter = quorumNumerator(e);
     address executorCheck = getExecutor(e);
 
-    assert quorumNumBefore != quorumNumAfter => e.msg.sender == executorCheck, "non priveleged user changed quorum numerator";
+    assert quorumNumBefore != quorumNumAfter => e.msg.sender == executorCheck, "non privileged user changed quorum numerator";
 }
 
 rule privilegedOnlyTimelock(method f, uint256 newQuorumNumerator){
@@ -217,5 +217,5 @@ rule privilegedOnlyTimelock(method f, uint256 newQuorumNumerator){
 
     uint256 timelockAfter = timelock(e);
 
-    assert timelockBefore != timelockAfter => e.msg.sender == timelockBefore, "non priveleged user changed timelock";
+    assert timelockBefore != timelockAfter => e.msg.sender == timelockBefore, "non privileged user changed timelock";
 }